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Due to the opioid use epidemic and an overwhelmed public child
protection system, minor guardianship is an increasingly important tool for
relative caregivers seeking to obtain legal authority regarding the children
who come into their care because of a parent’s crisis. Yet minor
guardianship originated in colonial law for an entirely different purpose: to
protect legal orphans who had inherited property. Today’s guardianship
laws are still based on this “orphan model” which does not fit today’s
reality. This Article is the first to analyze how these outdated guardianship
laws are being used as a form of “private child protection” and to propose
changes aimed serve the needs and interests of families in crisis.
Despite its central role in helping families address the care of children
today, the use of minor guardianship for child protection has received
remarkably little scholarly examination. This Article aims to fill that gap in
three ways. First, it traces the transformation of minor guardianship from a
probate tool used to protect orphans’ property interests to its contemporary
use as a way to keep children out of foster care and instead address their
care within the family. Second, the Article analyzes the implications for
children, parents, and relative caregivers of guardianship’s use for private
child protection. While families avoid the loss of control and other common
problems that accompany involvement in the public child welfare system,
family members cannot take advantage of the services and supports that the
system can provide. Third, I outline the specific measures that states can and
should enact to unlink minor guardianship laws from the “orphan model”
and rework them to serve the interests of families in crisis and to reflect the
broader policy goals of child protection, including preserving kinship ties.
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Keeping it in the Family: Minor Guardianship as
Private Child Protection
DEIRDRE M. SMITH†
I. INTRODUCTION
Today’s opioid use epidemic is the foremost challenge to child welfare
institutions in a generation, and it is poised to be the largest in U.S. history.
Thousands of parents are struggling with substance use, a problem that is
exceptionally difficult to address and for which inadequate resources are
available.1 To an observer with little understanding of substance use
disorders, a parent may appear to prioritize getting a fix over caring for their
child, and some parents have been demonized in the media for incidents such
as accidentally overdosing in the presence of their children.2 A parent’s
opioid use can lead to repeated or extended involvement in the criminal
justice system, to homelessness and acute poverty, to disappearance, and
†
Professor of Law and Director of the Cumberland Legal Aid Clinic, University of Maine School
of Law. Many people contributed to this Article’s development. I received excellent research assistance
from Garbrecht Law Library Reference Librarian Maureen Quinlan. I owe many thanks to Barbara
Herrnstein Smith and Jennifer Wriggins for reviewing earlier drafts of this Article and for providing
valuable comments and feedback. The collective wisdom I received from others directly shaped the
analysis and proposals in this Article. This includes comments and suggestions of those who attended
presentations of the research in this Article, including University of Maine School of Law Faculty
Workshop and the 2018 Annual Meeting of the Law and Society Association in Toronto, Ontario. I
appreciated the opportunity to work with Professors David English and Nina Kohn and the other
members of the Uniform Law Commission Drafting Committee for the Uniform Guardianship,
Conservatorship, and Other Protective Proceedings Act, which whom I discussed many of the ideas and
recommendations herein. The Maine Family Law Advisory Commission and the many judges, litigants,
practitioners, and guardians ad litem who participated in FLAC’s review of and proposed revisions to
Maine’s minor guardianship laws were of enormous assistance in helping me understand the complexity
of guardianship matters arising for families in crisis today and the specific ways that these laws need to
better serve those families. Finally, this Article arose directly from the minor guardianship matters I had
the privilege of supervising in the Cumberland Legal Aid Clinic, and I owe a debt of gratitude to the
Clinic faculty and student attorneys with whom I’ve worked, and, most significantly, to the clients who
granted us the privilege of assisting them during difficult chapters in their lives.
1
Margaret Talbot, The Addicts Next Door, THE NEW YORKER (June. 5, 2017),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/06/05/the-addicts-next-door; Evan Allen, Opioids’ hold on
parents takes toll on kids, BOSTON GLOBE (Dec. 1, 2016) https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2016/
12/01/vermont-mother-and-father-face-charges-after-taking-heroin-passing-out-with-toddlers-theircar/L7IoiA8T6gXfc046lhJoeJ/story.html; Brittany Greeson, Children of the Opioid Epidemic Are
Flooding Foster Homes. America Is Turning a Blind Eye, MOTHER JONES (July/Aug 2017),
https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2017/07/children-ohio-opioid-epidemic/; Sherry Lachman, The
Opioid Plague’s Youngest Victims: Children in Foster Care, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 28, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/28/opinion/opioid-crisis-children-foster-care.html;
Maria
Villenueve, More Maine children are being taken away because of parents’ drug use, ASSOC. PRESS
(Feb. 17, 2017), https://www.pressherald.com/2017/02/17/parents-drug-abuse-blamed-as-more-mainechildren-removed-from-homes/.
2
Evan Allen, They Passed Out From Heroin With Kids in the Car. But There Was More, BOSTON
GLOBE (Dec. 18, 2017), https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2016/12/17/heroin-worst-thing-world/
56dS0LH9sfPyqmcgdyK34I/story.html.
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even to death. It can also have an immediate impact on the health of children,
particularly those born drug-affected.3 In terms of their volume and
complexity, child welfare cases involving substance use place enormous
pressure on the agencies and courts that address children’s issues, mostly
due to their volume and complexity.
Another institution directly affected by parents’ opioid use is the family.
The children of these parents, as chronicled in several media reports in recent
years, are increasingly being raised and cared for by non-parent relatives.4
Relatives stepping into the caregiving breach is, of course, nothing new. As
has been true in the past across generations and cultures, many children in
the U.S. are raised by one or more non-parent relatives5 for some period,
including when a parent is facing a crisis of some kind, such as illness,
incarceration, homelessness, or a substance use disorder.6 But the numbers
are on the rise. As of 2011, more than 3 million children—or 4% of all
children—living in the United States were being raised in a home headed by
a non-parent relative, most commonly a grandparent,7 in which the child’s
parent did not reside.8 With the expansion of the opioid crisis during the past
few years, we can assume that today an even larger number of children are
cared for primarily by non-parent relatives.
Most intrafamilial caregiving arrangements are short-term, informal

3
Jennifer Egan, Children of the Opioid Epidemic, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (May 9, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/09/magazine/children-of-the-opioid-epidemic.html.
4
Alejandra Cancino, Grandparents Take a Bigger Role in Raising Grandchildren, ASSOC. PRESS
(Feb. 17, 2016), https://www.pressherald.com/2016/02/17/grandparents-take-a-bigger-parental-role-inraising-grandchildren/; Katharine Q. Seelye, Children of Heroin Crisis Find Refuge in Grandparents’
Arms, N.Y. TIMES (May 21, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/05/05/us/grandparentsheroin-impact-kids.html.
5
This may include, as is the case in many families, what is referred to by anthropologists and
sociologists as “fictive kin.” These are adults who have a close relationship with a child’s family but does
not have a direct family connection, such as through blood, marriage, or adoption. Margaret K. Nelson,
Fictive Kin, Families We Choose, and Voluntary Kin: What Does the Discourse Tell Us? 5 J. FAM.
THEORY & REV. 259, 259 (2013).
6
James P. Gleeson et al., Becoming Involved in Raising a Relative's Child: Reasons, Caregiver
Motivations and Pathways to Informal Kinship Care, 14 CHILD & FAM. SOC. WORK 300, 304–06. (2009);
Erin Duques, Note: Support for Relative Caregivers: A Look at the Financial Disincentives to Pursuing
Guardianship Through the Probate Courts, 19 QUINNIPIAC PROBATE L.J. 87, 89 (2005) (citing ADMIN.
ON AGING, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, GRANDPARENTS AND OTHER RELATIVES RAISING CHILDREN (2003)).
7
Catherine Chase Goodman et al., Grandmothers and Kinship Caregivers: Private Arrangements
Compared to Public Welfare Oversight, 26 CHILD. & YOUTH SERVS. REV. 287, 288 (2004). Research
findings indicate that more children are being raised by grandparents today than at any time in recent
history. Jill Duerr Berrick & Julia Hernandez, Developing Consistent and Transparent Kinship Care
Policy and Practice: State Mandated, Mediated, and Independent Care, 68 CHILD. & YOUTH SERVS.
REV. 24, 24 (2016).
8
PEW RESEARCH CTR., “AT GRANDMOTHER'S HOUSE WE STAY”: ONE-IN-TEN CHILDREN ARE
LIVING WITH A
GRANDPARENT (Sept.
3,
2013),
https://www.pewresearch.org/wpcontent/uploads/sites/3/ 2013/09/grandparents_report_final_2013.pdf. A total of 7.7 million children
lived in homes with non-parent relatives but the majority of these homes the parents were also present.
Id. at 1 (interpreting U.S. Census data). The practice is more prevalent in families of color—1 in 5
African-American children live with a relative during a period of their childhood, a trend that reflects
“longstanding cultural responses to hardships.” Berrick & Hernandez, supra note 7, at 24.
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arrangements and do not involve or require the legal system.9 Many,
however, do. A relative may be legally designated a “kinship placement” if
a public child welfare agency becomes involved. With or without formal
agency intervention, relatives who assume a caregiving role can seek court
appointment as the child’s legal “guardian.” Most relative caregivers do not
seek guardianship of the children in their care. This Article focuses on those
that do, and it examines the implications of that status as a form of child
protection.
Minor guardianship is a legal mechanism to appoint a non-parent
relative as a child’s substitute parent,10 commonly under state probate laws.
Such appointment ensures that the relative caregiver has legal authority to
perform actions generally reserved for parents, such as enrolling a child in
school or accessing health care for the child.11 When used to appoint a
guardian for a child whose parent is unable to provide care but has intact
parental rights,12 minor guardianship effectively serves as a form of what I
refer to as “private child protection.” Specifically, it involves “child
protection” when the petitioner initiates court proceedings based on
allegations of a parent’s limited ability to provide care for a child or of a risk
of harm to the child. Minor guardianship is “private” because a state or local
child welfare agency—although it may have some limited role—does not
take custody of a child or otherwise initiate a public child protection
proceeding. Where a public child welfare agency does pursue court
intervention regarding a child, the case is commonly referred to as a
“dependency” proceeding.
Guardianship is a powerful mechanism that families can use in various
ways to various ends. It has both significant advantages and significant
disadvantages for families in crisis that use it. On the one hand, it can stave
off public agency involvement in the family, including the placement of the
child in foster care. It can also prevent a parent from reassuming custody of
the child on demand alone, as can occur under informal arrangements. By
the same token, however, the proceedings implicate questions of both child
welfare and parental rights. The guardianship effectively suspends a parent’s
rights and, where a court’s appointment of a guardian is done over a parent’s
objection, it infringes on the parent’s fundamental liberty interest in
9
Goodman et al., supra note 7, at 288; James P. Gleeson & Claire M. Seryak, “I Made Some
Mistakes...But I Love them Dearly”: The Views of Parents of Children in Informal Kinship Care, 15
CHILD & FAM. SOC. WORK 87, 87 (2009).
10
Guardianship laws do not generally require that a petitioner be related to the child, but that has
long been the regular practice. See infra notes 73, 85, and 90 and accompanying text.
11
ANN M. HARALAMBIE, HANDLING CHILD CUSTODY, ABUSE AND ADOPTION CASES, Rights and
Duties of the Guardian, § 11:3 (2017).
12
Throughout this Article I use the term “parent” to include any person who is or could be
adjudicated as a child’s parent under a state’s law. In most states, such role is not necessarily determined
by a genetic connection but can also include presumed, acknowledged, de facto, adoptive, and other
forms of parentage. See Courtney G. Joslin, Nurturing Parenthood through the UPA (2017), 127 YALE
L.J. FORUM 589 (2018).
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parenting their children.13 Also, because guardianship is understood to be
“private” and therefore outside of the public child welfare system, once a
guardianship appointment is made, and even if the agency is aware of
concerns about possible neglect, a public child welfare agency will provide
little, if any, assistance to the family. This means the parent and child do not
have access to formally supervised paths to reunification or to the critical
public services and supports such families often need to help them reach it.
Two distinct legal mechanisms, “public” dependency and “private”
guardianship—now typically used in quite similar contexts and based on
quite similar concerns—can lead to vastly different results for the family in
both the short and long term. The disparities reflect the wholly different
historical origins of minor guardianship from laws governing dependency
proceedings. Guardianship of children closely resembles adult
guardianships: a legal mechanism, based in probate laws and courts, to
appoint a fiduciary to oversee the property and person of an individual
regarded as incapacitated by disability. The concept of guardianship has its
origins in colonial law, created at a time when the children for whom courts
appointed guardians were predominantly legal orphans, “incapacitated” by
their youth, who had inherited property.14
Today, guardianships are rarely needed to ensure appropriate
management of a child’s property. Instead, they are most commonly
employed to address a child’s need for care of their “person” when a living
parent is in a crisis that limits their ability—at least temporarily—to provide
such care.15 While there are benefits to addressing the crisis within the
family structure with minimal interference or involvement from the state,
minor guardianship laws fail to equip courts with the authority and guidance
necessary to effectively address the interests of children, their parents, and
their relative caregivers under the sorts of conditions that actually prevail
today.
The use of minor guardianship for child protection has received little
scholarly examination.16 There is no recent empirical research on families
who seek guardianship17 and, in the legal and social science literature, only
13
See, e.g., Tourison v. Pepper, 51 A.3d 470, 473 (Del. 2012); In re Guardianship of Jewel M., 2
A.3d 301 (Me. 2010); In re SRB-M, 201 P.3d 1115, 1119–20 (Wyo. 2009).
14
See infra notes 36, 62 and accompanying text.
15
CLARE HUNTINGTON, FAILURE TO FLOURISH: HOW THE LAW UNDERMINES FAMILIES 44–52
(2014) (describing the many “specific challenges facing American families…that make it harder for
parents to provide children . . . with strong, stable, positive relationships . . .”).
16
Other scholars have noted the acute dearth of scholarly attention to minor guardianship. Legal
historian Lawrence Friedman has referred to minor guardianship as being “among the least-noticed, leastdiscussed institutions of the working legal system.” Lawrence M. Friedman, et al., Guardians: A
Research Note, 40 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 146, 146 (1996). Two social work researchers observed recently:
“There is no literature of which these authors are aware relating to the characteristics of children or
caregivers in legal guardianship. In our review, we were unable to locate a single published or
unpublished scholarly paper addressing this issue.” Berrick & Hernandez, supra note 7, at 29.
17
Berrick & Hernandez, supra note 7, at 31. See also Gleeson & Seryak, supra note 9, at 87–89
(noting the dearth of research findings about families using informal kinship care).

2019]

KEEPING IT IN THE FAMILY

275

limited discussion of the mechanism as child protection.18 One reason for
this research gap is that minor guardianship has an ambiguous place in the
law. While the statutes are still generally located in probate codes and the
cases often proceed in probate courts,19 there is little use of minor
guardianship in its traditional probate context—that is, in relation to death,
estates, and inheritance.20 Scholars who write about “guardianship” usually
address only adult guardianship.21 At the same time, because the cases often
proceed outside of family, juvenile, or dependency courts and proceedings,
they are not often regarded as a form of “family law” either.22
This Article aims to fill the gap in the scholarly literature about the role
of minor guardianship today. I base my observations, discussion, and
recommendations for reform on a range of sources. These include articles,
commentary, and treatises by those in law and social work fields; statutes,
reports, and court opinions from amith cross jurisdictions, especially in the
appointment and termination realms that shed light on the context for
guardianship appointments; and media reports about relative caregivers. I
supplement these sources with direct experience and specifically applied
research. The law school clinical program in which I am a faculty supervisor
has litigated several cases involving minor guardianship in which we
represented petitioners or parents, and I regularly consult with local
practitioners on other guardianship matters. I also served as a consultant to
18
See, e.g., Mark F. Testa & Jennifer Miller, Evolution of Private Guardianship as a Child Welfare
Resource, in CHILD WELFARE FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: A HANDBOOK OF PRACTICES,
POLICIES, AND PROGRAMS (Gerald P. Mallon & Peg McCartt Hess eds., 2005); Tiffany Buban,
Protecting Children: Using Guardianships as an Alternative to Foster Care & Adoptions, 19 J. AM.
ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 389 (2005); Virginia G. Weisz & Suzanne McCormick, Abandon Probate Court
for Abandoned Children: Combining Probate Guardianship of the Person and Dependency into one
Stronger, Fairer Children's Court, 12 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 191 (2003); Joyce E.
McConnell, Securing the Care of Children in Diverse Families: Building on Trends in Guardianship
Reform, 10 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 29 (1998); Joyce McConnell, Standby Guardianships: Sharing the
Legal Responsibility for Children, 7 MD. J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 249 (1995/6); Ann E. Ross,
Stability in Child-Parent Relations: Modifying Guardianship Law, 33 STAN. L. REV. 905 (1981).
19
9 C.J.S. GUARDIAN & WARD § 20 (“The most usual method of selection of a guardian is by a
court having probate jurisdiction.”).
20
According to Black’s Law Dictionary, the term “probate” refers to “The judicial procedure by
which a testamentary document is established to be a valid will; the proving of a will to the satisfaction
of the court.” Probate, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). The word “probate” derives from
the Latin probate meaning “to try, test, approve, prove.” Probate, WEBSTER’S THIRD INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY (2002).
21
For example, a search in WestLaw’s “Journals and Law Reviews” database for articles with the
word “guardianship” in the title yields a list that is nearly entirely for articles discussing adult
guardianship. My experience as an observer of the ULC’s process for developing the Uniform
Guardianship, Conservatorship, and Other Protective Arrangements Act (UGCOPAA) bears this out. The
members and observers involved were drawn almost exclusively from the elder and disability law fields.
Similarly, Maine’s Probate and Trust Law Advisory Commission consists of judges and attorneys who
practice almost exclusively in the probate area, with little experience addressing child custody or parental
rights matters.
22
Although sometimes mentioned in conjunction with so-called “Third Party Custody” laws,
guardianship statutes, as I discuss herein, have a different origin and serve a distinct function from those
laws. See infra notes 458, 460 and accompanying text.
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the Maine Family Law Advisory Commission in its recent study and revision
of Maine’s minor guardianship law, and my research for that project
included extensive interviews with a range of stakeholders.23
In Part II of the Article, I describe how a probate tool designed to
manage the property of legal orphans came to be used as private child
protection.24 After discussing the origins of minor guardianship as a
mechanism to protect orphans’ property, I provide an overview of how most
of those laws are structured today.25 With a focus on the provisions
governing the appointment, powers, and termination of guardians, I describe
the common features of contemporary guardianship laws as reflected in the
nation’s uniform laws.26 This is followed by an examination of two historical
trends that likely led to minor guardianship being used today primarily to
give legal authority to relative caregivers when a parent is in crisis.27 One is
the increasing role taken by governmental agencies and courts in addressing
child welfare, a matter formerly left entirely to families. The second is the
increasing importance of legal categories of relationship between children
and their caregivers to secure certain benefits. Combined, these trends lead
relative caregivers to seek guardianships in order to avoid state intervention,
exercise parental authority, and secure their own custody of the child.
Part III examines in detail the implications of families using minor
guardianship rather than the public child welfare system to address concerns
about child welfare, thereby “keeping it in the family.”28 One set of
implications arises from having a family crisis not addressed through the
public child welfare system.29 As I discuss briefly, there are ideological and
cultural factors involved in different perceptions and assessments of the
desirability of private versus public agencies for child protection. A second
category of implications is that, in most jurisdictions today, families that
have a minor guardian must work within the state’s probate codes.30 As a
result, decisions involving minor guardianship continue to be tied to the
“orphan model” and adult guardianship rather than to the considerations
embodied in either family or juvenile codes. A set of inequities and lacunae
lead to quandaries for many courts and to difficult choices or the need for
costly tradeoffs for many families in crisis.
23
Report on file with author. See generally Deirdre M. Smith, From Orphans to Families in Crisis:
Parental Rights Matters in Maine Probate Courts, 68 ME. L. REV. 45 (2016) (discussing problems
associated with the adjudication of minor guardianship and adoption proceedings in Maine probate
courts). I also served as an observer-participant on the Drafting Committee for the development of the
UGCOPAA, which was approved by the Uniform Laws Commission in July 2017.
24
See infra notes 32-243 and accompanying text.
25
See infra notes 36-120 and accompanying text.
26
See infra notes 63-120 and accompanying text.
27
See infra notes 121-243 and accompanying text.
28
See infra notes 244-416 and accompanying text.
29
See infra notes 245-331 and accompanying text.
30
See infra notes 332-416 and accompanying text.
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Part IV proposes a set of reforms that would address these and related
problems.31 My presumption here is that any form of child protection,
whether public or private, should seek to preserve kinship ties, particularly
the parent-child relationship, while ensuring children’s safety and stability.
As this Article demonstrates, public and private approaches to child
protection remain on distinct tracks, with potentially vastly different
implications both for kinship ties and for children’s needs and welfare.
Minor guardianship laws and procedures should be reformed to minimize
the resulting inequities. Specifically, guardianship should be unlinked from
its historical placement in the probate realm, and guardianship laws and
procedures should be reworked to enable courts to address the needs of
families in crisis while also recognizing the rights of parents and facilitating
reunification between parents and children. As now adapted for child
protection uses, minor guardianship can borrow some key elements from
public child protection to fit contemporary conditions and functions.
Correspondingly, the public system for child protection should address the
problems that lead so many families, if they have the chance and resources
to do so, to seek a kinship-focused private alternative to address their
concerns for children's safety and stability.
II. THE ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF A PROBATE TOOL FOR CHILD
PROTECTION
Minor guardianship, this Article’s focus, refers to a legal relationship
created by a court by which a non-parent is assigned some or all powers and
duties of a parent for the management of a child’s property and “person”
(generally meaning their care and education) when a parent is unable to do
so.32 This Part traces the historical development of minor guardianship from
its origins in a mechanism for protecting the property of legal orphans to its
present use primarily as a tool for to obtain custody and decision-making
authority regarding a child whose parent has limited ability to exercise their
parental rights and responsibilities due to a crisis. Guardianship of minors in
the United States developed in the colonial era as a mechanism to appoint a
person to manage a minor’s property, usually when a minor inherited from
a parent.33 Jurisdiction for appointing and overseeing guardians for both
minors and adults has traditionally been assigned to state probate courts,
which were created to oversee the administration of decedents’ estates and

31

See infra notes 418-463 and accompanying text.
See Guardian, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“Someone who has the legal
authority and duty to care for another's person or property, esp. because of the other's infancy, incapacity,
or disability.”). Some states’ laws permit parental appointment of a guardian without the necessity of a
court order. The focus of this Article is on scenarios in which a relative caregiver seeks a court
appointment as guardian.
33
See infra notes 36-41 and accompanying text.
32
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disposition of their property, as was then the law and practice.34 The contexts
in which guardianships are sought have changed substantially in recent
decades; the laws and courts, however, have not.
A. Guardianship’s Colonial Origins and Early Uses: Protecting the
Property of Legal Orphans
While the rearing of children is primarily the function of a child’s
parents, other members of the child’s family, including siblings,
grandparents, aunts, and other close relatives often participate in providing
care. 35 When a child’s parents are unable to serve in the primary caregiving
role—whether temporarily or permanently—the child’s relatives have
traditionally served as the first responders to assume that role, providing
what is sometimes referred to as “kinship care.” Such care has been what
one commentator calls “a safety net for children’s needs across cultures and
for centuries.”36 In most instances, there is no need for a court to become
involved to allow the relative to take the child into their home and provide
care. 37
At the time of this country’s founding, there was one important
exception to a family’s ability to address a child’s needs independent of
court or other government involvement: when the child owned property. In
such instances, because a minor could not directly control their property due
to their youth, a court had to appoint a fiduciary, a “guardian,” to provide
such management. Indeed, even parents, as “natural guardians,” could not
oversee their children’s property without court supervision.38 Minors most
commonly owned property because they had inherited it from their deceased
fathers, so the children most in need of an appointed guardian were also legal
orphans.39 (A fatherless child was considered an orphan because their
34

Friedman et al., supra note 16, at 150; See 9 C.J.S. GUARDIAN & WARD, supra note 19, at § 20.
Melissa Murray, The Networked Family: Reframing the Legal Understanding of Caregiving and
Caregivers, 94 VA. L. REV. 385, 391–94 (2008).
36
Goodman et al., supra note 7, at 287; Linda Pollack, Childhood, Parents and the Family 15001900, in THE ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF GLOBAL CHILD WELFARE 9 (Pat Dolan & Nick Frost eds.,
2017) (noting that access to “networks of relatives” enhances “children’s feelings of inclusion, sense of
security and place.”).
37
James P. Gleeson, Kinship Care for Children: International Perspectives, in THE ROUTLEDGE
HANDBOOK OF GLOBAL CHILD WELFARE 246 (Pat Dolan & Nick Frost eds., 2017); see also Murray,
supra note 35, at 393-94.
38
JOHN GABRIEL WOERNER, A TREATISE ON THE AMERICAN LAW OF GUARDIANSHIP OF MINORS
AND PERSONS OF UNSOUND MIND 40, 55 (1897). A father was entitled to the child’s services and
earnings, however. Friedman et al., supra note 16, at 147 (noting that parents did not have automatic
authority to possess of control their children’s property).
39
Friedman et al., supra note 16, at 147–57. Before reforms improved women’s status and property
rights, a father could, through testamentary appointment, name a male guardian to oversee a surviving
child’s property, even if the father was survived by the child’s mother. MARY ANN MASON, FROM
FATHER’S PROPERTY TO CHILDREN’S RIGHTS: THE HISTORY OF CHILD CUSTODY IN THE UNITED STATES
19, 54–66 (1994); See also CATHERINE WAUGH MCCULLOUGH, GUARDIANSHIP OF CHILDREN (1912)
(describing the ways that discriminatory guardianship laws had disadvantaged mothers and the reforms
35
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mother had limited standing and rights.) In any case, such appointment
enabled the minor to enjoy the benefit of their property despite their legal
disability.40 Minor guardianship was, in many respects, one of the first forms
of court supervision of a child’s interests. Because courts usually appointed
a relative to serve in this role,41 the child’s needs were still being addressed
within the family.
Minor guardianship originated in English law. Under the first statutes in
U.S. law, a “guardian” was any person who had a “right and duty” to protect
(literally “guard”) the person or property of another, who was referred to as
the guardian’s “ward.”42 The legal term “guardian” was most commonly
associated with a person appointed by a court to serve as a “substitute
parent”43 by exercising what has been described as “‘custody and control of
the person or estate, or both of an infant, whose youth, inexperience, and
mental weakness disqualify him for acting for himself in the ordinary affairs
of life.’”44 The primary duties of these early guardians were largely
consistent with what the Uniform Law Commission (ULC) today refers to
as a “conservator”: to oversee the property inherited by the minor children
of a decedent.45
The varied and shifting meanings of a number of these terms are
themselves significant. The term “guardian” has several uses in the law with
respect to children and can refer to different roles including that of parents
as a child’s “natural” guardians.46 Most state laws at least implicitly
distinguish between “custody” and “guardianship” in that a custodian
provides for a child’s day-to-day care, whereas a guardian also has powers
to make certain decisions for the child, including medical treatment, military
enlistment, and other important events.47
in several states to provide mothers the ability to serve as the sole guardians of their children after a
father’s death).
40
WOERNER, supra note 38, at 1–2.
41
Friedman et al., supra note 16, at 156–57; WOERNER, supra note 38, at 98.
42
WOERNER, supra note 38, at 39; See Ward, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
43
HASSELTINE BYRD TAYLOR, LAW OF GUARDIAN AND WARD 3 (1935).
44
Id. (quoting JAMES SCHOULER, DOMESTIC RELATIONS § 283 (1921)); See also Friedman et al.,
supra note 16, at 146.
45
See UNIFORM GUARDIANSHIP, CONSERVATORSHIP, & OTHER PROT. ARRANGEMENTS ACT §§
102(5), 401–32. Such appointments were referred to as “curators” at the turn of the 20th century.
WOERNER, supra note 38, at 76; Friedman et al., supra note 16, at 146.
46
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 822–23 (10th ed. 2014) (describing the many different legal
meanings of the term “guardian”). Mark Hardin, Legal Placement Options to Achieve Permanence for
Children in Foster Care, in FOSTER CHILDREN IN THE COURTS 128, 154–56 (Mark Hardin ed., 1983).
Under the common law, parents are the “natural guardians” of their children. MASON, supra note 39, at
18; TAYLOR, supra note 43, at 31; WOERNER, supra note 38, at 53–55.
47
Hardin, supra note 46, at 154–155; TAYLOR, supra note 43, at 165. The form of guardianship
that is the focus of this Article is distinct from a more recent form of minor guardianship, sometimes
referred to as a “kinship” or “permanency” guardianship, a disposition available only through
dependency cases under the law in several states but is not in widespread use. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., CHILDREN’S BUREAU, KINSHIP GUARDIANSHIP AS A PERMANENCY OPTION (2018),
https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/kinshipguardianship.pdf. These guardianships resemble the
traditional probate guardianship in that the appointments establish a long-term legal relationship between
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Because minor guardianships commonly arose in the context of death
and involved the management of a minor’s “estate,” such appointments were
generally under the exclusive jurisdiction of probate courts, known in some
states as “orphan’s” courts.48 As explained in a late 19th century treatise on
guardianship, the rationale for appointment of a guardian for a minor was to
ensure that the minor was able to enjoy, control, and dispose of their
property, which is an “inalienable right of all human beings.”49 Since,
however, a child is presumably of “unsound mind”—like “idiots,”
“imbeciles,” and other categories of adults for whom guardians could be
appointed—the minor needed the assistance of someone who could supply
the necessary “quality of mind” from “without” and who was charged with
acting as the child would if they had the capacity to do so.50 Phrased in more
relevant practical terms, the fact that a child could not be bound in contract
(for example, for the lease or sale of property) limited the potential economic
benefits of the estate to the family and to any potential buyer, thus essentially
removing the property from the economic life of the community until the
child reached majority.51 The treatise’s near-exclusive focus on the
requirements for conducting and accounting for transactions of the minor’s
property (described in over two hundred pages) reflects a general
understanding, at least at that time, of the core function of minor
guardianship appointments.52
A clear distinction between a ward’s “property” and “person” prevailed
from the early period of American probate law through to the latter half of
the 20th century. If the guardian’s duties were limited to overseeing a minor
ward’s property, as was commonly the case, any living parent retained most
of their parental rights regarding the day-to-day care and control of the
child.53 Many guardianship statutes provided that, even if another person
a child and their primary caregiver. But the appointments occur in the context of a child protection matter
where termination of parental rights and adoption are not the best option, such as for an older child, and
entitle the caregiver to subsidies made available through federal law. Hardin, supra note 46, at 155–57.
As will be discussed herein, these guardianships can serve as models for guardianships that arise in
private proceedings. See infra notes 213-218, 298-299, 422-427 and accompanying text.
48
Friedman et al., supra note 16, at 150; C.J.S. GUARDIAN & WARD, supra note 19, at § 20. For
example, Pennsylvania and Maryland use term “Orphans Court.” 20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 711 (2018); MD.
CODE ANN. EST. & TRUSTS § 2-102 (2018).
49
WOERNER, supra note 38, at 1–2. See also Friedman et al., supra note 16, at 146 (noting that
guardianship was a necessary feature of any system of private property).
50
WOERNER, supra note 38, at 1–2.
51
Id. at 7–9.
52
Id. at 172–374; Friedman et al., supra note 16, at 163 (noting that “property was at the heart” of
most guardianship petitions in 1900). This was also confirmed through the case law of that time, which
dealt largely with property management disputes. Id.
53
Guardianship of children with living parents became less common once laws provided widows
the right to oversee their minor children’s property. The history and evolution of women’s ability to
control their and their children’s property on the death of a husband is beyond the scope of this Article,
but it does bear on the development of minor guardianship law, particularly with respect to testamentary
guardianships when a parent names a guardian in his will. See MASON, supra note 39, at 18–21, 50–54,
65–67; TAYLOR, supra note 43, at 25.
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were appointed to oversee a minor’s property, the care of the “person” of the
child and their education would be left to the minor’s father if he was alive
and competent and, if not, to the mother so long as she was unmarried and
competent.54
Thus it was rare, until quite recently, for a U.S. court to appoint a
guardian solely for care of the minor’s “person” and for provision of their
education.55 While guardianship laws granted probate courts the authority to
assign care and custody rights to the guardian “if [the judge] deems it for the
welfare of the minor,”56 Maine courts, for example, specified that such
authority was to be used only “in exceptional cases.”57 As a social work
scholar noted in 1935: “The probate court has been traditionally interested
in property, not child welfare.”58
The historically limited use of minor guardianship to care for the
“person” and education of the child is not surprising. It was not until the
Progressive Era that, as described in section II.C, below, the practice of
government—including court—intervention in a family on the basis of
parental abuse, neglect, or abandonment began.59 Early dependency
proceedings took place in juvenile courts, not probate courts.60 Children
from poor families who were orphaned or determined to be neglected or
54
WOERNER, supra note 38, at 18–20. See also THOMAS A. JACOBS, CHILDREN AND THE LAW:
RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS § 7.5 (2018); Richard T. Davis, Jr., Comment, Problems of Guardianship
Administration in Texas, 47 TEX. L. REV. 1124, 1126 (1969). For example, Maine’s guardianship statute
was revised in 1895 to apply the same standard to both fathers and mothers; it provided that fathers and
mothers jointly retained the rights to care and education if they were alive and competent and to the
surviving parent if one had died. ME. P.L. 1895, ch. 43, § 1 (codified in R.S. ch. 69, § 3 (1903)). As the
Maine Supreme Judicial Court noted in a 1924 opinion: “To the natural guardians the law commits the
child’s care and custody, even if he has a guardian appointed by the probate court. The probate guardian
as such (and other than in exceptional cases) has to do only with the ward’s property.” Shaw v. Small,
125 A. 496, 498 (Me. 1924); JACOBS, supra at § 7:3 (“When there is no estate property, a probate court
may not have any jurisdiction.”).
55
See MASON, supra note 39, at 66 (noting the development of two forms of guardianship in
nineteenth century); TAYLOR, supra note 43, at 26, 110, 168 (noting that, from the colonial period
through to the publication of that study in 1935, courts generally only appointed guardians for orphaned
minors with property). WOERNER, supra note 38, at 89–90 (discussing circumstance under which a
guardian can be appointed if father is alive, such as if parents are unfit, absent, or “absconded”); Friedman
et al., supra note 16, at 146, 157 (noting that only a small number of guardianship petitions filed in 1900
were to gain custody of a child who had been mistreated, neglected, or abandoned by parents); Davis,
Jr., supra note 54, at 1126.
56
ME. R.S. Ch. 69, § 3 (1903).
57
Shaw, 125 A. at 498.
58
TAYLOR, supra note 43, at 170. Orphans without “estates” were traditionally cared for by others
through informal arrangements within the child’s family; formal appointments as legal guardians were
unusual and occurred only when the petitioner had the funds to pursue such appointment. Id. at 157.
Matters concerning “guardianship of the person” were not usually the subject of petitions unless there
was a dispute between two people who wanted custody of the child, in part because of the significant
expense of bringing such petitions. Id. at 26, 168.
59
MASON, supra note 39, at 100–05; LEROY ASHBY, ENDANGERED CHILDREN: DEPENDENCY,
NEGLECT, AND ABUSE IN AMERICAN HISTORY 79–83 (1997); see TAYLOR, supra note 43, at 35 (“The
acknowledgement of child welfare as a state responsibility, although relatively new, now colors the
concept of natural rights of parents in their children . . . .”).
60
TAYLOR, supra note 43, at 167–70.

282

CONNECTICUT PUBLIC INTEREST LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 18.2

abandoned could become “wards of the court,” and, as such, were often
placed public or charity-based orphanages.61 In other words, during the
greater part of the long period of its establishment and use, minor
guardianship was used almost exclusively to address the needs of legal
orphans who had inherited money or property.62
B. Minor Guardianship Laws Today and the Persistence of the Orphan
Model
With a few exceptions, contemporary minor guardianship statutes
reflect their probate law origins and purpose and retain key features of the
“orphan model” from their earliest enactments.63 A comprehensive review
of all the components of and variations among state guardianship laws is
beyond the scope of this Article, but this section gives an overview of their
defining features. The section that follows details how, in practice, these
laws came to be adapted as a form of private child protection.
Minor guardianship law has always been strictly a matter of individual
state statute,64 usually located within a state’s probate code. Minor
guardianship is sometimes referred to as “probate guardianship” to
distinguish it from other uses of a “guardian.”65 While guardianship laws
vary from state to state,66 most include the same basic features. This
consistency reflects the development and adoption of uniform guardianship
laws.
The approval and adoption of uniform minor guardianship laws began
with the first Uniform Probate Code (UPC), which was approved by the
ULC in 1969 and includes provisions for both adult and minor
guardianships.67 The UPC has been revised several times since then, and

61
TAYLOR, supra note 43, at 167; ASHBY, supra note 59, at 23–30; WOERNER, supra note 38, at
76 (referring to appointment of a “public guardians” or a local sheriff as guardian, but these seem to be
rare); JACOBS, supra note 54, at § 7.12 (public guardians still exist under some state laws). From the
colonial period through the nineteenth century, a dependent child could also be “bound” or “put out” to
a master. ASHBY, supra note 59, at 10–11, 37–51. Any of these outcomes were possible even where the
child’s mother survived the father, if the mother had insufficient financial means or was found to be
“incompetent” to care for the child. MASON, supra note 39, at 20.
62
See, e.g., Friedman et al., supra note 16, at 147, 157 (noting that inheritance due to death of a
parent was the triggering event necessitating the appointment of a guardian for a minor in 62.9% of filings
in 1900 in Alameda County California). A 1969 article discussing minor guardianship in Texas outlined
the two situations in which a minor would need a guardian: their parents died, and someone needed to
take “custody and control” and the child had property of their own, usually inherited from a parent. Davis,
Jr., supra note 54, at 1125. See also RICHARD V. MACKAY, GUARDIANSHIP LAW: THE LAW OF
GUARDIAN AND WARD SIMPLIFIED 16-28 (1948).
63
Ann E. Ross, Stability in Child-Parent Relations: Modifying Guardianship Law, 33 STAN. L.
REV. 905, 909 (1981).
64
JACOBS, supra note 54, at § 7:1.
65
See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
66
Berrick & Hernandez, supra note 7, at 31.
67
UNIF. PROBATE CODE (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1969). The Uniform Law Commission (ULC) is also
known as the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.
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twenty states have adopted a version of the UPC.68 In 1982, the ULC issued
the guardianship provisions separately in the form of the Uniform
Guardianship and Protective Proceedings Act (UGPPA), which was
substantially revised in 1997.69 The UGPAA remained consistent with the
guardianship provisions in the UPC until 2017, with the ULC’s approval of
the Uniform Guardianship Conservatorship and Other Protective
Arrangements Act (UGCOPAA).70 Although not all states have adopted the
UPC, UGPAA, or UGCOPAA, the uniform laws’ provisions both reflect
and influence national trends in probate-based minor guardianships.71 For
this reason, my review of current laws will focus primarily on the ULC’s
acts.
In general, the ULC’s acts retain largely parallel provisions for adult and
minor guardianships, particularly with respect to the general powers and
duties of the guardian.72 A minor guardianship proceeding begins with a
petition for appointment of a guardian for a child. The laws are often phrased
broadly in terms of who can bring the petition, including a parent or the
minor, but it is most commonly brought by the individual seeking such
appointment. Although most laws do not expressly require physical custody
as a standing requirement, the petitioner is likely already providing care for

68

David M. English, Amending the Uniform Guardianship and Protective Proceedings Act to
Implement the Standards and Recommendations of the Third National Guardianship Summit, 12 NATL.
ACAD. ELDER L. ATT. J. 33, 34 (2016); UNIF. LAW COMM’N, OVERVIEW OF UPC,
http://www.uniformlaws.org/ActSummary.aspx?title=Probate%20Code;
UNIF. LAW
COMM’N,
UNIFORM PROBATE CODE LEGISLATIVE FACT SHEET, http://www.uniformlaws.org/LegislativeFact
Sheet.aspx?title=Probate%20Code.
69
English, supra note 68, at 34. The UGPPA has been adopted (either entirely or in “substantially
similar” form to the uniform act) in approximately 19 states, mostly those adopted the UPC. UNIF. LAW
COMM’N, UNIFORM PROBATE CODE ENACTMENT CHART, http://www.uniformlaws.org/
Shared/Docs/Probate%20Code/UPC%20Chart.pdf; UNIF. LAW COMM’N, A CT SUMMARY FOR UGPAA,
http://www.uniformlaws.org/ActSummary.aspx?title=Probate%20Code.
70
The UGCOPAA has been adopted in Maine and is under consideration in other states. UNIF.
GUARDIANSHIP CONSERVATORSHIP & OTHER PROT. ARRANGEMENTS ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017).
71
The UPC has had somewhat greater influence than the extent of official adoptions would suggest.
Roger W. Andersen, The Influence of the Uniform Probate Code in Nonadopting States, 8 UNIV. PUGET
SOUND L. REV. 599, 624 (1985) (“The breadth of its scope, the quality of its drafting, and the reputations
of its framers have given the Uniform Probate Code significant influence over the development of the
law in non-UPC states. It has served as the model for numerous provisions on a wide variety of topics.
Courts have used it both as a respected secondary authority and as an aid to statutory construction.”);
English, supra note 68, at 34 (“[E]ven if uniform laws are not enacted by states in their entirety, states
often borrow from them when revising or enacting particular provisions.”).
72
UNIF. LAW COMM’N, ACT SUMMARY OF UPC, http://www.uniformlaws.org/
ActSummary.aspx?title=Probate%20Code. The UPC provisions addressing the duties of guardians are
nearly identical. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 5-207 (duties of guardians of minors); UNIF. PROBATE CODE §
5-314 (duties of guardians of adults). JACOBS, supra note 54, at §§ 7:26–7:30 (discussing state laws
regarding guardian’s role as conservator of ward’s property). The UGCOPAA reflects a slight shift away
from parallel language by addressing, for example, the rights retained by parents. See, e.g., UNIF.
GUARDIANSHIP CONSERVATORSHIP & OTHER PROT. ARRANGEMENTS ACT § 206 (“The court, as part of
an order appointing a guardian for a minor, shall state rights retained by any parent of the minor, which
may include contact or visitation with the minor, decision making regarding the minor’s health care,
education, or other matter, or access to a record regarding the minor.”).
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the child in their home.73
The statutes specifying the conditions under which a petitioner may be
appointed a minor's guardian are, of course, crucial. If a minor has one or
more living parents,74 the petitioner may be appointed guardian under any
of three circumstances with respect to each parent: (1) the parent consents to
the appointment;75 (2) the parent’s rights have been terminated or suspended
by circumstances;76 or (3) the court finds that the parent is unwilling or
unable to exercise their parental rights.77 UPC-based statutes also require a
finding that the appointment of the guardian is in the minor’s best interest.78
Most guardians are appointed with a parent’s consent.79 In the absence
of such consent, a petitioner must prove the parent’s unfitness, which may
be done, as one treatise explains, by “demonstrating a personal deficiency
or incapacity that has prevented, or will probably prevent, performance of a
reasonable parental obligation in child rearing and that has caused, or
probably will result in, detriment to a child’s wellbeing.”80 Thus, a Nebraska
court affirmed the appointment of grandparents as guardians where the
child’s mother was proven to be “unfit” with evidence of her “pattern of
pattern of poor decision-making” and her minimal contact with the child
73
New Mexico’s Kinship Guardianship Act requires that the person seeking appointment be a
“caregiver” at the time of the filings, meaning that the child is in their care. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-10b5. This means that the proceeding does not permit a court to order custody of the child transferred to the
guardian over the parent’s objection. CORINNE WOLF CHILDREN’S LAW CENTER, NEW MEXICO CHILD
WELFARE HANDBOOK: A LEGAL MANUAL ON CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT 30A-1 (2014).
74
Although testamentary guardianships, which take effect upon a parent’s death, are less common
today, they are included in many state guardianship laws. JACOBS, supra note 54, at § 7:7; HARALAMBIE,
supra note 11, at § 11:10 (2017 update). Some states have standby guardians, JACOBS, supra note 54, at
§ 7:10, and this is now in the uniform guardianship acts UNIF. GUARDIANSHIP, CONSERVATORSHIP, &
OTHER PROT. ARRANGEMENTS ACT § 207; UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 5-202; see UNIF. GUARDIANSHIP &
PROT. PROCEEDINGS ACT § 202, editor’s comment (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1997). If no advance provision
is made, which is most commonly the case today unless parent has a serious illness, the death of a child’s
parents can serve as a basis for appointment as well. HARALAMBIE, supra note 11, at § 11:10.
75
The consent requirement is usually undemanding—generally the execution of a simple form—
and few states require informed consent. Under probate codes based on the UGPPA, there need not be
any court determination at all, as long as the guardian is nominated by the parent in a witnessed written
document, the nominee accepts the appointment, and both of the minor’s parents are dead or incapacitated
(or have no parental rights or have been adjudicated incompetent). HARALAMBIE, supra note 11, at §
11:2; UNIF. GUARDIANSHIP & PROT. PROCEEDINGS ACT § 202 (2010). The child, if 14 or older, may file
an objection to the appointment of the nominee. Id. § 203.
76
UNIF. GUARDIANSHIP & PROT. PROCEEDINGS ACT § 204(b)(ii).
77
Id. § 204(b)(iii). Some states have more specific language regarding abandonment or unfitness.
HARALAMBIE, supra note 11, at § 11:2. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-610 (2018); ME. REV.
STATE ANN. tit. 18-C, § 5-204(2)(c) (2019). Some laws have broad language regarding the circumstances
giving rise to an appointment. See NY SURR. CT. PROC. ACT § 1707(1) (2018) (“If the court determines
that appointment of a permanent guardian is in the best interests of the infant or child, the court shall
issue a decree appointing such guardian.”); CAL. PROB. CODE § 1514(a) (2018) (“if it appears necessary
or convenient”); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2111.02(A) (2008) (guardian may be appointed “[i]f found
necessary”).
78
UNIF. PROB. CODE § 5-206(a) (amended 2008).
79
Smith, supra note 23, at 66 (review of Maine guardianship matters revealed that in 2015
approximately 75% of guardians of minors were appointed without objection by a parent).
80
LINDA D. ELROD, CHILD CUSTODY PRAC. & PROC. § 4:6 (2018).
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during the four years that the child had lived with petitioners.81
Many courts have recognized the constitutional implications of
appointing a guardian over a parent’s objection and, as discussed further in
the next section, have imposed higher standards of proof than the plain
language of a statute.82 The UGCOPAA and some state laws also now reflect
these considerations by, for example, requiring clear and convincing
evidence as the basis for a finding of parental unfitness.83 Significantly,
however, in no state is there a standard that specifies that the finding of
unfitness must be equivalent to that for termination of parental rights in a
public child protection proceeding.84
Also significantly, guardianship statutes say little regarding the
petitioner’s qualifications for appointment as a guardian of a minor. Under
the early laws, a person was deemed suitable if they had good character,
sound judgment, an ability to make the property productive, and other
financial capabilities.85 Courts preferred that the person appointed have at
least some prior connection to the child, such as being a close family
member, preferably male, rather than a “stranger in blood.”86 However, no
relative other than a parent could claim guardianship of a minor by right.87
Rather, if there was a disputed appointment, the choice of guardian was to
be based on the welfare or best interest of the child.88 The same is true
today.89 Where there is a preference for relatives over “strangers by blood,”
it arises largely in judicial opinions.90 In short, and unlike “third-party
custody” statutes, discussed below, an existing caregiving or parent-like
relationship with a child is not a requirement for appointment to
guardianship.91
Once appointed, the guardian is granted the full powers of a parent,
81

In re Guardianship of Elizabeth H., 771 N.W.2d 185 (Neb. App. 2009).
See, e.g., In re K.R., 735 S.E.2d 882 (W. Va. 2012); In re Guardianship of Chamberlain, 118
A.3d 229 (Me. 2015).
83
UNIF. GUARDIANSHIP, CONSERVATORSHIP, & OTHER PROT. ARR. ACT § 201(b)(3); JACOBS,
supra note 54, at § 7:19. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-610 (2018); cf. Santosky v. Kramer,
455 U.S. 745, 747–48 (1982) (“Before a State may sever completely and irrevocably the rights of parents
in their natural child, due process requires that the State support its allegations by at least clear and
convincing evidence.”).
84
HARALAMBIE, supra note 11, at § 11:2.
85
WOERNER, supra note 38, at 100. In their study of guardianship petitions in California in 1900,
Friedman et al. noted that courts almost always granted the petitions, usually within a matter of a few
weeks, suggesting that they were not subject to extensive vetting or scrutiny. Friedman et al., supra note
16, at 152, 158.
86
WOERNER, supra note 38, at 98–99. Friedman et al., supra note 16, at 152, 155 (noting that most
guardians appointed in 1900, in court files examined, were the minor’s mothers; if no parent was
available another family member was usually appointed, especially adult siblings or grandparents).
87
WOERNER, supra note 38, at 99.
88
Id. at 98. The concept of a child’s “best interest,” which has a central place in guardianship law,
id. at 21, has a long history in the law. See MASON, supra note 39, at 59-64, 67.
89
The only person given statutory priority under current ULC laws is the minor’s nominee if the
minor is over 14. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 5-206(a) (amended 2009).
90
HARALAMBIE, supra note 11, at § 11:7; see e.g., Kicherer v. Kicherer, 400 A.2d 1097 (Md. 1979).
91
See infra notes 166-186 and accompanying text.
82
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usually in a broadly-worded order or “letters of guardianship.” The only
limit to their authority may be the power to consent to the minor’s
adoption.92 Traditionally, the letters operated to transfer the minor’s property
to the guardian for oversight and management.93 Today, they serve as
evidence of the guardian’s authority to perform parent-like functions; that is,
to be able to enroll the minor in school, to access health care for a child, to
determine where the child will live, and, along with other actions, to obtain
and manage benefits and property, if not a substantial amount. These useful
powers also implicitly extend, however, to determining whether the minor
has visitation or other contact with their parent. Significantly, most
guardianship laws are silent on the status of a parent’s rights during the
period of the guardianship. While the appointment of a guardian does not
terminate parental rights permanently, the rights of a parent are subject to
those of the guardian and essentially suspended.94
To the extent that a guardian’s powers are “limited” by the court—
meaning that the guardian is granted something less than full powers—any
unassigned powers theoretically belong to the minor’s “natural guardian,”
meaning the parent. This is reflected in the early distinction between being
appointed the guardian only of the minor’s property or estate rather than of
their property and person.95 Early guardianship orders appointing guardians
of the minor’s estate granted full powers because such complete authority
was needed to control and manage a minor’s property by virtue of the
minor’s legal disability to do so themselves.96
Once guardianship statutes recognized the concept of a limited
guardianship, however, they did not reserve rights to the minor’s parents, but
instead allowed the minor “ward” to exercise some control over their own
residence and wages, using language consistent with the approach developed
for adult wards subject to guardianships.97 This objective is reflected in the
92

UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 5-109; UNIF. GUARDIANSHIP, CONSERVATORSHIP, & OTHER PROT.
ARRANGEMENTS ACT § 210(a), (c) (“The court may authorize a guardian for a minor to consent to the
adoption of the minor if the minor does not have a parent.”).
93
JACOBS, supra note 54, at § 7.22 (“Letters of conservatorship are evidence of transfer of all assets
of the minor to the guardian of the property. They may be filed or recorded to give record notice.”). As
noted above, the UPC created a distinction between a “guardian,” which was a person who stepped in
the role of legal custodian with some or all of the powers of a parent (including overseeing the child’s
education and health and providing a home), and a “conservator,” which was solely responsible for
overseeing the management of a minor’s property, the role that had been assigned to pre-UPC guardians.
UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 5-401–432; see also UNIF. GUARDIANSHIP, CONSERVATORSHIP, & OTHER
PROT. ARRANGEMENTS ACT, §§ 401-432.
94
HARALAMBIE, supra note 11, at § 11:3; see Guardianship of Sebastien, 118 A.3d 229, 241 (Me.
2015) (“A guardian, once appointed, has almost all decision-making responsibilities for the child, which
removes from the parent even the right to determine how or where the child should be raised.”).
95
See supra notes 53–54 and accompanying text.
96
WOERNER, supra note 38, at 15-16. Thus, unless the guardian resigned, a guardianship would
terminate only “by reason of the majority of one who was a minor, the death of a ward, the marriage of
a female ward, the death of the guardian, or marriage of a female guardian.” Id. at 327.
97
See Lawrence A. Frolik, Promoting Judicial Acceptance and Use of Limited Guardianship, 31
STETSON L. REV. 735, 740–41 (2002) (describing how adult guardianship reformers advanced the
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development of the UGPPA, which permits a court to limit the guardian’s
powers “in the interest of developing self-reliance” on the part of the minor
or for “other good cause.”98 The 1997 UGPAA made the goal of “selfreliance” an express philosophy and “major theme” of the act, as reflected
in “the emphasis on limited guardianship, both for minors and adults.”99
Similarly, the ULC comment to the limited guardianship section states:
[The] court should be specific about identifying the powers
of the guardian regarding the minor’s education, care,
health, safety, and welfare. This section gives the court
flexibility to design the guardianship in a way to empower
the minor as much as possible to make the minor’s own
decisions, either at the time of appointment or at a later
date.100
This concern for the “empowerment” of minor wards developed due to: (1)
the trend in guardianship laws to minimize restrictions on adult wards
advanced by reforms combined with (2) a practice of maintaining parallel
treatment of minors and adults in uniform guardianship laws. It does not
really reflect, therefore, a specific policy finding that children should have
more authority over their lives when they are under guardianship than they
would under the care of a parent.101
This empowerment orientation may also reflect a long-standing feature
of most states’ minor guardianship laws in terms of the role assigned to
concept of a “limited” guardianship “that would maximize the incapacitated person's autonomy and
independence”); Phillip B. Tor & Bruce D. Sales, A Social Science Perspective on the Law of
Guardianship: Directions for Improving the Process and Practice, 18 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 1, 25
(1994) (outlining policy reasons for preferring limited guardianships including that “a ward's incapacity
may be limited to specific areas of functioning such that a plenary guardianship constitutes an
unreasonable deprivation of the ward's autonomy; and preventing a ward from functioning where he or
she is capable ‘foster(s) (further) degeneration of existing competent behaviors and obstruct(s) the
development of new ones’”).
98
See UNIF. GUARDIANSHIP & PROT. PROCEEDINGS ACT §§ 5-206(b), 5-304, 5-311. In fact, as one
commentator has observed, “A key reason the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws adopted the … [UGPPA] in 1982 to amend the Article V guardianship provisions of the Uniform
Probate Code (UPC) was to include the concept of limited guardianships,” in recognition of “the need
for more sensitive procedures and for appointments fashioned so that the authority of the protector would
intrude only to the degree necessary on the liberties and prerogatives of the protected person.” Sally
Balch Hurme, Current Trends in Guardianship Reform, 7 MD. J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 143, 161
(1996).
99
UNIF. GUARDIANSHIP & PROT. PROCEEDINGS ACT § 207, ULC comment (amended 1997) (“A
court, whenever possible, should only grant to the guardian those powers actually needed. The court
should be specific about identifying the powers of the guardian regarding the minor's education, care,
health, safety, and welfare. This section gives the court flexibility to design the guardianship in a way to
empower the minor as much as possible to make the minor’s own decisions, either at the time of
appointment or at a later date.”) (emphasis added).
100
UNIF. GUARDIANSHIP & PROT. PROCEEDINGS ACT § 5-206, ULC comment (amended 1997)
(emphasis added); HARALAMBIE, supra note 11, at 11:2.
101
See MARTIN GUGGENHEIM, WHAT’S WRONG WITH CHILDREN’S RIGHTS 9–16 (2005) (critiquing
the concept of “children’s rights”).
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minors themselves in the proceedings, generally starting at age 14.102 They
are entitled to notice of and participation the proceedings and to seek a postappointment order concerning the guardianship.103 Minors may nominate a
specific person or state a preference for who is appointed, usually subject to
approval by the court to ensure that their best interest is served.104 Some state
laws permit a minor to petition for a change of guardian once the minor turns
14.105 These provisions granting standing and other rights to the minor,
which are not usually found in other state laws regarding the care and
custody of minors, stem from guardianship’s origins as a fiduciary
relationship between ward and guardian.
The core duty imposed on guardians of minors under the UPC is “to
become or remain personally acquainted with the ward and maintain
sufficient contact with the ward to know of the ward’s capacities, limitations,
needs, opportunities, and physical and mental health.”106 Identical language
is found in the corresponding adult guardianship provision.107 Laws
addressing minor and adult guardianship also include parallel language
regarding obligations to educate and provide care108 and the power of the
guardian to “take custody” of the ward.109 Although guardians of minors are
effectively “substitute parents,” guardians cannot be held liable to a third
party for the acts of the minor, and they are not obligated to support the
minor.110 The UPC includes similar language in the minor and adult
provisions requiring a guardian to report “on the condition of the ward” and
related matters.111 Traditionally, courts exercised minimal supervision over
102
See WOERNER, supra note 38, at 91–92 (discussing rights of “infants” involved in guardianship
proceedings in 1897). In the UGCOPAA, the ULC lowered age of involvement from 14 to 12 to be
“consistent with modern trends in the law, the revised Act provides for greater involvement of minors in
decisions involving them.” UNIF. GUARDIANSHIP, CONSERVATORSHIP, & OTHER PROT. ARRANGEMENTS
ACT, prefatory notes 3–4.
103
UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 5-203, 5-204(d),(e), 5-205(a)(1), 5-210(b) (amended 2010).
104
UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 5-204(a), 5-206(a) (amended 2010); WOERNER, supra note 38, at 93;
HARALAMBIE, supra note 11, at § 11:8; Davis, Jr., supra note 54, at 1127. Minors may also object a
person nominated by a parent to be a stand-by guardian. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 5-203 (amended 2010).
105
See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 30, § 2-104 (1988) (“When a guardian has been appointed by the
court for a minor under the age of fourteen (14) years, the minor, at any time after he has attained age
fourteen (14), may nominate his own guardian, subject to the approval of the court.”).
106
UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 5-207(b)(1) (amended 2010).
107
UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 5-314(b)(1) (amended 2010).
108
UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 5-207(a), 5-314(a)(1) (amended 2010); see JACOBS, supra note 54, at
§ 7:24 Nevada’s unitary guardianship law, which applies to both adults and minors, states that the
guardian has a duty to ensure that the ward “is properly trained and educated and that the protected person
has the opportunity to learn a trade, occupation or profession.” NEV. REV. STAT. § 159.079.
109
UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 5-208(b)(2); 5-215(a)(2) (amended 2010)
110
HARALAMBIE, supra note 11, at § 11:3; UNIF. GUARDIANSHIP & PROT. PROCEEDINGS ACT §
207, comment (“[A guardian is] basically a substitute parent, but without the personal financial
responsibility for the minor's support.”).
111
UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 5-207(b)(5) (amended 2010) (a guardian of a minor must “report the
condition of the ward and account for money and other assets in the guardian’s possession or subject to
the guardian’s control, as ordered by the court on application of any person interested in the ward’s
welfare or as required by court rule.”). The adult provision imposes a more specific and detailed reporting
duty, including a continuing duty to report. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 5-317 (amended 2010) (“Within 30
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a guardian’s management of the ward’s estate.112 To the extent that a court
uses its authority to require any kind of reporting, the required updates are
generally undemanding. There are usually no requirements for continuing
investigations by a guardian ad litem or visitor to check on the well-being of
the minor.
The uniform guardianship laws and state laws based on them make no
mention of any procedure or standards for modifying an appointment order
to reflect changed circumstances. Once the appointment is made, the
guardianship is considered to be indefinite and essentially permanent,
meaning that it remains in place until the need is eliminated by the death,
marriage, or attainment of majority by the minor.113 Because such
appointments were designed for situations in which a parent (or at least the
father) was dead or, if living, was incompetent, the assumption was that the
child had no living parent with intact parental rights and that the need for a
guardian would likely continue until the child reached majority.114 Under
these assumptions, there was no need for laws to guide courts on how to
allocate rights between guardians and parents.
Until the UGCOPAA,115 uniform guardianship laws did not include a
specific standard for terminating a guardianship while the ward was still
alive, unmarried, and a minor, and most state guardianship laws lack such
provisions.116 Today, pre-majority petitions to terminate a guardianship are
most commonly filed when a parent alleges that the circumstances giving
rise to the appointment—such as the parent’s crisis—are no longer
days after appointment, a guardian shall report to the court in writing on the condition of the ward and
account for money and other assets in the guardian’s possession or subject to the guardian’s control”).
112
Friedman et al., supra note 16, at 152 (noting that guardianships were “pretty much rubberstamp affairs” with “loose” supervision by courts). Bonds are still required by some courts when a
guardian is appointed for a minor, but generally only when the guardian must manage property of the
minor. JACOBS, supra note 54, at § 7.21 (noting that bonds are not usually required if the child has no
property).
113
Friedman et al., supra note 16, at 165 (noting that, in 1900, guardianships of minors remained
in place until the minor reached majority). Some laws permit removal of a guardian whenever it would
be in a ward’s best interest. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 5-112(b) (amended 2010) (unitary provision for both
adult and minor guardianships). A successor guardian can be appointed to replace a guardian who is
removed, dies, or resigns. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 5-112(c) (amended 2010) (unitary provision);
HARALAMBIE, supra note 11, at § 11:3., § 11:14; JACOBS, supra note 54, at § 7:35. Contemporary
guardianship laws usually provide for “temporary” guardianships, but those are time limited, such as up
to 6 months, and may or may not have a more limited scope of duties. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 5-204(d)
(amended 2010); HARALAMBIE, supra note 11, at § 11:5. The UPC also includes provisions for the
appointment of an emergency guardian upon a showing of a risk of substantial harm to the minor. UNIF.
PROBATE CODE § 5-204(e) (amended 2010).
114
WOERNER, supra note 38, at 327. As one treatise states, even now: “A typical circumstance for
an appointment of a guardian is when the parents die and the grandparents seek to be appointed as
guardian.” JACOBS, supra note 54, at § 7.14 (discussing “purpose” of minor guardianships).
115
UNIF. GUARDIANSHIP & PROT. PROCEEDINGS ACT § 211(a) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017).
116
UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 5-210(a) (amended 2010) (“A guardianship of a minor terminates upon
the minor’s death, adoption, emancipation or attainment of majority or as ordered by the court.”). The
UPC also includes a provision at section 210(b) permitting “a ward or a person interested in the welfare
of a ward [to] petition for any order that is in the best interest of the ward.” UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 5210(b) (amended 2010).
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present.117 In the absence of statutory guidance regarding a parent’s ability
to remove the guardian and regain parental rights or the standards and
presumptions that apply in such instances,118 courts developed a range of
approaches to address pre-majority petitions to terminate. As a matter of
constitutional law and the doctrine of “parental preference,” most courts
permit parents to seek to regain custody of their child and generally
terminate the guardianship unless there is a finding of current or continued
unfitness,119 but there is no uniformity among courts’ approaches. The
complex issues and considerations presented when a parent seeks to
terminate a guardianship over the objection of the guardian are discussed in
Part III below.120
C. Going Private: A New Purpose for Minor Guardianship
By the turn of the 21st century, the disconnect between the original
functions of minor guardianship and its contemporary primary uses had
become dramatically visible. Increasingly, courts’ caseloads were filled, not
with matters involving the management of orphans’ property, but with
families struggling because a parent—owing to substance use, incarceration,
illness, or poverty—could not care for their children. The struggles generally
stemmed from the same conditions as those seen in state dependency
proceedings.121 Parental “unfitness” or abandonment had been an express or
implied statutory basis for appointing a guardian of a child since the 19th
century, but the predominant use of such appointments had been in instances
where the child’s parents were dead or, due to a serious illness, were unable
to provide care for the child. Since that time, the context for most
guardianships has come close to being reversed. Whereas the laws originally
enabled families of means to appoint an outsider to manage the wealth of
orphans, they were now used to enable continued family care of children
whose parents were in crisis, often as the result of poverty. This section
considers the factors and trends that likely led to this radical transformation.
The simplest reason for this change of function is the substantial drop in
the need for the traditional uses for guardianships. Because the average life
117
Although the trend is not documented in any research findings, I suspect that when a guardian
consents to the parent resuming care, the parties do not bother to return to court to modify or terminate
the guardianship.
118
Some state laws do include pre-majority termination provisions. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS.
ANN. §§ 700.5208, 700.5219 (2008); 18-A ME. REV. STAT. ANN. § 5-212(d) (2016).
119
JACOBS, supra note 54, at § 7:35 n.5; HARALAMBIE, supra note 11, at § 11:14 n.2.5. See, e.g.,
Matter of Guardianship of Jenae K.S., 539 N.W.2d 104 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995) (terminating guardianship
on petition of mother and holding that, although mother was unmarried and with limited education, there
were “no compelling circumstances” to deny custody to her).
120
See infra notes 381-402 and accompanying text.
121
Weisz & McCormick, supra note 18, at 195 (noting that “bulk” of probate court matters
involving guardianship death were not to address the management of orphan’s property); Smith, supra
note 23, at 66 n.30 (probate judge noted that guardianship cases involving orphans were uncommon in
his court).
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expectancy in the U.S. is far longer now than it was one hundred years ago,
far fewer people experience the death of one or both parents during their
childhood.122 Also, fewer children have substantial property or money of
their own while their parents are alive and, where they do, other legal
mechanisms are used to manage it. The UPC separated guardianship and
conservatorship, with the latter being used to manage the property of
minors.123 Because there are fewer restrictions on parents’ ability to manage
their children’s property today as compared with the 19th century, there is
less need for a specific appointment for that purpose, such as by the
surviving parent.124 When parents or other relatives undertake estate
planning, they usually find it more advantageous to provide for their children
through use of trusts, which give them more flexibility and control while
avoiding the “red tape and expense” of a guardianship or conservatorship to
oversee the minor’s property.125
Despite the fact that a legal guardian is rarely needed today to manage a
child’s property, minor guardianship remains an important legal tool. Over
the course of the 20th century, the primary uses of minor guardianship were
re-shaped by two other developments. One was the increasing role assumed
by government—through agencies and courts—to intervene in families in
crisis to address child welfare concerns. The second was the emerging
significance of legally defined roles, rights, and authority for parents and
other caregivers. Together, these developments created strong incentives for
non-parent caregivers to seek appointment as legal guardians of children in
their care and also provided an effective avenue for them to do so. Minor
guardianship’s predominant use shifted to private child protection, not by
legislative or juridical design, but to address a very different set of needs for
families in crisis.

122
According to vital records compiled and analyzed by the U.S. Centers for Disease Control, life
expectancy for men in the year 1900 was only 46.3 years, compared with 73.3 in 2015. U.S. DEP’T OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., HEALTH, UNITED STATES: WITH CHARTBOOK ON LONG-TERM TRENDS IN
HEALTH 2016, at 116 (2017), https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/hus/hus16.pdf.
123
UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 5-401(1) (amended 2010) (“The court may appoint a limited or
unlimited conservator or make any other protective order provided in this [part] in relation to the estate
and affairs of a minor: (1) if the court determines that the minor owns money or property requiring
management or protection that cannot otherwise be provided or has or may have business affairs that
may be put at risk or prevented because of the minor’s age, or that money is needed for support and
education and that protection is necessary or desirable to obtain or provide money . . . .”).
124
The most common context for appointment of a conservator of a minor is when the child receives
a personal injury settlement of a significant amount. See Michele P. Fuller & Donna M.
MacKenzie, Considerations When Settling A Lawsuit for an Individual Lacking Legal Capacity or A
Minor, 97 MICH. B.J. 32, 34 (2018). In recognition of a parent’s constitutional rights, the UGCOPAA
limits the appointment of a conservator for a minor with living parents to circumstances in which the
appointment is in the minor’s best interest, after giving weight to the relevant recommendations of the
parent. UNIF. GUARDIANSHIP, CONSERVATORSHIP, & OTHER PROT. ARRANGEMENTS ACT § 401(1),
comment (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017).
125
LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, DEAD HANDS: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF WILLS, TRUSTS, AND
INHERITANCE LAW 113 (2009).
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1. The Expanded Role for the Government in the Lives of Children and
Families
At the center of child welfare systems in the United States today is a
government agency, the state or county child protective services (CPS), with
a broad range of crucial powers. These include the power to receive and
investigate allegations of child abuse and neglect; to seek a court order for
the removal of children from their parents’ care; to take custody of children
and place them in foster care; to develop and implement a plan of
reunification; and, if such a plan is unsuccessful, to seek termination of the
parents’ rights and the implementation of a plan for permanent placement of
the children, commonly through adoption.126
The possibility of such drastic state intervention in the name of child
welfare developed during the 20th century, particularly during the second
half. Until well into the 19th century, children were viewed as chattel of their
families, and there was little role for institutions outside of the family to
address a child’s needs.127 Since multiple generations of a family often lived
in the same household or in close proximity, it was not unusual for nonparent relatives to share in the regular care of children. 128 If a child’s parent
was unable to serve as the primary caregiver, family members would assume
that role on an informal basis for as short or long a period of time as
necessary. 129
Although U.S. common law adopted the English law concept of a parens
patriae role for the government, it was rarely invoked until the 20th
century.130 Prior to then and throughout most of the 19th century, the children
whose care became a public concern were the orphans of “paupers” who
were not taken in by other family members, and decisions about their care
were based on serving the needs of the community, not the children.131 If
another family member could not assume care, the child would likely be sent
to an orphanage or almshouse when young, and then, generally after age 9
or so, indentured to a family to learn a trade and work off the costs of their

126
MASON, supra note 39, at 86–87, 150–60; JANE WALDFOGEL, THE FUTURE OF CHILD
PROTECTION: HOW TO BREAK THE CYCLE OF ABUSE AND NEGLECT 5–6, 67–69 (1998). Although CPS
agencies are sometimes based in county or municipal authorities, I will refer to the government entity
overseeing public child welfare agencies generally as the “state.”
127
Brenda G. McGowan, Historical Evolution of Child Welfare Systems, in CHILD WELFARE FOR
THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: A HANDBOOK OF PRACTICES, POLICIES, AND PROGRAMS 11–12 (Gerald
P. Mallon and Peg McCartt Hess eds., 2005). See also Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, “Who Owns the
Child?”: Meyer and Pierce and The Child as Property, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 995, 1037–39 (1992);
HUNTINGTON, supra note 15, at 120.
128
See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
129
McGowan, supra note 127, at 12; Sacha M. Coupet, Ain’t I A Parent? The Exclusion of Kinship
Caregivers From the Debate Over Expansions of Parenthood, 34 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 595,
602–607 (2010).
130
MASON, supra note 39, at 58, 101, 150.
131
McGowan, supra note 127, at 12.
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rearing.132 Institutions were operated by private charities, not the state, and
there was no outside monitoring or licensing to ensure that minimum
standards of care were provided.133 In the U.S., children who were abused or
neglected, whether in the care of their own families or an institution, were
simply not the object of public concern.
Pressure for public intervention for the protection of children began to
develop in the U.S. during the Progressive Era. Children’s advocates urged
public authorities to take responsibility for the welfare of children living in
poverty rather than leave their fate to charities or their own struggling
families.134 Pursuant to their parens patriae authority, states established what
were called “juvenile” and “dependency” courts, marking a significant
change in the role of courts and public agencies in the lives of children and
families.135 Where children were found to be in need of “proper care and
supervision,” juvenile courts could appoint government agencies as their
custodians.136 Child welfare thus became a responsibility of the state rather
than one to be addressed solely by the family or by another private actor.137
Today’s public child welfare system developed from these early-20thcentury efforts. As citizens increasingly accepted the role of the government
in family life, and specifically in the lives of children, child welfare policy
throughout the 20th century reflected an ongoing quandary regarding the
appropriate role for the state. What was the best way to understand child
welfare? Should a child be “rescued” from a home experiencing possible
parental inadequacy, with the resulting loss of family ties and possible longterm psychological harm to the child? Or should the primary goal of public
efforts be to keep children in their homes, with the resulting risk of continued
parental neglect and family dependency on public assistance? In short, in
seeking to “protect children,” should agencies be “homebreakers” or
“homebuilders”?138
Although prevention of abuse, family preservation, and family
reunification remain stated goals of child welfare policy, in practice, the
child welfare system that emerged focused on the first of these, commonly
at the expense of the other two goals.139 As one critical commentator, Clare
Huntington, has noted: “The central problem of the child-welfare system is
132

Id.
Linda Gordon, Child Welfare: A Brief History, SOCIAL WELFARE HISTORY PROJECT (2011),
http://socialwelfare.library.vcu.edu/programs/child-welfare-overview.
134
Woodhouse, supra note 127, at 1040–41.
135
Hardin, supra note 46, at 158; McGowan, supra note 127, at 16.
136
Mark F. Testa & Jennifer Miller, Evolution of Private Guardianship as Child Welfare Resource,
in CHILD WELFARE FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: A HANDBOOK OF PRACTICE, POLICIES, AND
PROGRAMS 406 (Gerald Mallon & Peg McCartt Hess eds., 2005). These appointments were sometimes
referred to as “public guardianships.”
137
See Woodhouse, supra note 127, at 1051 (“Progressive reforms, such as children's welfare
bureaus [and] juvenile courts . . . pushed at the borders of the domestic realm.”).
138
McGowan, supra note 127, at 24, 36–38; WALDFOGEL, supra note 126, at 71.
139
McGowan, supra note 127, at 25–26.
133
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that it suffers from a fundamental disorientation. Rather than trying to
prevent abuse or neglect long before it occurs, the prevailing approach to
family well-being is to wait for a crisis and then intervene in a heavy-handed
manner.”140
While the primary work of family intervention has been left to local
agencies, the federal government has had a central role in shaping the goals
and institutions of such intervention across the country.141 With the
enactment of the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act of 1974 and the
flow of federal funding and regulations that accompanied it,142 the public
child welfare system expanded and became nationalized.143 The laws
regarding child welfare enacted by Congress in the decades that followed
reflected a growing societal concern about child abuse and an increasing
expectation that the government would remove children found to be in
unsafe homes.144 CPS agencies’ caseloads exploded under these intervention
policies. By the late 1980s and 1990s, an overwhelming number of children
languished in long-term foster care after unsuccessful attempts at both
reunification with their parents and adoption by another family.145 The high
incidence of illness and death from AIDS and crack cocaine use in urban
areas during those years, as well as increased incarceration and
homelessness among women, had a direct and substantial impact on the
number and type of CPS caseloads.146
Kinship care, rather than placement in non-relative foster homes, has
slowly found a place in public child welfare practices during the past few
decades. Supported in part by social science findings about the benefits of
kinship care147 but mostly reflecting an overburdened system and a shortage
of foster families, policymakers began to see the value of placing children
140

HUNTINGTON, supra note 15, at 91.
Congress established the U.S. Children’s Bureau in 1912, which provided a central role for the
federal government in overseeing and shaping the development of the child welfare system. McGowan,
supra note 127, at 19–20.
142
Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, Pub. L. 93247, 88 Stat. 4 (1974).
143
Martin Guggenheim, Somebody’s Children: Sustaining the Family's Place in Child Welfare
Policy, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1716, 1735–36 (2000).
144
McGowan, supra note 127, at 36-37.
145
Federal efforts to support adoption increased substantially with the enactment of the Adoption
and Safe Families Act in 1997, which set timelines for achieving permanence, thereby encouraging
cessation of reunification efforts in favor of termination of parental rights, even if adopting families were
not available. Controversies and concerns over transracial adoption practices were blamed for insufficient
number of kids being adopted. Testa & Miller, supra note 136, at 410. The availability of federal funds
for adoption subsidies was an added incentive to adopt children, and the notion of “unadoptable” children
was outdated. Id. at 412.
146
Josh Gupta-Kagan, The New Permanency, 19 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y 1, 26 (2015); Mark
Testa, New Permanency Strategies for Children in Foster Care, in CHILD WELFARE RESEARCH:
ADVANCES FOR PRACTICE AND POLICY, 108, 114 (2008); KASIA O’NEILL MURRAY & SARAH
GESIRIECH, A BRIEF LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CHILD WELFARE SYSTEM, PEW COMMISSION ON
CHILDREN IN FOSTER Care 4 (2004).
147
See Jed Metzger, Resiliency in Children in Kinship Care, 87 CHILD WELFARE 115, 116–19
(2008); CHILD WELFARE LEAGUE OF AMERICA, KINSHIP CARE: A NATURAL BRIDGE, 1–2 (1984);
Gleeson, supra note 37, at 247–52.
141
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with relatives when they could not remain in their parents’ care.148 Congress
enacted a series of provisions149 to encourage CPS agencies to look to
“kinship placement”—children in state custody residing with extended
family—as an alternative to traditional foster care.150 With these practices,
the use of non-parent relatives as foster placements gave the family a role in
the public system. Relative caregivers became licensed foster care homes,
received public subsidies, and were accountable to child welfare case
workers, but they could also sometimes be in adversarial positions with other
family members, especially if they sought to adopt the child.151
The extended family has also become more involved in care of children
as CPS agencies in some jurisdictions, in addition to removing children from
the home through court orders, engage in interventions without court
supervision. When CPS workers find a basis for concern about abuse or
neglect, they may decide to ask the family to enter into an arrangement, such
as a Voluntary Placement Agreement (VPA), under which a relative takes
the child into their home but is provided neither a formal legal status nor
foster care subsidies.152 Although ostensibly “voluntary,” the implicit or
explicit understanding underlying these agreements is that the family must
abide by the terms to prevent further intervention by the CPS agency.153
Parents and relatives are motivated to agree largely to ensure that the child
can have a relative to live with immediately without being subject to the
risks and delays of the foster care licensing process or losing control
altogether if the child is taken into state custody.154 In some cases, there is
no formal agreement, only a relative’s promise to a CPS agency worker to
148
Parents’ attorneys recognized that “alternative placement opportunities” such as kinship care
were often the “most viable solution” to avoiding long-term foster care. Gary Wienerman, Improving
Practice to Avoid Unnecessary Placements, in FOSTER CHILDREN IN THE COURTS 4, 8 (Mark Hardin ed.,
1983) (explaining that parents’ attorneys should ask clients to provide a list of persons “particularly
relatives” who would be willing to take the child temporarily).
149
In the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Congress
enacted a “kinship preference” to the list of required features for state plans. Personal Responsibility and
Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 Pub. L. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(19)) (“[T]he State shall consider giving preference to an adult relative over a nonrelated caregiver when determining a placement for a child, provided that the relative caregiver meets all
relevant State child protection standards;…).
150
Testa & Miller, supra note 136, at 410–11; Mark F. Testa, When Children Cannot Return Home:
Adoption and Guardianship, 14 THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN: CHILDREN, FAMILIES, AND FOSTER CARE
115, 116 (2004).
151
See generally KINSHIP CARE: MAKING THE MOST OF A VALUABLE RESOURCE (Rob Geen ed.
2003); RELATIVES RAISING CHILDREN: AN OVERVIEW OF KINSHIP CARE 9-26, 90-91 (Joseph Crumbley
& Robert Little eds. 1997).
152
Berrick & Hernandez, supra note 7, at 27; Gleeson et al., supra note 6, at 308; Karin Malm &
Robert Geen, When Child Welfare Agencies Rely on Voluntary Kinship Placements, A-61 NEW
FEDERALISM 1, 1 (2003); Karin Malm & Robert Geen, Voluntary Placement or Kinship Diversion?, in
KINSHIP CARE: MAKING THE MOST OF A VALUABLE RESOURCE 179–199 (Rob Geen ed. 2003). Various
terms are used to describe such arrangements including “informal placement, an informal adjustment, or
an informal or relative agreement.” Malm & Geen, Voluntary Placement, supra at 152.
153
Malm & Geen, Voluntary Placement, supra note 152, at 196–97.
154
Id. at 185.
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care for the child.155 Under any of these “voluntary” kinship care
arrangements,156 the agency can then close the file on the child and the
family.157 As I indicate below and in Part III, such “kinship diversion”158
practices, in which a family is left on its own to address the problem that led
to the agency’s involvement, can have substantial negative consequences for
parents, children, and caregiver relatives.159
2. The Increasing Importance of Defined Legal Roles, Rights, and
Authority Regarding Children
Among other implications of public agency intervention and court
involvement in matters of child welfare, as described above, are
constitutional limitations on such engagements in family matters. Starting in
the 1920s, a series of U.S. Supreme Court opinions conceptualized the
liberty interests of parents when there is unwanted state intrusion in the
family.160 Through several cases that directly or indirectly concerned parentchild relationships, the Court confirmed that the Due Process Clause protects
parents’ fundamental liberty interests. One of the most significant opinions
in this line of cases is Santosky v. Kramer, a child welfare case in which the
Court held in 1982 that a clear and convincing evidence standard is required
to terminate a parent’s rights.161 Writing for the majority, Justice Harry
Blackmun noted the Court’s “historical recognition that freedom of personal
choice in matters of family life is a fundamental liberty interest protected by
the Fourteenth Amendment.” 162 He explained that this
interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and
management of their child does not evaporate simply
because they have not been model parents or have lost
temporary custody of their child to the State. Even when
blood relationships are strained, parents retain a vital
155

Malm & Geen, When Child Welfare Agencies Rely, supra note 152, at 1.
Goodman et al., supra note 7, at 288.
157
Malm & Geen, When Child Welfare Agencies Rely, supra note 152, at 3.
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ANNIE E. CASEY FOUNDATION (AECF), THE KINSHIP DIVERSION DEBATE: POLICY AND
PRACTICE IMPLICATIONS FOR CHILDREN, FAMILIES AND CHILD WELFARE AGENCIES 2 (2013) (defining
kinship diversion as when a child welfare agency investigates a report of child abuse or neglected,
concludes that the child cannot continue to live safety with parent, and then “helps to facilitate that child’s
care by a relative instead of bringing into state custody.”).
159
Berrick & Hernandez, supra note 7, at 25–26; AECF, supra note 158, at 1–2.
160
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (finding no violation of parents’ liberty
interest in enforcing child labor laws regarding children of Jehovah’s Witnesses); Pierce v. Society of
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (holding that compulsory public school attendance was a violation of
parents’ liberty interest); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (holding that law prohibiting
teaching children foreign language was a violation of parents liberty interest).
161
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982).
162
Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 845 (1977); Moore v. East Cleveland,
431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977); Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639–40
(1974); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651–52 (1972).
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interest in preventing the irretrievable destruction of their
family life.163
In short, the ostensibly good intentions of a public child welfare agency
acting under parens patriae authority are not in themselves a basis for
intervention.
Alongside these constitutional developments, state laws gave more
explicit definition to the roles and authority of parents and other caregivers
in a child’s life. Wholly private or informal arrangements regarding the care
of children became less tenable for two primary reasons. First, as concerns
about child custody and parental rights gained the national spotlight,
agencies and agents who worked with families needed to ensure that they
were taking direction from people who had the authority to provide it. For
example, schools required proof of such authority to enroll children, and
physicians required it to provide health and other services at the request of
an adult who purported to act on behalf of and in the interests of a child in
their care.164 Entitlement to some government benefits and services were
also often based on the legal relationship among household members.165
The second reason for some caregivers to seek a legally defined role
with respect to the children in their care is to obtain some measure of
enforceable rights of their own, given that parents otherwise would have an
unlimited authority to end the caregiving arrangement. Informal agreements
between parents and caretakers can be broken. Parents can change their
minds. Relationships can sour or end. If a caregiver wants security of access
to the child in the face of such changes, they must have enforceable legal
rights, if not as a full “parent” then in some other legally-defined role.
During the latter half of the 20th century, courts and eventually state
legislatures faced new questions about the legal status of non-parent
caregivers or others who played a significant role in a child’s life. These
included grandparents, stepparents, and the unmarried partners of legal

163
Santosky, 455 U.S. at 753. See also M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 116–17 (1996) (“[T]he State's
authority to sever permanently a parent-child bond, demands the close consideration the Court has long
required when a family association so undeniably important is at stake.”).
164
See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 164.502 (2018) (HIPAA regulations that requires providers to only disclose
information about minor to those who are “under applicable law a parent, guardian, or other person acting
in loco parentis has authority to act on behalf of an individual who is an unemancipated minor in making
decisions.); id. at § 10:4.2 (“Without parental consent, a doctor, nurse or other medical professional who
provides treatment risks liability.”).
165
Some states limit Temporary Aid to Needy Families “family” or “child-only” grants to adults
with a family-like relationship to the children if they have legal custody or guardianship of the children
(or are seeking the same). Ana Beltran, Improving Grandfamilies’ Access to Temporary Assistance for
Needy Families, 1 GRANDFAMILIES: CONTEMP. J. RES., PRAC. & POL’Y 56 (2014); Carol B. Cox, Policy
and Custodial Grandparents, 11 MARQ. ELDER'S ADVISOR 281, 285-88 (2010); see, e.g., CONN. GEN.
STAT. 17b-112(a) (2019); 16 DEL. ADMIN. CODE § 5100-3004 (2018).
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parents, especially in same-sex households.166
Concerns about children in troubled families and the role of other family
members in addressing their needs gave rise to important legal developments
regarding the legal status of grandparents and other close relatives. While
intrafamilial estrangement and conflict was certainly nothing new, the idea
of parents and other relatives—including grandparents—being opposing
litigants or interested parties in the same court proceedings involving a
minor child and parental fitness was previously uncommon. The increasing
possibility of such courtroom and legislative disputes raised questions about
the value and role of non-parent relatives in the lives of children and also
about the role of courts and public agencies in preserving or limiting those
roles in light of the constitutional rights of parents.167
One of the most significant developments in non-parent caregivers’ legal
status came during the 1970s and 1980s, when every state enacted some
form of a Grandparents Visitation Act (GVA), a law that enables some
grandparents to obtain court-ordered access to a grandchild over the
objection of a child’s parents.168 A number of demographic forces led to the
rapid and universal adoption of GVAs. These included a sharp increase in
divorce and other reasons for single-parent households, such as the death of
a parent, leading to estrangements within extended families and other
barriers to grandparents' continued access to their grandchildren.169 At the
same time, older Americans were becoming a significant political force; they
were “greater in number, healthier, and more politically conscious, and

166
See generally Josh Gupta-Kagan, Children, Kin, and Court: Designing Third Party Custody
Policy to Protect Children, Third Parties, and Parents, 12 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 43 (2008);
Coupet, supra note 129.
167
See generally Gupta-Kagan, supra note 166; Coupet, supra note 129; Kathleen Meara, What's
in a Name? Defining and Granting a Legal Status to Grandparents Who are Informal Primary
Caregivers of Their Grandchildren, 52 FAM. CT. REV. 128 (2014); Stephen A. Newman, Grandparent
Visitation Claims: Assessing The Multiple Harms of Litigation to Families and Children, 13 B.U. PUB.
INT. L.J. 21 (2003); Andre P. Derdeyn, Grandparent Visitation Rights: Rendering Family Dissension
More Pronounced?, 44 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 277 (1985).
168
Anne Marie Jackson, Comment, The Coming of Age of Grandparent Visitation Rights, 43 AM.
U. L. REV. 563, 564, 570–74 (1994); ELROD, supra note 80, at § 1:2. New York enacted the first GVA
in 1965, and by 1862, every state in the country had adopted a GVA, with the vast majority being enacted
between 1975 and 1985. Karen J. McMullen, The Scarlet “N”: Grandparent Visitation Statutes That
Base Standing on Non-Intact Family Status Violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, 83 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 693, 693 n.3 (2012); Edward M. Burns, Grandparent Visitation
Rights: Is It Time for the Pendulum to Fall?, 25 FAM. L.Q. 59, 60 (1991); Derdeyn, supra note 167, at
277.
169
Jackson, supra note 168, at 575; Burns, supra note 168, at 59. These factors were also combined
with decreasing birthrates (making ties to grandchildren more valuable), increasing life expectancy
(meaning grandparents were around longer to develop relationships with grandkids), increased family
estrangement of extended families, such as from employment-driven migration and relocation. Jackson,
supra note 168, at 563-644 (citing Grandparents: The Other Victims of Divorce and Custody Disputes:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Human Services of the House Select Comm. on Aging, 97TH CONG.,
2D SESS. 71 (1982) and Grandparents’ Rights: Preserving Generational Bonds: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Human Services of the House Select Comm. on Aging, 102D CONG., 1ST SESS. 3 (1991)).
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powerful than in prior decades,”170 as one commentator noted in 1985.
Advocates for legal recognition of grandparent caregivers coined the term
“Grandfamilies.”171
GVA laws immediately became the subject of controversy. There were
concerns that such laws set up contests between parents and grandparents
for the affection of the child, increasing friction and animosity within the
family.172 Questions about the constitutionality of these laws were also raised
from the start, through both scholarly criticism and litigation.173 One
commentator noted: “A statute or court order requiring a parent to allow a
grandparent to visit with the parent's child intrudes on the parent’s
fundamental right to decide who may see the child and when and where such
meeting shall take place.”174
The U.S. Supreme Court eventually weighed in in 2000 with its opinion
in Troxel v. Granville striking down Washington’s “breathtakingly broad”
GVA.175 The opinion established the basic constitutional framework for
examining laws and court actions permitting non-parent interference with
parenting decisions, with implications for minor guardianship proceedings
as well.176 The trial court’s award of visitation rights to grandparents over a
parent’s objection, Justice Sandra Day O’Conner wrote for the plurality,
“directly contravened the traditional presumption that a fit parent will act in
the best interest of his or her child. . . . In that respect, the court’s
presumption [in that case] failed to provide any protection for [the parent’s]
fundamental constitutional right to make decisions concerning the rearing of
her own daughters.”177
One of the most significant implications of Troxel is that, as one court
noted, “the best interests of the child standard, standing alone, is an
insufficient standard for determining when the state may intervene in the
decision making of competent parents.”178 For the first time, the Supreme
Court applied the “superior rights” doctrine to limit interference by non-state
parties in parenting decisions.179 A court can grant a relative or other third
party access to a child only if it first affords the child’s parents the
170
Derdeyn, supra note 167, at 282. See also Jackson, supra note 168, at 564 (stating that success
was due to “well-organized efforts of grandparents and their supporters”); Gupta-Kagan, supra note 166,
at 76 (noting that state legislators found it “politically difficult to take a stand against grandparents” who
proved their “significant clout” repeatedly).
171
Gupta-Kagan, supra note 166, at 46.
172
Derdeyn, supra note 167, at 279, 281–82. See also Karen Czapanskiy, Grandparents, Parents,
and Grandchildren: Actualizing Interdependency in Law, 26 CONN. L. REV. 1315, 1346 (1994).
173
See, e.g., Burns, supra note 168, at 61; Jackson, supra note 168, at 577-87.
174
Burns, supra note 168, at 63.
175
Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
176
Gupta-Kagan, supra note 166, at 68. See also ELROD, supra note 80, at § 4:6.
177
Troxel, 530 U.S. at 69-70.
178
Rideout v. Riendeau, 761 A.2d 291, 297 (Me. 2000) (citing Troxel, 530 U.S. at 67). Some
commentators have argued that courts have placed more significance on the Troxel opinion than is
warranted. See, e.g., Gupta-Kagan, supra note 166, at 67.
179
Coupet, supra note 129, at 616.
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presumption that they are acting in their children’s best interests, employing
what is sometimes referred to as the “parental preference” doctrine or
“Troxel presumption.”180 This holding has shaped several developments in
family law, including contested minor guardianship matters.181
GVAs provide a route only to visitation with a grandchild. When
grandparents or other relatives who had served as caregivers seek custody
or legal status as a parent or the equivalent, they must pursue other legal
avenues, for example, by petitioning for rights as a “de facto” parent.182 Such
forms of status, based on the pre-litigation role the caregiver played in a
child’s life, provide the full rights of a parent and convey both “practical and
expressive value.”183 Achieving such status or even establishing standing to
litigate the question of custody, however, requires the grandparent or other
relative caregiver to overcome the significant constitutional limitations
confirmed by Troxel.184 Some courts have been reluctant to award
grandparents—as opposed to the former spouses and partners of parents—
status as “parents” under these theories.185 As legal scholar Sacha Coupet
has argued, U.S. family law is built around the implicit model of a “conjugalhorizontal” parental dyad. The possibility of a child’s legal “parents” falling
outside of this paradigm and crossing generations has been met with strong
resistance from courts and legislatures.186
3. How These Developments Contributed to Use of Minor
Guardianship as Private Child Protection
If we pull the strands of these legal and social trends together, we can
see how and why minor guardianship became primarily a mechanism for
relatives to obtain legal custody of a child when a parent is unable to provide
care. While kinship caregiving is nothing new, for many families it had
become increasingly difficult to leave these arrangements as strictly
informal, without involving courts at all.187 Minor guardianship provides a
route for a kinship caregiver to obtain a legally defined role.
180
See, e.g., In re K.H., 773 S.E.2d 20, 30 (W. Va. 2015); Tourison v. Pepper, 51 A.3d 470, 473
(Del. 2012); In re D.I.S., 249 P.3d 775, 784 (Colo. 2011); In re Guardianship of Reena D., 35 A.3d 509,
513 (N.H. 2011).
181
See, e.g., Matter of Guardianship of W.L., 467 S.W.3d 129, 133 (Ark. 2015); In re Guardianship
of Chamberlain, 118 A.3d 229, 238 (Me. 2015); Guardianship of Richard C., B247332, 2014 WL
1316684, at *8 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 2, 2014); In re D.I.S., 249 P.3d 775, 776 (Colo. 2011).
182
Meara, supra note 167, at 132–33; Elizabeth Barker Brandt, De Facto Custodians: A Response
to The Needs of Informal Kin Caregivers?, 38 FAM. L.Q. 291, 302–305 (2004) (discussing Kentucky’s
“de facto custodian” law).
183
Coupet, supra note 129, at 611.
184
Gupta-Kagan, supra note 166, at 73–84 (analyzing the “overwhelmingly confused” body of case
law in state courts regarding the standing of non-parent caregivers seeking custody rights).
185
Meara, supra note 167, at 132–33.
186
Coupet, supra note 129, at 615, 636.
187
RELATIVES RAISING CHILDREN, supra note 151, at 74 (“The overwhelming majority of kinship
caregivers never see the inside of a courtroom or seek the approval of a judge. In these situations, the
caregiver has physical custody only.”).
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Because, as noted above, information about the families who pursue
guardianship is limited, little is known about the incidence, characteristics,
strengths, or challenges of the children or relative caregivers involved with
these cases.188 As two social work scholars observed in a recent article: “The
research literature on legal guardianship is remarkably sparse.”189 My
analysis in what follows is based on research on how minor guardianships
are used in Maine and on what can be gleaned about their use nationally
from the existing cases, reports, and other materials.190
a. Obtaining Authority to Make Decisions Regarding Children in
their Care
The initial and most apparent reason that relative caregivers seek
appointment as a legal guardian is to obtain the legal authority to act as
substitute parent with respect to the child's schools, doctors, and other
providers. Just as there was a need for a guardian to manage property in the
19th century, there is a need today for legal authority to do what is reserved
for parents in terms of decision making, accessing education and care, and
receiving public benefits.191 When a child is placed in the care of a
grandparent, parents do not always execute legal documents, such as powers
of attorney, to delegate parental rights to the grandparent.192 Even if a parent
has done so, legal guardianship is specifically required to take certain actions
with regard to a child, for example, accessing public benefits for the child or
enrolling them in school.193 Having legal guardianship is important for a
caretaker’s interactions with other institutions and systems as well. For
example, many prisons and jails will not permit a child to visit an
incarcerated parent unless accompanied by another parent or legal

188

Berrick & Hernandez, supra note 7, at 26; Gleeson et al., supra note 6, at 300-01.
Berrick & Hernandez, supra note 7, at 26. See also AECF, supra note 158, at 2 (noting that little
information is available about families affected by kinship diversion practices).
190
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ACT 56 MINOR GUARDIANSHIP COMM., MINOR GUARDIANSHIP PROCEEDINGS IN VERMONT: 2012
REPORT TO THE VERMONT LEGISLATURE (2012), https://www.vermontjudiciary.org/sites/default/files/
documents/Minor_Guardianship_Proceedings_in_VT_2012.pdf.
191
RELATIVES RAISING CHILDREN, supra note 151, at 77 (noting that some relatives must use
“creative ways to maneuver around” the parental consent requirements, including waiting until medical
need merits a trip to the emergency room); Cox, supra note 165, at 286, 296–98; Meara, supra note 167,
at 130–31; Brandt, supra note 182, at 294–95. For example, a written delegation of parental rights or
“power of attorney” is not usually sufficient to obtain legal authority for enrollment. Brandt, supra note
182, at 295, 300. One scholar has noted that, while kinship families face numerous stressors, “one of the
most vexing hurdles they face is the ambiguous, often tenuous legal status.” Coupet, supra note 129, at
608.
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Mary C. Rudasill, Grandparents Raising Grandchildren: Problems and Policy from an Illinois
Perspective, 3 ELDER L.J. 215, 217–18 (1995); Coupet, supra note 129, at 609.
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Gupta-Kagan, supra note 166, at 46; Duques, supra note 6, at 91.
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guardian.194 Families in these situations must pursue a court action in order
to meet a child’s immediate needs.195
Clearly, then, minor guardianship provides relative caregivers with a
route to obtaining necessary legal status for providing care for children,
sometimes to address an immediate need. But it also requires families to use
a legal tool designed for complete, permanent assumption of parenting
responsibilities for a minor. Most guardianship laws, as discussed further in
Part III, are a poor fit for the actual needs of today’s families.
b. Avoiding State Intervention and Foster Care
As indicated by the title of this Article, “Keeping it in the Family,” a
major reason for relatives to seek guardianship is to ensure that the family—
and not the state—has the central role in addressing a child’s needs when the
parent is unable to do so.196 The use of guardianships for this purpose
originated in observations and proposals published by several scholars in the
social work field in the mid-20th century.197 As the child welfare system and
foster care expanded, these scholars urged consideration of guardianships as
an alternative to foster care and adoption to preserve familial ties while also
ensuring care and stability for the child.198 These initial suggestions were
about children already formally in the child welfare system, but they shaped
the re-framing of minor guardianship into a mechanism to help families in
need due to parents’ limited ability to provide care for children.199
Guardianship did not immediately gain ground as an alternative to foster
care in the wake of these arguments because national child welfare trends
placed emphasis on the goals of either reunification or adoption;
194
This is the policy in several Maine institutions. Our Clinic represented an incarcerated mother
who consented to having her mother appointed as legal guardian of the client’s infant daughter so that
she could have contact with the baby during her incarceration for a drug-related conviction.
195
Berrick & Hernandez, supra note 7, at 25; JACOBS, supra note 54, at § 7.14 n.12.
196
Cf. Gleeson et al., supra note 6, at 300-01 (summarizing prior research findings that relative
caregivers’ motivations for providing kinship care include keeping the child out of foster care and “within
the family”); id. at 306 (describing authors’ research findings confirming the same). See also CASEY
FAMILY SERVS., A STUDY OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT’S PROBATE COURTS AND THE MANAGEMENT
OF CHILDREN’S MATTERS INVOLVING CUSTODY AND GUARDIANSHIP, FINAL REPORT 5 (2003)
[hereinafter “CFS FINAL REPORT”] (describing reasons relative caregivers seek guardianship and how
such actions means that a “significant number of children are not becoming wards of the state”).
197
Bogart R. Leashore, Demystifying Legal Guardianship: An Unexplored Option for Dependent
Children, 23 J. FAM. L. 391, 393–97 (1984); HASSELTINE BYRD TAYLOR, Guardianship or “Permanent
Placement of Children”, in THE LAW OF THE POOR 417 (Jacobus tenBroek ed. 1966); Alice Scott Hyatt,
Guardianship of Children, SOCIAL SECURITY BULLETIN, Jan.–Feb. 1950, at 10; IRVING WEISSMAN,
GUARDIANSHIP: A WAY OF FULFILLING PUBLIC RESPONSIBILITY FOR CHILDREN (n.d.) (publication date
does not appear in book itself; other sources consistently cite it as 1949).
198
Testa & Miller, supra note 136, at 412–13; Testa, supra note 150, at 120–21; CAROL W.
WILLIAMS, Expanding the Options in the Quest for Permanence, in CHILD WELFARE: AN AFRICENTRIC
PERSPECTIVE 266, 276–82 (Joyce Everett, Bogart Leashore, & Sandra Stukes Chipungu, eds. 1992)
(noting that “guardianship complements the social and cultural reality of many African American
children”); Leashore, supra note 197, at 393–97.
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Leashore, supra note 197, at 393 (“Typically, probate guardianship over a child occurs if a
child’s parents die or become incapacitated and someone assumes legal control of the child.”).
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guardianship neither returned children to their parents nor provided a degree
of permanency equivalent to adoption.200 But as children were increasingly
placed with relatives after removal from their parents’ care, agencies and
policymakers had to consider the potential role of relatives for permanency
outcomes, not merely placement. With the increasing use of kinship
caregivers as foster parents, there were fewer adoptions out of foster care. In
contrast to non-relative foster families, relatives providing such care were
often reluctant to seek adoption when it meant that the court would, as part
of that process, also terminate the parental rights of their own adult child or
another close relative.201 Some kinship caretakers felt that they already had
a defined familial relationship with the child and saw little need to place a
“parent” label on it through formal adoption.202 With reunifications and
adoptions on the decline, guardianship became a more acceptable alternative
form of permanency for children in foster care.
When Bogart Leashore, an influential scholar writing in the 1980s, reimagined minor guardianship as a child welfare tool, it was because he saw
the potential benefits of guardianship for children without property and
otherwise in need of care.203 In his research, he had noted that significant
numbers of children—particularly children of color—who had been
removed from their parents’ homes were not likely either to return to those
homes or to be adopted into other families.204 He observed that familial
bonds are not easily broken and that the emotional impact on children of
removal from their families was often severe. Appointing a relative as a
child’s guardian, he argued, could preserve the child’s kinship ties.205
Specifically, guardianship would allow the child’s parents to remain in
their life and perhaps even to have a role in the placement selection. Children
would be in the care of their own relatives or of others who knew them and
who would not “deny the existence of their parents,” thus further enabling
them to sustain familial ties.206 Such arrangements, he argued, could
alleviate the “identity problems” that often accompanied adoption, as
evidenced by the number of adoptees who search out their birth families later
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in life.207 As had earlier scholars, Leashore noted that, while a state may
“take custody” of a child, it can never really function as a substitute parent
providing day-to-day care. Non-relative foster parents appointed by the state
are limited in their role because their authority must be specifically delegated
by the state, and they function more as a “hired hand” than as a member of
a family.208 In addition, foster care often involves disruption and uncertainty,
as well as the potential for abuse or neglect.209 Guardianship would thus
provide a route to securing a legal relationship by another relative without
the finality of adoption.210
The model of guardianship that Leashore promoted differed from
traditional probate guardianship in several important respects. The guardians
could receive public subsidies like those provided to foster and adopting
families. There would also be a continuing role for the child welfare agency
in assessing the child’s well-being, setting up and supervising visits with
parents, and providing ongoing services to the family to support potential
reunification.211 Given what he saw as its many potential advantages,
Leashore urged legal and social work professionals to stop associating
guardianship with death and property and, instead, to use it for any child
who needs “protection, love, care, and guidance.”212
Leashore’s ideas gained traction with other scholars213 and eventually
with policymakers. His model is reflected in what is commonly known as
“kinship” or “permanency” guardianship.214 With the support of federal
funds for demonstration projects, a number of states developed laws for
guardianship as another permanency option for children in state custody who
could not be returned to their parents’ care but were also, either because of
the child’s age or a relative caregiver’s reluctance to pursue that option, not
likely to be adopted.215 Under this new, hybrid form of guardianship, the
court overseeing the dependency proceeding can transfer custody of the
child from the state to the relative caregiver.216 These permanency
207

Leashore, supra note 197, at 394.
Id. at 395.
Id. at 396.
210
Id. at 397.
211
Id. at 398–99.
212
Id. at 400.
213
WILLIAMS, supra note 198, at 276-78; Meryl Schwartz, Reinventing Guardianship: Subsidized
Guardianship, Foster Care, and Child Welfare, 22 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 441, 457-73 (1996);
Testa & Miller, supra note 136, at 412-14; Ann E. Ross, Stability in Child-Parent Relations: Modifying
Guardianship Law, 33 STAN. L. REV. 905, 907, 909 (1981) (“Guardianship, in theory, enhances the
custodial family's integrity while maintaining the tie between biological parents and their child.
Proponents of guardianship claim that it assures the child a stable family relationship when it appears
unlikely that the child can return to its parents and when adoption is inappropriate.”).
214
Testa & Miller, supra note 136, at 412–15; Testa, supra note 150, at 120-21.
215
HUNTINGTON, supra note 15, at 129; Cox, supra note 165, at 290.
216
Berrick & Hernandez, supra note 7, at 27. There are specific federal law requirements for such
arrangements, including that the relative caregiver must have provided care for the child for at least six
months, that other permanency options were ruled out, and that there is a strong relationship between the
208
209
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guardianships—which remain distinct from traditional probate guardianship
and are limited to families in the formal child welfare system—are now
potentially available.217 Unfortunately, despite their useful, innovative
features, these tools remain in only limited use.218
It was not until the final decades of the 20th century that traditional
probate guardianship was significantly re-purposed as a potential private
child protection tool to address the problems Leashore identified and to serve
the basic goals he advanced, that is, to keep children out of foster care and
to maintain familial ties.219 With legal standards that consider both the
child’s needs and parental fitness, a guardianship case can strongly resemble
a dependency proceeding. It differs in that, rather than a state CPS agency
seeking a change in legal custody based on allegations of parental unfitness,
it is the petitioning relative who does so. What is crucially limiting here is
that, by pursuing guardianship on their own, families must still use the
standard guardianship law. Those statutes still rooted in the orphan model
lack the innovations advanced by Leashore, reflected now only in
“permanency guardianships.”
This shift to the increased use of guardianship by families was, in part,
facilitated by child welfare agencies. The benefits of kinship placement and
permanency demonstrated that guardianship could be a way to avoid a
dependency proceeding entirely by having a relative directly assume care of
a child and obtain the legal authority to do so, such placement bypassed the
need for any formal state intervention. For some agencies, guardianship was
an extension of kinship diversion and therefore a way to avoid a number of
burdens that followed when a child when seen to be in need or removed from
a parent: taking on a family in the caseload, identifying a potential foster
family or, alternatively, assisting a relative caregiver with foster care
licensing and payment, and providing reunification services.220 Once a legal
guardianship was in place, the agency could close its file on the family.221
relative caregiver and the child. Id. at 28. States provide guardianship households federally-backed
subsidies under Guardianship Assistance Programs (GAP). Katz, supra note 202, at 1096–97.
217
Most states, the District of Columbia, and some tribal jurisdictions, have enacted statutes
authorizing subsidized guardianships. Berrick & Hernandez, supra note 7, at 28; Cynthia Godsoe,
Parsing Parenthood, 17 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 113, 145 (2013)
218
Godsoe, supra note 217, at 144-48 (noting that permanency guardianship statutes has failed to
bring about a needed “paradigm shift” in child welfare policy due to “implicit bias, both on a systemic
level and through individual workers”). Some policymakers and public agencies regard permanency
guardianships as not sufficiently “permanent” because a parent maintains their right to seek modification
or termination. This debate implicates an important distinction between “lasting” and “binding”
attachments. Testa & Miller, supra note 136, at 415–16. Some research indicates that adoption, although
more legally “binding” is just as vulnerable to “disruption” as guardianship. Id. at 417–18. This may be
because the attachments created through adoption are not as “lasting” as those created through the family
bonds that are the prerequisite to permanency guardianship.
219
Testa & Miller, supra note 136, at 407–08.
220
GA. OFFICE OF THE CHILD ADVOCATE, REDUCING THE FOSTER CARE ROLLS: ARE WE USING
THE RIGHT TOOLS? 3 (2009).
221
Id. at 9; Julia Zalenski, Minor Guardianships Created by the Probate Court When the
Department for Children and Families is Involved: Problems with Possible Solutions, 37 VT. B.J. 26, 28
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One Vermont probate judge described favorably the “family engagement
strategies” of his state’s child welfare agency. “[P]robate guardianships,” he
noted, “have value for families who take control of their own family
problems.”222 Specifically, he explained, “There is a value for the state to
provide a forum for family resolution of issues within a legal framework
outside” of the formal child protection context.223
Petitioning for guardianship also emerged as a strategy used by families
to avoid any level of involvement by a child welfare agency.224 As I discuss
in Part III, even with the increased use of kinship placement, the child
welfare system does not serve many families well.225 More often than not,
state child welfare agencies will not place children with relatives after
removal from the home.226 While families had long engaged in informal
kinship care to stave off state intervention, a court appointment as a guardian
provided far more security against any such interference.227 One
grandmother said she got “legal custody”—presumably guardianship—of a
child in her care after kinship diversion because otherwise the state could
“still come in and take my [] child away.”228
Also, through a guardianship, a parent in some sort of difficulty may
arrange for a third person to assume parental duties without an otherwise
disturbing and damaging court finding of “unfitness.” In fact, most minor
guardianships are created with the consent of the parent.229 As one
commentator observed: “Guardianships give parents an opportunity to
temporarily relieve themselves of the burdens involved in raising a child,
thereby enabling parents to take those steps necessary to better their situation

(2011). Because much of this practice is “off the books” and not part of the reporting obligations by
public welfare agencies (the cases were just reported as investigated and not needing further intervention)
it is impossible to know how many children ended up in a relative’s care through minor guardianship at
the behest of a public welfare agency, or by a family to avoid the threat of a child’s removal by the same).
See NAT’L COAL. FOR CHILD PROT. REFORM, TEXAS HIDE ‘EM: NEARLY TWO-THIRDS OF STATE’S
FOSTER CARE PLACEMENTS ARE “OFF THE BOOKS” (2016), https://www.nccprblog.org/2016/04/texashide-em-nearly-two-thirds-of.html (“Kinship care almost always is a better, safer option than stranger
care. But it is still foster care.”).
222
George K. Belcher, Custodial Kinship Guardianships for Minors: A Response to Zalenski, 38
VT. B.J. 25 (2012) (emphasis added).
223
Id. at 25.
224
Gupta-Kagan, supra note 166, at 62.
225
Weisz & McCormick, supra note 18, at 197.
226
Gupta-Kagan, supra note 166, at 61 (noting that research indicated that only a quarter of children
in foster care lived with relatives).
227
Weisz & McCormick, supra note 18, at 197 (noting a shifting in the numbers of children in Los
Angeles County living with relative caregivers rather than foster care); Duques, supra note 6, at 91.
228
AECF, supra note 158, at 4. Guardianship as private child protection was a trend also consistent
with and embraced by the goals and positions of grandparents’ advocacy groups. See, e.g., AM. ASSOC.
OF RETIRED PERS., RAISING GRANDKIDS: LEGAL ISSUES, https://www.aarp.org/relationships/friendsfamily/info-08-2011/grandfamilies-guide-legal-issues.html.
229
Berrick & Hernandez, supra note 7, at 26. Smith, supra note 23, at 87 n.272. Both of these data
sets suggest that at least 75-80% of guardianship matters are uncontested. See also Belcher, supra note
222, at 25.
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so they can resume custody of their child in the future.”230 While that may
be the aim of many guardianship petitions, for many other families, as we
will explore in the Part III, the reality is more complicated.
In the 1980s, some states enacted a new form of private guardianship—
the “standby guardianship”—for the specific purpose of enabling families to
avoid state intervention when the need for a guardianship could be
anticipated, for example, in single-parent families where the parent had
AIDS or another potentially fatal illness.231 Such appointments enabled a
parent to ensure that a guardianship was in place and that a person of their
choosing could assume the role of substitute parent if the parent became
physically unable to care for the child or died232 while at the same time
preventing the child from entering foster care or being cared for by an adult
with no legal authority.233 As this approach has been available, however,
only to a small, narrowly defined set of families,234 the traditional form of
minor guardianship has remained the legal route best suited for pursuing
child protection while keeping it in the family.
c. A Route for Some Relative Caregivers to Obtain Custodial
Rights
As courts saw more intrafamilial litigation and conflict over the question
of who is a “parent,” many relatives caring for children saw guardianship as
a route for obtaining legal rights with respect to those children without
having to meet the difficult standing and other requirements to establish
parentage. When kinship care is provided informally, the household can be
subject to “upheaval at the whim of the children’s parent,” as one
commentator has described it; that is, if the parent returns from an absence
and demands custody of their child.235 Another observed: “Only a court’s
230
ELROD, supra note 80, at 4:6. See also Gleeson & Seryak, supra note 9, at 90–94 (describing
research findings regarding views of parents of children in informal kinship care).
231
HARALAMBIE, supra note 11, at § 11:6. This form of appointment was included in the UNIF.
PROBATE CODE § 5-202(c), and the UNIF. GUARDIANSHIP, CONSERVATORSHIP, & OTHER PROT.
ARRANGEMENTS ACT § 207.
232
These are distinct from a delegation of parental authority, which is not a court appointed
guardianship, and it most useful for travel, military service, or temporary illness. HARALAMBIE, supra
note 11, at § 11:5; UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-105. The parent’s rights are unaffected and can be exercised
in conjunction with the delegate.
233
McConnell, supra note 18, at 255-61. A 1992 report by an epidemiologist in the Journal of the
American Medical Association estimated that 83,000 minor children in the U.S. would lose their mothers
to AIDS. Id. at 257 (citing David Michaels, Estimates of the Number of Motherless Youth Orphaned by
AIDS in the United States, 268 JAMA 3456 (1992)).
234
The appointment of a stand-by guardian is triggered only by death or medically-documented
incapacity of the parent. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 5-202(c). The UGCOPAA provision broadened the
potential contexts in which a parental appointment could take effect. UNIF. GUARDIANSHIP,
CONSERVATORSHIP, & OTHER PROT. ARRANGEMENTS ACT § 207. Either provision requires both advance
planning (and therefore access to legal knowledge and services) and parental consent, either of which are
frequently absent by the time a crisis is identified, thus limiting its use in a wide range of contexts.
235
Rudasill, supra note 192, at 218, 273; see also Gupta-Kagan, supra note 166, at 46; RELATIVES
RAISING CHILDREN, supra note 151, at 77
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custody order can protect children from the uncertainty and potential risk”
of being “bounced from parent and grandparent and back again.”236
Adoption is not usually the best option for the relative caregiver as it is a
winner-take-all contest that pits the caretaker, perhaps a grandparent, against
the parent, perhaps the caregiver’s own adult child, and requires them to seek
termination of the parent’s rights.237 Third-party custody laws often require
the relative to “frame their claims to rights as parental claims,” which is not
generally how the caregivers regard their role.238 For many relative
caregivers, by allowing the relative to attain full authority over a child’s care,
guardianship is a better route to address concerns about stability and the
specter of the “reappearing parent.”239 Guardianship suspends but does not
permanently terminate a parent’s rights. For that reason, parents are more
likely to consent to the appointment of a guardian than to an adoption240 or
to a court order that provides permanent parental status to the relative.
Because a relative caregiver seeks status as a substitute parent—rather
than sharing custody and other rights with a parent—guardianship is a more
appropriate mechanism than custody laws for private child protection when
a parent’s abilities are limited. Deriving from the traditional tool to aid a
minor in the exercise of property ownership, the focus of minor guardianship
is on the child’s needs and the parent’s limited ability to meet them. In
guardianship appointments, the relationship between the child and the
petitioner is not a central question.241 While courts prefer to appoint relatives
or other adults who have some prior relationship with the child—and some
laws contain explicit preferences for certain relatives, such as
236

RELATIVES RAISING CHILDREN, supra note 151, at 77.
Many relatives do adopt children who have been in kinship care. Approximately one in five
children are adopted out of foster care by a relative (and presumably in most of those cases, the relative
was the foster care placement prior to the termination of the parents’ rights). Berrick & Hernandez, supra
note 7, at 28. But such formal steps appear unnecessary as a means of committing to raising a child.
Studies indicate that even in the absence of formal adoption, a relative’s commitment to caring for and
raising the child was not decreased. Mark F. Testa, The Quality of Permanence - Lasting or Binding
Subsidized Guardianship and Kinship Foster Care as Alternatives to Adoption, 12 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y &
L. 499, 533 (2005).
238
Murray, supra note 35, at 399-405 (emphasis added).
239
Rudasill, supra note 192, at 219, 241 (“Filing for guardianship under the Probate Act is the best
choice when the minor child is not in the physical custody of a parent and the sole issue before the court
is whether the guardianship is in the best interest of the minor based on the facts and circumstances
presented to the court.”). As discussed earlier, some relative caregivers attempt to use so-called “third
party” custody statutes, seeking “de facto parent” or similar status as a way to secure rights to the children
in their care when there is a dispute with a parent. With the high stakes of the relative being potentially
adjudicated as a legal parent of their children, parents are likely to contest these cases. Due to the
demanding standing requirements, which require showing of a close relationship between the caregiver
and child that is the equivalent to that between a parent and child, relatives often have only limited
success. Gupta-Kagan, supra note 166, at 50.
240
Ann E. Ross, Stability in Child-Parent Relations: Modifying Guardianship Law, 33 STAN. L.
REV. 905, 907, 909 (1981) (the guardianship concept, by serving as a middle ground between temporary
foster care and permanent adoption, seems to fit the needs of long-term foster children).
241
Gupta-Kagan, supra note 166, at 47 (noting that one of the aims of third party custody orders is
to “protect deep bonds” between the caregiver and the child).
237
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grandparents242—a parent-like relationship is not a pre-requisite. Indeed,
there often is no explicit threshold standing requirement to seek appointment
as a child’s guardian.243 A guardianship petitioner must prove only that they
are in a position to fulfill the duties of a guardian and that their appointment
is in the child’s best interest. In this respect, the petitioner assumes a role
comparable to the state’s in a child welfare proceeding. CPS agency social
workers of course have no prior parental role with respect to the children,
and the need for state intervention to provide the child with an alternative
custodian and caregiver is the key inquiry. However, as discussed in Part III,
guardianship’s distinctive features can also present significant drawbacks,
particularly for addressing families’ long-term needs.
We have seen how two trends—state intervention in the family and the
need for legal status for caregivers—transformed the original and primary
use of minor guardianship from a tool to manage the property of legal
orphans to a route for relative caregivers to achieve legal status of a child in
their care. Part III considers the practical and legal implications for families
of using minor guardianship for child protection, particularly where it
assumes this function out of necessity rather than legislative design. The
efficacy of minor guardianship in this role is assessed below against the
generally accepted key policy goals of child protection: that is, to provide
children with safe and stable homes; to preserve kinship ties and, in
particular, to preserve the parent-child relationship; and, when parents are in
crisis, to value the role of extended family in providing care for children.
There are two sets of implications to consider in this analysis. The first
are the practical implications of addressing the needs of children and a
family in crisis outside of the public child welfare system that has been
developed over the past 100 years specifically for that purpose. When a
family stays out of “the system,” it retains control of the arrangements for
the child’s care and avoids the legal and other risks that accompany state
intervention. At the same time, however, it loses access to the services,
subsidies, and forms of supervision that accompany a formal child protection
case. The second set of implications concerns the legal consequences and
impact on children and other members of a family in crisis when they seek
to address the situation specifically through minor guardianship. When a
242
See, e,g., N.H. REV STAT. § 463:10(V) (2017) (“If a parent’s substance abuse or dependence is
the basis for the guardianship petition, the court shall give a preference to any grandparent of the minor
who seeks appointment as guardian of the person or the estate, or both, for the minor.”).
243
See Gupta-Kagan, supra note 166, at 62 (advocating for low standing thresholds for third-party
custody cases so that children avoid or quickly exit from the foster care system). The other distinction is
the precipitating incident. In most guardianship cases, the guardian is already serving as a primary
caregiver of the child with the consent of the parent. In third-party custody cases, a person who has (at
least allegedly) acted in the role of a parent seeks court-ordered access or physical custody when a dispute
arises with the child’s legal parent, such as when a relationship ends or there is intrafamilial estrangement.
Some scholars, however, lump them all together. Where there are concerns about abuse or neglect of a
child, third-party custody statutes can have the added benefit of preventing state intervention and
placement in foster care, just as guardianships. Id. at 50.
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family uses minor guardianship for this purpose, certain advantages are
obtained. At the same time, the needs of the child and family are addressed
in the context of probate codes and probate courts, neither of which
developed to address the protection of children with living parents.
The analysis of these two sets of reciprocal implications provides a
backdrop for the final part of the Article, Part IV. There I propose a number
of ways that minor guardianship can be reformed to reduce inequities from
the dual public and private child protection tracks and to better serve families
where children are in need of protection.
III. THE CONTEMPORARY IMPLICATIONS OF MINOR GUARDIANSHIP AS
PRIVATE CHILD PROTECTION
As noted in Part II, some families use minor guardianship specifically
to avoid involvement in the child welfare system. This Part will examine
more closely why many families have significant concerns about
engagement with the system and the implications for those families
remaining outside of that system. Other scholars have considered many of
these reasons and implications in detail.244 I will only summarize them here
to illustrate an important set of considerations for the use of minor
guardianship for child protection.
A. Child Protection Outside of the Public System: The Trade-Off for
Families
The number of families who attempt to address a parent’s crisis outside
of the public child welfare system, relying only on informal kinship care, is
substantial. As one group of researchers observed: “It is clear that outside of
the child welfare system looms a much larger group of private kinship
families who may have similar needs [to families in the system] but who are
not attached to any comprehensive support system.”245 Some children live
with relative caregivers in private kinship care arrangements that were
encouraged, facilitated, or even required by a child welfare agency after an
assessment that the child cannot safely live with their parent.246 Many other
families made kinship care arrangements entirely on their own. There is little
data about these families precisely because of their limited involvement, if
244
See generally HUNTINGTON, supra note 15, at 93-95; GUGGENHEIM, supra note 101, at
174-212; WALDFOGEL, supra note 126, at 65-93; DOROTHY ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS 1-99
(2002).
245
Goodman et al., supra note 7, at 288.
246
A 2002 national study by the Urban Institute revealed that 300,000 children reside with kinship
caregivers each year as a result of placements by child welfare agencies that have not taken the vulnerable
children into state custody. Weisz & McCormick, supra note 18, at 203 (citing Jennifer Ehrle et al.,
Children Cared for by Relatives: Who Are They and How Are They Faring?, in THE URBAN INSTITUTE,
ASSESSING THE NEW FEDERALISM POLICY BRIEF B-28 1, 5 (2002)); see also Malm & Geen, Voluntary
Placement, supra note 152, at 179.
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any, with public agencies.247
Scholars and others draw several distinctions among categories of
kinship care, such as public, private, and voluntary, or other categories based
on the extent of government engagement, if any, with the family.248 The
implications I review below apply to most forms of private kinship care, of
which minor guardianship is just one.249 While these implications are not
unique to families that use minor guardianship, they are true for most such
families because pursuing guardianship nearly always means that they are
addressing their situation—or attempting to do so—outside of the public
child welfare system.250
1. What is Avoided: The Benefits of Staying Out of the Public Child
Welfare System
Over the last century, every jurisdiction developed an extensive child
welfare system to address the needs of children and families when a parent
is unable to serve as a primary caregiver for a child. Many families do their
best to avoid this system, however, even when a child is truly at risk of
neglect. The primary source of concern by parents, families, and children is
a loss of control once a government agency with enormous power to effect
permanent and radical change intervenes in a family.
The specter of government workers appearing and taking their child into
custody evokes horror for most parents.251 For the child’s relatives, even if
there is concern about the fitness of the child’s parent, there is wariness of
the state deciding where the child will live and perhaps limiting the relative’s
contact with the child. For the child, who commonly has only a limited
understanding of what is happening, the impact of the intervention may be
most damaging.252 In some cases, a child may be interviewed by a stranger,
such as social worker or even a law enforcement officer, and asked confusing
and difficult questions about their home life.253 If an emergency removal is
ordered by a court, a child may be suddenly taken from their home, friends,
pets, school, and the people who love them and know them best, with no one
able to tell them when or if they can return. Even if parents have engaged in

247

Goodman et al., supra note 7, at 288.
Berrick & Hernandez, supra note 7, at 25.
Id. They refer to minor guardianship as “government mediated” kinship care because the
government is involved in the form of the probate court.
250
It is not impossible for a family to be involved in both a dependency and minor guardianship
case, but those generally arise in one of two situations. First, there is concern about abuse or neglect by
the guardian. Second, if a family member brings a minor guardianship proceeding to collaterally attack
the dependency proceeding, perhaps to try to attain a kinship placement.
251
HUNTINGTON, supra note 15, at xvii, 84. Such scenarios can provide dramatic moments in film
and novels. The recent film The Florida Project effectively depicts the experience of CPS removal of a
child from both the parent’s and child’s perspectives. THE FLORIDA PROJECT (A24 Films 2017).
252
HUNTINGTON, supra note 15, at 84.
253
WALDFOGEL, supra note 126, at 67–69.
248
249
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severe neglect, the child may nonetheless feel a strong bond with them.254
For all concerned, the proceedings are marked by uncertainty and disruption,
with the risk of permanent dissolution of the family.255
A child who cannot continue to live with a parent is less likely to
experience the trauma of parental separation if they live with a relative rather
than non-relative foster parents,256 particularly because the child and parent
may continue to have regular engagement.257 Although federal child welfare
policy requires states to give preference to placement with relatives when a
child is taken into state custody, state agencies do not always do so. Once
the child is in state custody, the agency makes the decisions, including
placement.258 CPS workers have substantial discretion regarding placement,
notwithstanding the federal directives, and they are often reluctant to place
children with relatives because of assessments based on the (sometimes
dubious) social norms that led to the intervention in the first place,259 and
families have good reason to be concerned about the placement of their
children with non-relatives. Many “kinship” practices by public agencies are
problematic and inequitable.260
The child welfare system can be demanding on relative caregivers
serving as foster care families, who must meet federal licensing standards to
receive the subsidies granted to foster parents.261 Some relatives—even
those who had already served as caregivers—are unable to meet these
standards. A relative’s approval as foster parents may be delayed
significantly because of a criminal history or a determination that their
home, due to considerations of size or fire safety, is inadequate.262 Families
254

HUNTINGTON, supra note 15, at 85, 118.
AECF, supra note 158, at 4; Belcher, supra note 222, at 25 (noting that one reason parents prefer
minor guardianship over dependency is that “the family often experiences a loss of control”).
256
RELATIVES RAISING CHILDREN, supra note 151, at 1–2; Duques, supra note 6, at 90–91.
257
Gleeson & Seryak, supra note 9, at 90–91, 94–95 (describing ongoing engagement of parents,
including co-parenting, with children in informal kinship care); Goodman et al., supra note 7, at 289.
One study found that children in the public child welfare system have decreased well-being due to
difficulties from parental neglect and emotional separation. Grandmothers providing private care
benefitted from co-parenting assistance and support from the parents due to their ability to remain
engaged in the care of their children without approval from the CPS agency. Id. at 300–301. See also
MARTIN GUGGENHEIM & VIVEK S. SANKARAN, REPRESENTING PARENTS IN CHILD WELFARE CASES 43
(2015) (noting benefits for case outcomes of kinship placement when children have been removed from
their parents’ home).
258
McConnell, supra note 18, at 258; Gupta-Kagan, supra note 166, at 64; Belcher, supra note 222,
at 25.
259
Josh Gupta-Kagan, The New Permanency, 19 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y 1, 42–46 (2015);
Rob Geen, Kinship Foster Care, An Ongoing, Yet Largely Uninformed Debate, in KINSHIP CARE:
MAKING THE MOST OF A VALUABLE RESOURCE 15-19, 63–64 (Rob Geen ed. 2003); Murray, supra note
35, at 433-34 (noting that the state will choose whether to value a child’s caregiving network based on
“a range of values and normative commitments”).
260
Initially, placing children with relatives often resulted in lower subsidies, a practice that was
eventually found unconstitutional by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1979. Testa & Miller, supra note 136,
at 410; Miller v. Youkim, 440 U.S. 125 (1979).
261
Berrick & Hernandez, supra note 7, at 27; Duques, supra note 6, at 104.
262
AECF, supra note 158, at 4; Gupta-Kagan, supra note 166, at 63; Weisz & McCormick, supra
note 18, at 200.
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in these situations often face a particular disadvantage because they are
asked to step in unexpectedly, with little if any chance for planning and
preparation to receive a child in their homes.263 By contrast, foster families
are pre-approved for placements and simply await a call from a CPS agency
informing them that a child will soon be arriving at their home. Because of
these potential barriers to kinship placement, extended family remains an
underused resource for children in need of protection. As of 2013,
approximately 113,000 children, or only about 1 in 4 children in foster care,
were placed with family members.264 Evidently, when a child is removed
from their parent’s care and put into state custody, CPS workers will most
often place the child with a non-relative foster family.
The concern to families about loss of control regarding a child extends
beyond the initial placement determination by the CPS agency. Once the
child is in foster care, whether with a relative or non-relative, “the state calls
the shots,” as one CPS caseworker explained.265 The approaches generally
taken by CPS agencies when children are in care have been extensively
criticized. Some family advocates have argued that “Government is a poor
surrogate for family decision making.”266 The child’s family is beholden to
an under-resourced and overburdened system with a high rate of staff
turnover. Parents experience the proceedings as punitive and accusatory with
terminology such as “unfit,” “neglect,” and “jeopardy” used to describe
them and their parenting.
Parents and their advocates also complain that the bar a parent must clear
to satisfy the state CPS agency to regain custody of a child is beyond their
reach, particularly if the agency cannot or does not provide access to all of
the services needed to make progress to reunification.267 If a parent has not
been able to address the problems that led to the removal within a certain
time frame, they face losing custody of their child permanently.268 Federal
law imposes strict timelines on states to achieve “permanency” for a child
in state custody, and a court must conduct regular reviews of the case for
such a child.269 If a child has spent at least 15 out of 22 months in foster care
and still cannot be safely returned to their parent’s care, then the state must
263
Berrick & Hernandez, supra note 7, at 25; Geen, supra note 259, at 68; Gleeson et al., supra
note 196, at 301.
264
In some states, the placement occurs without court involvement pursuant to a “voluntary
placement agreement” that binds the agency, parent, and relative caregiver to a specific set of services
and actions. Berrick & Hernandez supra note 7, at 27.
265
AECF, supra note 158, at 4.
266
Id. at 2.
267
See WALDFOGEL, supra note 126, at 86, 90-93; Kara Finck, Negotiating for Services for the
Family in Court: Admissions to the Petition, in REPRESENTING PARENTS IN CHILD WELFARE CASES
133-46 (2015); Martin Guggenheim, Somebody’s Children: Sustaining the Family's Place in Child
Welfare Policy, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1716, 1728-31 (2000); ROBERTS, supra note 244, at 134.
268
Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 (ASFA), P.L. 105-89. See also ROBERTS, supra note
244, at 105-13.
269
42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(B) (2012).

314

CONNECTICUT PUBLIC INTEREST LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 18.2

seek permission to “cease reunification” efforts and develop a permanency
plan for the child.270 Such plan will most likely involve terminating the
parents’ rights and making the child available for adoption, perhaps by a
foster family. If a child in state custody has been living with a non-relative
foster family, that family may be hoping to adopt the child, which can further
encourage CPS workers to move towards termination of the parents’ rights.
Termination of parental rights legally severs the child’s relationship, not only
with their parents, but, unless the child is later adopted by a family member,
with their entire extended family, including their siblings.271 Thus the child
could be lost to another family, not only for the initial placement but
forever.272
By contrast, when a child is in informal kinship care, the family decides
what level of contact the parent and child will have and the extent to which
the parent has a role in caregiving.273 In many kinship caregiving
arrangements, the parent lives in the same home as the child and relative
caregiver, which would not be possible if the child were in state custody.274
And if the family determines that the circumstances giving rise to the
arrangement have sufficiently resolved so that the child may return to the
parent’s custody, there is no legal impediment to doing so.275
2. How Parents, Children, and Families May Miss Out by Avoiding the
System
While there are clearly good reasons for a family in crisis to avoid
having a child placed in state custody, there are important benefits attached
to such placement that are lost to children, parents, and relatives who remain
outside the formal child welfare system.
Many U.S. jurisdictions have developed specific policy goals for the
child welfare system and specific features to implement such goals. Of
particular significance here are goals that involve family preservation and
features that involve individualized assessment and family support.
Although such goals are laudable, the actual practices of agencies, courts,
and other players often fall far short of implementing the features adequately
or serving the goals effectively. The history of the U.S. child welfare system
is in many respects an unfortunate one. As many commentators and critics
270

Id. § 675(5)(E); WALDFOGEL, supra note 126, at 74; McGowan, supra note 127, at 29-30.
HUNTINGTON, supra note 15, at 84–85; Sarah Katz, Termination of Parental Rights, in
REPRESENTING PARENTS IN CHILD WELFARE CASES 293, 312 (2015); Duques, supra note 6, at 90–91.
272
Guggenheim, supra note 267, at 1737 (noting that “child welfare” was not viewed as “a social
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of a parent); Katz, supra note 271, at 312 (noting that agencies may try to focus a TPR hearing on the
bond developed between the child and the foster family in support of a “best interest” analysis in a
termination of parental rights proceeding).
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Gleeson & Seryak, supra note 9, at 87, 90.
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Id. at 90.
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Id. at 87, 94.
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have observed, not only have policymakers failed to provide that system
with adequate resources but, more importantly, they have refused to
acknowledge the extent to which the incidence of child abuse and neglect is
itself a result of social policy decisions that fail to address acute racial and
economic inequality.276 In identifying some of the benefits of the public
system and positive features of its design, I do not mean to idealize that
system or minimize its significant flaws in practice.
Children at risk of abuse or neglect may not come into state custody for
any number of reasons, the most obvious of which is that no one outside of
the family is aware of such risk. In many families, another strong factor for
remaining outside of the system is that another relative, for example a
grandparent or a parent’s sibling, has assumed, or is willing to assume,
primary care of the child. In some instances, this outcome may be due to the
family’s initiative to address the child’s need for care this way. In other cases,
as noted in Part II, it is a kinship diversion strategy initiated by a CPS agency
that has identified a relative who can assume “private” care of the child for
some time.277 In either instance, remaining outside the system has significant
implications for the family.
As the public child welfare system is currently structured in most U.S.
jurisdictions, a dependency proceeding is required for a family to have
access to the resources and supports provided by that system. Once a child
is in state custody, the CPS agency is responsible for assessing the suitability
of placement of the child for the duration of such a proceeding. While most
children fare better in kinship placements than in non-relative foster
families, not all relatives are a good option for providing care.278 When
children are in informal kinship care, the agency generally has not made an
assessment of the kinship caregiver, including their strengths, possible
needs, and home.279 In a dependency case, by contrast, the agency
investigates the suitability of the kinship placement and vets the individual
family members receiving visitation rights and those supervising parentchild visits. A potential kinship placement may be denied a foster care
license due to a serious risk to the child’s health or safety that, outside the
system, would go undetected. The foster care licensing standards and the
way they are implemented is the object of some criticism, but the general
framework aims to place a child in a safe home.280
276
See, e.g., Guggenheim, supra note 267, at 1735–36; ROBERTS, supra note 244, at 25-46;
WALDFOGEL, supra note 126, at 82–87; Vivek Sankaran, Is The Solution Really For More Children To
Enter Foster Care?, CHRON. SOC. CHANGE (Aug. 29, 2018), https://chronicleofsocialchange.org/childwelfare-2/is-solution-really-more-children-entering-foster-care.
277
See supra notes 152-159, 220-223 and accompanying text.
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Gleeson, supra note 37, at 247–48.
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This is true even pursuant to a VPA or diversion arrangement. Berrick & Hernandez, supra note
7, at 26; AECF, supra note 158, at 5, 11.
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Gleeson, supra note 37, at 247–48. In 2014, the Annie E. Casey Foundation and the American
Bar Association developed new model foster care licensing standards, that “for the first time, help ensure
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The prospect of foster care subsidies can provide an opportunity for the
relative to get their home into shape to meet licensing standards. And,
importantly, a relative who is licensed for foster care placement can receive
subsidies and other forms of financial support that are far greater than the
Temporary Aid to Needy Families payments under other kinship care
arrangements.281 Generally, having the state oversee and financially support
the child’s placement may minimize the chances that a child will be moved
from one unstable unsafe home to another within an extended family.
A primary policy goal of public child welfare laws is to reunify a child
with their parent as soon as it is safe to do so, and half of all children who
are placed in foster care do return to their parents’ homes.282 The design of
dependency proceedings reflects the assumption that the removal is a
temporary arrangement and that the best outcome is reunification. Orders
granting custody to the state are presumably structured to give the family the
best prospects for arriving at that outcome. To this end, the state is required
to develop and implement a reunification plan, sometimes referred to as a
“family plan,” that includes services, counseling, transportation, and other
features that the agency identifies as essential for the family’s success based
on the reasons for removal.283 Such plans commonly include a schedule for
parent-child contact, with specific conditions for such contact, including
location and the presence of a professional or family supervisor.284
If child in state custody has special needs, it is the state’s responsibility
to ensure that they are addressed. This can translate into the state providing
services and support for the child’s placement. The state may also order a
parent to take specific steps to address the problems that were at the basis
for the jeopardy finding, with a timeline for completing them. Such steps
may include the parent enrolling in treatment for substance use or mental
illness, completing parenting education classes, and other measures tailored
to their situation. The family’s progress under the reunification plan is
monitored by social workers and, based on how the parents and children are
children in foster care are safe while also establishing a reasonable, common-sense pathway to enable
more relatives and non-related caregivers to become licensed foster parents.” NAT’L ASSOC. FOR
REGULATORY ADMIN. ET AL., MODEL FAMILY FOSTER HOME LICENSING STANDARDS 4 (2014),
http://grandfamilies.org/Portals/0/Model%20Licensing%20Standards%20FINAL.pdf.
281
Berrick & Hernandez, supra note 7, at 26.
282
HUNTINGTON, supra note 15, at 85; Fred Wulczyn, Family Reunification, 14 CHILD., FAMILIES,
& FOSTER CARE 95, 95-99 (2004). However, agencies also engage in “concurrent planning,” in which
they simultaneously explore permanency options, such as adoption, for the child in the event that
reunification efforts fail. Id. at 98; ROBERTS, supra note 244, at 111-12.
283
HUNTINGTON, supra note 15, at 62; Hardin, supra note 46, at 157.
284
Weisz & McCormick, supra note 18, at 212–13; Center for Family Representation, Achieving
the Client’s Objectives to Shorten Foster Care Stays and Reunify the Family, in REPRESENTING PARENTS
IN CHILD WELFARE CASES 65, 78 (2015) (“Visitation plays a crucial role for the family throughout the
life of [a dependency] case, and research has shown that meaningful and frequent visits between parents
and their children are the single best predictor of safe and lasting reunification.”); Sonya J. Leathers,
Parental Visiting and Family Reunification: Could Inclusive Practice Make a Difference? 81 CHILD
WELFARE J. 595, 614–15 (2002).

2019]

KEEPING IT IN THE FAMILY

317

doing, the terms of the plan can be modified as needed. There may also be
court-ordered visitation with siblings and other family members to ensure
that the child’s kinship ties are preserved while in state custody even if they
are placed with non-relatives.285
In many states, jurisdiction over dependency proceedings is assigned to
courts specializing in cases involving children, including custody and
juvenile matters.286 Some of these courts are equipped with child- and
family-focused resources including on-staff social workers, child-friendly
waiting areas, and other supports.287 The court conducting dependency
proceedings may also be part of a Unified Family Court or other problemsolving court based on a therapeutic jurisprudence model.288 Children in the
child welfare system are sometimes involved in more than one proceeding
at a time (such as a juvenile matter in addition to the dependency
proceeding), and the fact that a court system can track and address the child’s
needs across the cases can be of considerable benefit to the family.289
Dependency proceedings are usually overseen by judges who carry a
docket of primarily child-focused cases and have developed expertise, based
on specialized training and direct experience, with the many issues that can
be implicated, both centrally and peripherally, in child welfare cases. These
issues can include substance use, mental illness, child development (physical
and emotional), trauma, parenting capacity, and similar concerns that are
regular features of dependency cases. This expertise can inform the judge’s
approval and oversight of the reunification plan, as well as crucial
subsequent determinations, such as orders to cease reunification and plans
for permanent placement.290
Because of the constitutional implications of state intervention in the
parent-child relationship, parents in dependency proceedings have a right to
counsel in most states and other due process protections.291 If the state
proceeds with a petition to terminate the parent’s rights, it can do so only if
“reasonable efforts” at reunification are first made, after which reunification

285
Some state laws provide grandparents or other relatives with limited standing rights to seek
visitation or otherwise participate in dependency proceedings. See, e.g., N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1081(1)
(2018); ME. REV. STAT., tit. 22, § 4005-H(1) (2018).
286
JACOBS, supra note 54, at § 2:33; HARALAMBIE, supra note 11, at § 12:2.
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See Jane M. Spinak, Family Defense and the Disappearing Problem-Solving Court, 20 CUNY
L. REV. 171, 173 (2016).
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Id. at 171-78; Unified Family Courts and the Child Protection Dilemma, 116 HARV. L. REV.
2099, 2108 (2003).
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See generally Hardin, supra note 283; WILLIAMS G. JONES, WORKING WITH THE COURTS IN
CHILD PROTECTION 7-9 (2006).
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Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753–70 (1982). Parents have the right to counsel at least at
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is ruled out,292 and it must meet a clear-and-convincing evidence standard
for such termination.293
The appointment of a guardian ad litem for children is a standard feature
in dependency cases. The level of qualification and training of such
guardians varies greatly, as does their role. Some may be “law guardians”
whose role is to advocate for the child’s expressed interests. Others may be
tasked by the court to investigate and report on the child’s best interest, as a
sort of check on the public CPS agency.294 Some are paid attorneys or mental
health professionals, while others may be community volunteers, such as
Court Appointed Special Advocates who have gone through a specific
training for their role but are not generally professionals.295 Regardless of
the model followed, however, every state provides a role for someone other
than the family or the state to weigh in on the child’s interests in dependency
proceedings.
The state has the full responsibility for prosecuting such proceedings. A
relative caregiver, even if they are serving as the foster care placement for a
child in custody, is not required to prepare and file any court papers
themselves. A relative can seek standing as an interested party in
dependency proceedings, but generally they do not need an attorney to do
so. Conflicts between family members may arise during proceedings, for
example, over kinship placement or permanency planning or when a relative
who has served as the placement seeks to adopt the child. But, since the state
is unquestionably the lead prosecutor in the proceedings, there is less chance
of long-term emotional damage and stress on kinship ties than when relatives
are opposing parties in a proceeding.
If a child in custody will not be returning to the care of a parent, the
involvement of the state in the child’s placement can have a significant
impact on the permanency opportunities for the family. If the child has been
placed in the foster care of a relative who wants to adopt the child, the state
CPS agency will often provide the resources needed to support that adoption
petition.296 Such crucial resources can include access to counsel, assistance
with the preparation of the petition, conducting a home study, and
performing other critical steps in the process that could present a significant
challenge and expense for a relative seeking to adopt the child outside of the
292
42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(B) (2012); HUNTINGTON, supra note 15, at 62; Wulczyn, supra note
282, at 97–98. States are not required to make such reasonable efforts in a few narrow categories of cases,
such as when a child is the subject of serious physical abuse. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(D) (2012).
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Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. at 769.
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Katherine Hunt Federle, Children’s Rights and the Need for Protection, 34 FAM. L. Q. 421, 426
(2000); Michael S. Piraino, Lay Representation of Abused and Neglected Children: Variations on Court
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public child welfare system. Also, because, in the dependency proceeding,
the parents’ rights will have been legally terminated, the petitioning relative
does not need to be concerned about obtaining the parent’s consent or
proving the parent’s unfitness. Finally, relatives who adopt a child in state
custody may qualify for specific subsidies not otherwise available to
them.297
Permanency guardianship—an alternative option for subsidized longterm placement with a relative caregiver—may be ordered only if the child
in state custody and has been living with the relative as an approved foster
care placement.298 Those guardianships can be modified or even terminated
based on the parent’s ability to address their specific problems, thus
presenting the opportunity for a continued connection with the parent and
extended family.299
As becomes clear, families in crisis who choose to use guardianship as
a route to address a child’s needs without direct state involvement face a
significant trade-off. Although they avoid the significant risks of such
involvement, as described in the previous section, they are at a significant
disadvantage in other ways. As indicated in this section, when a family is on
a CPS caseload, the child, parents, and caregiver have access to subsidies,
counseling, treatment, and other benefits.300 Parents and children have a path
to reunification and receive services specifically aimed at moving them
along this path. If such reunification is not possible, a relative caregiver can
be part of the permanency plan. Thus, while minor guardianship may
initially appear to be a positive turn to avoid a dependency proceeding,
relative caregivers who choose it are left with little support and assistance
when caring for a child.301
In view of the challenges facing households with children needing care,
the limited availability of supports and services to relative caregivers outside
of the public system is particularly significant. Kinship care households
have, on average, higher needs and more limited resources than other
households, whether or not there is involvement with the public child
welfare system. As compared with caregivers in non-family placements,
relative caregivers are older, less educated, more likely to be single, and

297
298
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foster care after a [dependency] proceeding have access to a greater range of services than children in
minor guardianships.”). In this respect, parents, caregivers, and children who are not in the child
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likely to have “fewer material resources.”302 More than half of such relative
caregivers are grandmothers.303 As of 2010, the average age of a caregiver
grandparent was 55, with one-third over the age of 60304 and many in poor
health.305 The presence of grandchildren in the household may limit the
family’s housing options or result in overcrowding.306 And the reason for a
grandparent being in a caregiving role may be that the child’s parent—their
own son or daughter—is incarcerated or suffering from substance use or
mental illness, any of which presents its own set of challenges for the family.
In important individual respects and in terms of the households in which
they live, there are many similarities between children in private kinship care
and those in the child welfare system.307 In both, a child may have been born
drug-affected or experienced significant trauma or instability before coming
into the relative’s care. 308 In both, the family is likely to have limited material
resources and to face serious emotional and practical challenges. Families
that address crises outside of the child welfare system have the same
significant needs as those involved in the system. What they do not have are
the same significant services and supports.
3. Policy Implications of Ideologically and Culturally Shaped
Perceptions of Families’ Relation to the Child Welfare System
This Article focuses on the legal and practical implications of using
minor guardianships for private child protection. Policies and practices
governing guardianship are shaped, however, by broader contemporary
views of private kinship caregiving, and there are significant ideological
dimensions to those perceptions, often involving matters of race and class. I
discuss these dimensions only briefly here because, in the absence of formal
data, my observations about them and about their effects on policies and
302
Berrick & Hernandez, supra note 7, at 30; Goodman et al., supra note 7, at 288–89; Cox, supra
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(2015)).
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Cox, supra note 165, at 283 (noting research findings that custodial grandparents are at increased
risk of heart disease and chronic health conditions).
306
Id. at 291–92.
307
Goodman et al., supra note 7, at 289; Duques, supra note 6, at 90; CFS FINAL REPORT, supra
note 196, at 48-51.
308
Cox, supra note 165, at 284; Gupta-Kagan, supra note 166, at 59. Goodman et al., supra note 7,
at 296–97 (study comparing grandmothers engaged in public versus informal kinship care in Los Angeles
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care). GA. OFFICE OF THE CHILD ADVOCATE, supra note 220. Such history can present additional
challenges for the relative caregiver. Cynthia Andrews Scarcella et al., Identifying and Addressing the
Needs of Children in Grandparent Care, B-55 NEW FEDERALISM 1–4 (2003) (9-13% of children living
with grandparents or other relatives “exhibit high levels of behavioral or emotional problems”).

2019]

KEEPING IT IN THE FAMILY

321

practices can sometimes drift close to the realm of speculation. While the
questions raised here can be best explored by social scientists with expertise
in these trends (and some have already done so), they require some
consideration in connection with the concerns of this Article.
Comparison of public-versus-private approaches to protecting the
children of parents in crisis is complex. Part of that complexity arises from
the often sharply different ways the alternatives are perceived. Involvement
by public agencies in the family in the U.S. today tends to be viewed in
distinctly negative ways by those who consider themselves conservative.
This tendency, which has been evident since the public child welfare system
was first developed more than a century ago,309 reflects the “small
government” orientation of conservatives, including many of those in
positions of authority with regard to child welfare, whether through election
to public office or other avenues of political influence. Former President
Ronald Reagan, a hero of this orientation, once famously quipped at a news
conference: “I think you all know that I’ve always felt the nine most
terrifying words in the English language are: I’m from the Government, and
I’m here to help.”310 Although he was referring on that occasion to trade and
tax policies and their impact on farmers, the quip reflects a more general
conviction that government assistance is a sign of failed policy. Not
surprisingly, Reagan’s words and sentiment are often invoked by those
seeking to limit social services to children and families through public
agencies.311
Those who view government involvement in ways that align with this
perspective and who—in courts and legislatures as elsewhere—see placing
a child in state custody as inherently undesirable, are among the key
proponents of kinship diversion practices and of minor guardianship.312 A
Vermont probate judge praised minor guardianship as a way for a family to
“step up and take custody of the child.”313 An analysis of the debate over
kinship diversion conducted by the Annie E. Casey Foundation concluded
that people’s view of whether or not the practice was beneficial depended on
how they generally saw the role of government versus the family in
addressing a problem.314 Another way that those suspicious of the welfare
309
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state can keep children away from the government (and vice versa) is
exemplified in the faith-based non-profit organization, Safe Families for
Children, which has created a network of volunteers, largely recruited and
organized through churches, to care for the children of families in
difficulties.315
Consistent with the alignment of views just described, much of the
criticism of private diversion practices, including minor guardianship,
originates with those with a liberal orientation who generally advocate for
increased public services for children and families through a strong welfare
state. Legal scholar Sacha M. Coupet has critiqued what she sees as the
broad political motives for the “privatization” of child welfare. She
comments:
A pervasive philosophical shift at the federal level prior to,
and
particularly
throughout,
the
Reagan
administration prompted movement away from “the public
commitment at the heart of the Great Society programs of
the 1960s and [early] 1970s and toward individual and
private solutions to social problems.” No area of social
service emerged unscathed, and the shift inevitably set the
stage for a diminished governmental presence in child
welfare service delivery.316
These critics of kinship diversion and minor guardianship commonly stress
the ways such practices place the child and family, especially those in
poverty, at a disadvantage compared with children and families involved in

315
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dependency proceedings.317 They also point out that, while guardianship
permits a family to avoid the uncertainty and disruption of a child
dependency proceeding, it also potentially allows a child to remain in an
unsafe situation and permits the state to avoid the obligations of providing
services to the family.318
If we shift our view of the comparison between minor guardianship and
child welfare services from ideological debates about the role of government
in addressing social problems to the perspective of the families that have
received the most scrutiny from public child welfare agencies, we see the
alternatives in terms of a very different sense of risks and benefits. These are
families at the margins rather than centers of power. While their advocates
argue that they are entitled to government assistance, they are themselves
often quite wary of such “help.” While there are deep roots for kinship care
practices in many cultures and societies, interfamilial care has had a
particularly important role in U.S. African-American communities.319 In
these and other communities of color, the self-sufficient “nuclear family"
has never been set as the ideal for a household or childrearing
configuration.320 Challenges presented to families in these communities by
economic, social, and political pressures has often obliged them to look
within their own kinship networks for assistance and support.321 And in fact,
for generations, families in these communities have employed child
protection systems of their own. They have done so in part to avoid any
engagement with the government: not, however, for ideological reasons but
because the risks of such engagement are multifold, substantial, and pose
very real threats to their survival as families.
As noted and documented by many scholars, the broad definitions of
“abuse,” “neglect,” and parental “unfitness” employed in the child welfare
system allows CPS workers to apply them to family arrangements that fall
outside tacit social norms that are themselves often shaped by biased
assumptions about race, culture, religion, gender, disability, and class.322
Such biases can be reflected in how agencies target families for disruption
317
AECF, supra note 158, at 5–9; Zalenski, supra note 221, at 28. Some suggest that kinship
diversion has an especially adverse impact on poor families of color. AECF, supra note 158, at 6.
318
Smith, supra note 23, at 70–71; ACT 56 MINOR GUARDIANSHIP COMM., supra note 190.
319
Coupet, supra note 129, at 602; Berrick & Hernandez, supra note 7, at 24; ROBERTS, supra note
244, at 7.
320
Coupet, supra note 129, at 605.
321
Coupet calls it a “rich system of interdependence.” Id. at 606–607. Scholars have noted the
longstanding and valued practice of informal “adoption” of children by relatives in African-American
families. This often occurs due to the death, divorce, or poverty of their parents, and may happen when
the children are quite young. Leashore, supra note 197, at 396–97. See also Gleeson & Seryak, supra
note 9, at 94–95.
322
See HUNTINGTON, supra note 15, at 73–76; Guggenheim, supra note 267, at 1735–36; Martin
Guggenheim, General Overview of Child Protection Laws in the United States in Representing Parents,
in REPRESENTING PARENTS IN CHILD WELFARE CASES 1 (2015) (noting that the term “neglect” can refer
to a “temporary lapse of care on the part of the parent, often involving some degree of willfulness” and
that status can be either quite detailed or “couched entirely in broad phrases”).
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and dissolution.323 For some communities, the bar for government
intervention has been shockingly low. The experience of Native American
families that led to the enactment of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA)
in 1978 is perhaps the starkest and most tragic example of the effect of these
biased social norms. Thousands of Native children were removed from their
families based on the assumption that they needed to be “rescued” from
conditions seen as inferior and exposed to the majority culture to ensure they
would be able to assimilate and succeed in the majority society.324 The
widespread practice was halted and remains in check only by the enactment
of ICWA by Congress.325
More recently, figures on the racial makeup of the families from whom
children have been removed reveals serious disparities and inequities, with
African-American families as the overwhelming majority of CPS caseloads
in urban communities.326 The nebulous conceptualization of parental
“unfitness” leaves much to the discretion of caseworkers. Actions and
conduct that would be considered unremarkable in middle- and upper-class
white families—such as alcohol and drug use—and that fall far short of
physical abuse or abandonment serve as grounds for removal of the children
in poor, urban families.327 Under this approach to parental “unfitness,” other
relatives in the family may be considered not as resources for alternative
care but rather as part of the problem from which children need to be
removed—the “apple doesn’t fall far from the tree” assumption. As was true
of immigrant families in urban settings at the turn of the century328 and of
Native American tribal members for decades after that, marginalized groups
have always been particularly vulnerable to intervention.329 Instead of
323

ROBERTS, supra note 244, at 16-25; HUNTINGTON, supra note 15, at xix, 73–76.
ROBERTS, supra note 244, at 248-51; Murray, supra note 35, at 419; Mississippi Band of
Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 32 (1989) (acknowledging the practice of “unwarranted
removal of Indian children from Indian families due to the cultural insensitivity and biases of social
workers and state courts”).
325
Pub. L. No. 95-608, 92 Stat. 3069 (1978), codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901–1963 (2012).
326
See ROBERTS, supra note 244, at 6–10 (describing the acute and longstanding problem of
discrimination against African-American families in the child protection system and describing “the
foster care system in the nation’s cities” as “an apartheid institution.”). HUNTINGTON, supra note 15, at
45.
327
HUNTINGTON, supra note 15, at 94 (noting that the majority of cases in which a state removes a
child from the home are based on “poverty-related neglect, which typically involves substance abuse,
inadequate housing, or inappropriate child-care arrangements.”). The vast majority of family
interventions of any kind by public CPS agencies—about 75%—are to address cases of perceived
“neglect”; 18% involve allegations of physical abuse.” Id. at 44–45. Racial inequality in mass
incarceration has a spillover effect in this realm as well. See Dorothy E. Roberts, Prison, Foster Care,
and Systemic Punishment of Black Mothers, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1474, 1491–1500 (2012).
328
HUNTINGTON, supra note 15, at 75.
329
These practices were reminiscent of the 19th Century “orphan trains,” an early form of “foster
care.” Although they may have stated benevolent purposes, the measures are harsh by today’s standards.
The Children’s Aid Society of New York developed a program to “save” poor children, generally from
Catholic immigrant families, from urban life by sending thousands of them to foster families in the
Midwest via the so-called “orphan trains.” These early “free foster homes” were criticized as little more
than indenturing since the children were expected to provide labor, and many of the children were not in
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permitting children in such communities to be cared for by other family
members, CPS workers plucked them from this worrisome “element” and
placed them in overcrowded institutions330 or with foster families far
different from their own. In short, families of color and low-income families
have long had good reason to take care of problems within the family.331
It seems, then, that advocates and analysts across the political
spectrum—regardless of the broader narrative they are trying to serve—
agree that state intervention at the expense of kinship ties reflects poor
policymaking. Given this shared sentiment, in the final part of this Article I
suggest some possible routes to common ground on better policies for
children and families in crisis.
B. Child Protection in Probate Codes and Courts: The Mismatch Between
Traditional Purposes and Contemporary Uses
The previous section explored how the public child welfare system
responds when a parent is judged unable to provide care for a child and
considered the general implications for families when such concerns are
addressed in some other nominally private way, either by kinship diversion
or a voluntary placement agreement of some kind. This section considers the
specific implications of private kinship care for families who use minor
guardianship to provide a relative with legal authority with regard to the
child in their care. For these families, in addition to the various
consequences—positive and not—of staying out of the public child welfare
system, there are specific implications of bringing the matter into the state
courts and of being subject to codes linked with probate matters.
As discussed above (Part II.B.), although most guardianship laws today
have persistent core features that reflect the laws’ historical origins and
purposes, minor guardianship is now used in a context far different from that
fact orphans. McGowan, supra note 127, at 14. The goal was not just to remove children from their
parents, but from their “elements” and a wholly different culture.
330
HUNTINGTON, supra note 15, at 75.
331
Gleeson, supra note 37, at 246. The depiction of child protection alternatives in J.D. Vance’s
recent bestselling memoir, Hillbilly Elegy, provides a good example of this complex political and cultural
dynamic. Vance, who is white and identifies himself as a conservative Republican, describes how he was
raised by his working-class grandmother “Mamaw.” He lied about the abuse and neglect he experienced
while living with his mother to ensure that he could remain with his grandmother rather than be taken
into state custody. J.D. VANCE, HILLBILLY ELEGY (2016). As the author explained in an interview with
Terry Gross on NPR’s “Fresh Air”:
[A] lot of times, [] child welfare bureaucracies ignore these extended
networks of kin that are really important to these children's lives. And so that's one
of the things I found when I was a kid - is that I wasn't really given an opportunity
by the child welfare worker to go and live with mamaw and papaw, which is what
I wanted to do. What I was given - an opportunity was to either shut up or to go
live with a complete stranger.
'Hillbilly Elegy' Recalls a Childhood Where Poverty Was 'The Family Tradition,’ FRESH AIR,
NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO (Aug. 17, 2016), https://www.npr.org/2016/08/17/490328484/hillbilly-elegyrecalls-a-childhood-where-poverty-was-the-family-tradition (emphasis added).
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giving rise to its original design. Significantly here, it is now operating
primarily as a private child welfare law to address the same concerns with
child protection that give rise to intervention by public agencies. Clearly,
guardianship laws reflect a significant mismatch between their historical
design and their contemporary use. The laws and the courts that administer
them are poorly equipped to support the policy goals of child protection and
family preservation.332 Indeed, in failing to serve those goals, they can in
fact undermine them, with significant consequences for the children and
families involved.333
1. A Policy Goals Framework to Evaluate Minor Guardianship for
Child Protection
I have used the term “child protection” in this Article to refer to judicial
intervention and related measures to address a child’s needs when a parent
is limited in their ability to provide appropriate care.334 In this section, I
assess the effectiveness of minor guardianships as a tool for child protection
so defined. The evaluation of any measure taken to address child protection
must focus on the extent to which they serve identified policy goals. Where
it has been determined that a parent cannot provide care for a child, the key
questions are: what is an appropriate response and what is a successful
outcome. As reflected in the development of the U.S. child welfare system
(and driven largely by federal funding priorities), the primary aims of such
interventions could be described as, first, ensuring that a child is not facing
an intolerable risk of abuse or neglect and, second, maintaining the parentchild relationship if it can be done so “safely,” as that term is understood by
agencies and courts, within a timetable.335 In light of more recent
developments, however, I would frame the implicit overarching policy goal
of child protection law today somewhat differently and more broadly:
protecting children from harm while valuing and preserving kinship ties to
the greatest extent possible. I explain this difference as follows.
The aforementioned broad goal of child protection includes three
interrelated strategies to serve that goal. The first and most obvious of these
is ensuring safety and stability for a child determined to be at risk of abuse

332
Zalenski, supra note 221, at 27 (“The fact that both of these proceedings could be used
effectively to remove a child from a parent's custody when concerns arise about the child's safety or the
parent's suitability as a caretaker initially may disguise critical differences between the proceedings.”).
333
Weisz & McCormick, supra note 18, 191–92.
334
See Nigel Parton, Comparing Child Protection Systems, in THE ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF
GLOBAL CHILD WELFARE 229–32, 236 (Pat Dolan & Nick Frost eds., 2017) (describing orientation of
U.S. child protection system, as compared with other forms of child welfare).
335
HUNTINGTON, supra note 15, at 61; WALDFOGEL, supra note 126, at 74, 78–79. Of course, the
extent that each of these concepts of “intolerable,” “risk,” “neglect,” and “safely” applies in a given case
is often in dispute in dependency proceedings.
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or neglect.336 This strategy is often best implemented by also protecting
kinship ties, thereby ensuring that children are being cared for in their family
home. Children who live in homes where they are safe and supported can
grow, learn, and thrive, and therefore emerge as an engaged member of that
family. Conversely, allowing a child to remain in a harmful situation in their
own home can lead to instability and trauma that can permanently damage
the child’s relationships with their parents and perhaps with other family
members as well.
There are many ways to ensure children are safe. The U.S. child welfare
system is one that, at least in principle, seeks to do so within the context of
the second major strategy: that is, protecting the parent-child relationship—
in both legal and nonlegal respects—by intervening only if and to the extent
it is necessary. While a child has important relationships with many adults,
including non-parent relatives, throughout their childhood, the connection
with their parents has unique legal and psychological significance.337 Parents
are never perfect, and many family homes and childrearing approaches are
or could be the object of valid criticism and judgment. But child welfare
laws are based on an assumption that most of those situations do not justify
intervention. Rather, our laws reflect the finding that children should live
with their parents to the greatest extent possible. This is not only a public
policy goal based in social science research; it is a fundamental
constitutional right.338 As it stands, child protection laws—whether public
or private—reflect this right by not intervening between children and parents
unless necessary. But our laws should also address the conditions that lead
to the need for intervention, that is, the economic, gender, and racial
inequalities that can lead to a family crisis (a parent’s incarceration,
substance use, mental illness, and so forth) and to the neglect and abuse of
children. Laws addressing these conditions are the most effective prevention
services we can provide to families and the most effective protection
services we can provide to children.339
The third strategic component of the broader goal of protecting children
while preserving kinship ties is to recognize the potential role of extended
family in supporting both children and parents in crisis. As discussed
previously, when the state intervenes to protect a child, an entire family is at
336
As many critics have noted, U.S. society has not embraced a broader goal of ensuring the welfare
of all children, including preventing childhood policy and addressing their health needs. The focus of our
child welfare system is predominantly on addressing children at risk of abuse or neglect. See, e.g.,
Guggenheim, supra note 267, at 1735-40.
337
ROBERTS, supra note 244, at 159; Godsoe, supra note 217, at 129-34; Josh Gupta-Kagan, NonExclusive Adoption and Child Welfare, 66 ALA. L. REV. 715, 730–32 (2015).
338
HUNTINGTON, supra note 15, at 61. Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of Durham Cty., 452 U.S.
18, 27 (1981) (“[A] parent’s desire for and right to ‘the companionship, care, custody and management
of his or her children” is an important interest that ‘undeniably warrants deference and, absent a powerful
countervailing interest, protection.’”) (quoting Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972)).
339
HUNTINGTON, supra note 15, at xiii.
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risk of the impact.340 Valuing the potential role of the extended family in
meeting the two other components of this goal requires engaging non-parent
relatives as potential resources and, no less significantly, limiting the extent
to which intrafamilial relations are strained by litigation and conflict. Unless
it is managed with care, litigation involving allegations of neglect or other
potential forms of parental unfitness can drive a wedge into families that
leaves lasting scars.341 Unlike the litigants in a personal injury or contract
case, family members will need each other beyond the time the litigation is
pending, and indeed far longer than the minor’s childhood.342 Through
adversarial litigation, however, familial ties for the child can be weakened,
not strengthened.343 Court filings and testimonial evidence filled with
disparagement and blame can widen rifts in the family precisely at a time
when support and interdependence is most needed.344 Because family
members—for example, a child’s grandmother and mother—know each
other well and the stakes involved are great, emotions can be extreme.345
Intergenerational family conflicts are among the most painful and damaging
I have encountered in legal proceedings.
2. Using Probate Codes for Child Protection
The specific implications for families of using guardianship for private
child protection can vary greatly from state to state or even within states.
How families are affected depends on how minor guardianship matters are
classified under state law. Many minor guardianship statutes are still within
the state’s probate code while others are located with the statutes for other
family laws statutes. Those minor guardianship laws that remain in state
probate codes tend to reflect the traditional orphan model for using such
appointments. A 2003 study by Casey Family Services of guardianship in
Connecticut courts noted in its summary of major themes: “Most striking
was the reflection from many around the state that the Probate Courts
operate according to an older set of rules that do not necessarily apply

340
The current federal public child welfare goal of “permanency” has been extensively criticized
for undermining family bonds in the interest of moving children out of the system too quickly and valuing
binding rather than lasting ties, which has had the effect of undermining the overall goal of preserving
kinship ties. Gupta-Kagan, supra note 146, at 32-37. There is no evidence that the results of these
policies and practices have been good for children and much to suggest that they have not. Stability, by
contrast, can be found through maintaining ties that run deep. See Testa, supra note 237, at 524-34; Katz,
supra note 202, at 1090-96.
341
RELATIVES RAISING CHILDREN, supra note 151, at 78; HUNTINGTON, supra note 15, at xii.
342
HUNTINGTON, supra note 15, at xiii-xiv.
343
Coupet, supra note 129, at 609–10.
344
See Newman, supra note 167, at 27–31 (discussing potential harm from GVA litigation when
family already dealing with death, divorce, or conflict).
345
HUNTINGTON, supra note 15, at 84 (“The people involved in family disputes often know one
another on the deepest personal level and are likely to have, as nearly all people do, complicated,
emotional relationships with particular histories.”).
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anymore to current guardianship matters.”346 As will be seen, the impact of
using guardianship for child protection in specific cases will depend on how
far a state has moved its minor guardianship laws and procedure from its
orphan model origins. The discussion below focuses primarily on states that
retain minor guardianship laws in their probate codes, including those based
on the UPC or UGPPA, as many of these potential implications are likely
true to at least some degree in all states.
Under any version of the ULC’s uniform laws, provisions for minor and
adult guardianship are largely parallel. The association between minor and
adult guardianship reflects their common origin. As discussed above (Part
II.A.),347 both were developed to address the legal disability of so-called
“imbeciles, idiots, and infants,” specifically to manage their property. In
some states, a single statute covered all the categories of “protected” persons
who needed to have a guardian appointed, with no distinctions in the
procedures, standings, powers, or duties. While most state laws now have a
separate section for each kind of guardianship, they maintain this close
alignment. Under the uniform laws, there is a common set of “General
Provisions,” which applies equally to both adult and minor guardianships,348
and similar language in many of provisions specific to each category.
Evidently, the drafters of these provisions aimed to preserve consistency
between the two aspects of the law,349 and, in many instances, such common
terminology or provisions are appropriate and useful.350 As minor
guardianship is increasingly used for child protection, however, aspects of
these parallel provisions are clearly inappropriate or counter-productive.
A key distinction between adult and minor guardianship is the protected
interest that may be compromised by the appointment of a guardian.
346

CFS FINAL REPORT, supra note 196, at 48.
WOERNER, supra note 38, at 1–2 (explaining origins of legal guardianship as providing a means
by which minors and “persons of unsound mind” could enjoy their property while they lacked the ability
to “legally dispose of or control” their property).
348
UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 5-101-5-117; UNIF. GUARDIANSHIP, CONSERVATORSHIP, & OTHER
PROT. ARRANGEMENTS ACT §§ 101-127.
349
During the initial development of the UGCOPAA, the ULC Drafting Committee specifically
discussed whether the uniform guardianship law should continue to include provisions for both minors
and adults. The Summary of the October 9-10, 2015 Drafting Committee meeting reflected that there
was discussion and “some disagreement about whether minors should be included.” But the committee
concluded that “separating the two might be outside the scope of this Committee’s charge” and ultimately
decided to maintain the provisions for minors in the new uniform act. Summary available at
https://www.uniformlaws.org/HigherLogic/System/DownloadDocumentFile.ashx?DocumentFileKey=e
95f23b4-9ab4-9443-9ea3-ca3717b098ec&forceDialog=0. During the drafting process, including the
final stages in which I was an observer, the Drafting Committee reflected less concern with adhering to
consistency between the adult and minor provisions than is reflected in the prior uniform guardianship
laws, and the committee specifically considered the implications of the Troxel opinion on guardianship
determinations. UNIF. GUARDIANSHIP, CONSERVATORSHIP, & OTHER PROT. ARRANGEMENTS ACT,
prefatory note 4. Nonetheless, the new uniform act preserves the common “General Provisions” and
substantial parallels between the adult and minor provisions.
350
See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 5-207, 5-314 (“Duties of guardian); UNIF. GUARDIANSHIP,
CONSERVATORSHIP, & OTHER PROT. ARRANGEMENTS ACT §§ 209 (“Duties of guardian of a minor), 313
(“Duties of guardian of an adult”).
347
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Specifically, while the appointment of a guardian for an adult is a limitation
on that adult’s fundamental constitutional rights, the appointment of a
guardian for a minor infringes on the liberty interests of the minor’s parents.
However, because the uniform laws continue to group both guardianships
together and the changes in the laws have been driven largely by those who
work with adult guardianships, such as scholars and practitioners of
disability or elder law, the emphasis on reform in guardianship law has been
on enhancing the rights of the “wards” or the persons under guardianship.351
This orientation means that the objectives of reform have not focused on
expanded protections for parents’ constitutional interests. The result is that
various reforms in the realm of family and child protection, including the
increased recognition of the constitutional implications of interfering with
the parent-child relationship, have not been incorporated widely into
guardianship statutes. As long as legislators and those drafting uniform law
strive to maintain consistency between minor guardianship and the rest of a
probate code, especially adult guardianship, it risks being significantly out
of step with the policy goals of child protection and maintenance of kinship
ties.
a. Does Minor Guardianship Protect Children?
On one level, minor guardianship is well-suited for providing safety and
stability for children. It grants a caregiver legal custody and the full legal
authority they need to provide care for a child. At another level, however, it
is not well designed for that strategy. For example, requirements for the
selection of a guardian appointed through a typical probate code process are
far less stringent than those required in the rigorous process for approval of
a kinship foster placement.352 During the initial appointment process, the
assessment tends to be focused more on a parent’s limitations than on a
potential guardian’s suitability to step into that role. Some state laws have
categorical exclusions—based on age or criminal history—for eligibility to
be appointed as a guardian, but most say little about the qualifications or
vetting process.353 State laws also vary widely in terms of the extent to which
a court must investigate the suitability of a guardian prior to appointment.354
Some explicitly require the petitioner to be a relative already serving as a
child’s caregiver, and most courts demonstrate a preference for kinship
placement in practice. While most statutes do not include an explicit kinship
351
See UNIF. PROBATE CODE, prefatory note to Article V, 491-92; UNIF. GUARDIANSHIP,
CONSERVATORSHIP, & OTHER PROT. ARRANGEMENTS ACT, prefatory note 2-4.
352
Berrick & Hernandez, supra note 7, at 26.
353
JACOBS, supra note 54, at § 7.15; see, e.g., ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. Ch. 755, § 5/11-3(3) (2015)
(prohibiting those of “unsound mind” or convicted of a felony, with some exceptions, from appointment
as a guardian of a minor); MO. ANN. STAT. § 475.055 (2018) (“no incapacitated or disabled person, and
no habitual drunkard shall be appointed guardian of the person or conservator of the estate”).
354
JACOBS, supra note 54, at § 7.15
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preference, that is the practice of many courts.355 Generally, however, the
standing requirement is undemanding.356
Once appointed, a minor guardian’s responsibilities with respect to the
child are, under most guardianship statutes, quite generic and modest. Laws
often include seemingly archaic language, for example, imposing the duty
to “become or remain personally acquainted with the ward and maintain
sufficient contact with the ward.”357 Such language makes sense when
applied to an adult guardianship, but seems odd and is certainly meager
when describing the duties of someone who will be a primary caregiver for
a child. In sharp contrast to dependency proceedings, there is little if any
monitoring of the guardianship or the child once the appointment is made.358
The failure of minor guardianship to address the needs of children, and
especially the children of families in crisis, is most evident in the virtual
absence of services and support for a child who has someone appointed their
guardian. As detailed in the preceding section, many of the financial,
treatment, and advisory resources most valuable for families in crisis are
only available through the public child welfare system. Guardians may not
be eligible for financial assistance beyond a TANF grant or food assistance
benefits, and the appointment does not provide access to specialized
treatment for conditions such as mental illness or addiction. A minor
guardian is empowered to make determinations about the child’s needs and
to seek services, just as a parent would. Unless, however, a guardian
specifically attempts to locate appropriate and available services and is
successful in doing so, no services will be provided.359 While many
guardianship statutes permit a court to order parents to pay child support to
the guardian, parents in crisis are not usually in a position to do so and
subsidies for the purpose are available only through special programs for
permanency/kinship guardianships.360 And, of course, under most
contemporary guardianships, the minor has no independent income or
property. This means that a child for whom a guardian is appointed will
likely be in a household with few resources available to meet either the

355
JACOBS, supra note 54, at § 7.16 (“When the parents are deceased, all things being equal,
relatives are preferred to others.”). Some state laws give preference to the person nominated by the minor,
if 14 or older, the parents, if alive, and after that, “preference is usually given to close blood relatives and
relatives with whom a minor resided more than six months.” Id.
356
CFS FINAL REPORT, supra note 196, at 49 (noting a lack of screening process for guardianship
petitions); JACOBS, supra note 54, at § 7.15 (noting that the general requirement for appointment as a
guardian is that the person is a “suitable adult”); see, e,g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-14-206 (2018)
(“The court shall appoint a guardian whose appointment will be in the best interest of the minor”).
357
UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 5-207(b)(1); see also UNIF. GUARDIANSHIP, CONSERVATORSHIP, &
OTHER PROT. ARRANGEMENTS ACT § 209(b)(1) (“A guardian for a minor shall [] be personally
acquainted with the minor and maintain sufficient contact”).
358
CFS FINAL REPORT, supra note 196, at 48-49.
359
Id. at 48-49.
360
Id. at 49.
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child’s or the guardian’s specific needs.361
The role in guardianship proceedings given to children themselves by
current laws could be seen as a positive or negative feature, depending on
one’s perspective. The long-standing provisions that give the equivalent of
party status to minors age 14 and older in guardianship proceedings can be
contrasted with the very limited status minors have under most family law
statutes, which generally speak only of a child’s best interests, reflecting the
court’s parens patriae role in such proceedings (for example, the
determination of custody in a divorce). As noted above,362 most state
guardianship laws require that minors age 14 or older be served notice of the
proceedings, with an express or implied right to attend, and grant older
minors the right to consent or object to the appointment of a guardian, even
one who has been nominated by parent.363 The newest uniform guardianship
law expands these provisions by, among other things, lowering the age of
engagement to 12 and requiring the minor to attend the proceeding unless a
specific exception applies.364 These revisions giving more minors a greater
role in the proceedings reflect parallel reforms for adult guardianships.365
By contrast, in proceedings involving custody determinations (for
example, divorce and dependency), family courts are wary of involving
children too directly in disputes regarding their care and custody.366 This is
one reason for the prevalent use of court-appointed attorneys or guardians
ad litem in most states.367 The appropriate role of a child in adversarial
family law proceedings is unsettled and the subject of extensive debate.368
The issue is not resolved by the language in guardianship statutes, which
361

See supra notes 302-308 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 102-105 and accompanying text.
363
The states with lower ages include California and Colorado use, which uses age 12 for their
notice and consent provisions, CAL. PROB. CODE § 1510 (2014); COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-14-206 (2001),
and South Dakota sets the age at 10 for notice and appearance (but for consent the age is still 14), S.D.C.L.
§§ 29A-5-204, 208.
364
UNIF. GUARDIANSHIP, CONSERVATORSHIP, & OTHER PROT. ARRANGEMENTS ACT, prefatory
note 4, § 203(a)(1)(A). The UGCOPAA Drafting Committee lowered the age to 12 to be consistent with
the consent age in the Uniform Adoption Act (UAA). UGCOPAA Drafting Committee, Summary of
April 17-18, 2015, Meeting at 5, https://www.uniformlaws.org/HigherLogic/System/Download
DocumentFile.ashx?DocumentFileKey=fe048691-ec73-dfc0-f089-391048526e8c&forceDialog=0.
However, Vermont, the only state to adopt to adopt the UAA, set the consent age at 14. 15-A V.S.A. §
4-201. The two scenarios (guardianship and adoption) may not be analogous for these purposes. In an
adoption case, the child’s consent is a one-time question about a permanent familial relationship. By
contrast, in a guardianship, the child will receive notice and potentially be involved in the appointment
and post-appointment proceedings.
365
UNIF. GUARDIANSHIP, CONSERVATORSHIP, & OTHER PROT. ARRANGEMENTS ACT, prefatory
note 1-2.
366
Barbara A. Atwood, The Child’s Voice in Custody Litigation: An Empirical Survey and
Suggestions for Reform, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 629, 642 (2003); Janet Weinstein, And Never the Twain Shall
Meet: The Best Interests of Children and the Adversary System, 52 U. MIAMI L. REV. 79, 124 (1997).
367
Atwood, supra note 366, at 632, 636.
368
Donald N. Duquette & Julian Darwall, Child Representation in America: Progress Report from
the National Quality Improvement Center, 46 FAM. L.Q. 87, 91–94 (2012); Atwood, supra note 366, at
631; Weinstein, supra note 366, at 124.
362
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says nothing about the child’s role in matters of care or custody. A guardian
has long been understood as a fiduciary appointed by the court to replace a
parent who, traditionally, was given a legal role more like a child’s owner
than as a provider of care.369 In guardianship proceedings, this original
fiduciary relationship gives rise to roles for both the guardian and the “ward”
quite different from those either party would have in a parental rights or
dependency proceeding.
b. Does Minor Guardianship Recognize and Protect the ParentChild Relationship?
When a parent selects and nominates the potential guardian for their
child, guardianship law gives appropriate respect and deference to the
parent’s role in the child’s life, at least in the initial phase of a guardianship
proceeding. It permits a parent to make arrangements for their child if they
need an additional or perhaps substitute caregiver. Such appointment can be
made by the parent’s petition or consent, without the need for any agency's
or court's findings of unfitness. Indeed, although there is limited data, it
appears that, in most guardianships, proceedings begin with a parent’s
consent or at least with a parent voluntarily placing the child in the care of
the petitioner.370
The shortcomings of most minor guardianship laws in terms of
recognizing and protecting the parent-child relationship are more apparent
once an appointment of a guardian is made, whether with a parent’s consent
or based on a finding of a parent’s unfitness. The laws are striking for their
limited acknowledgment of the existence of the child’s parents after the time
of the initial appointment process.371 In the vast majority of minor
guardianships created today, one or both parents are alive with intact parental
rights at the time the petition is filed; legal “orphans” are exceptionally
rare. 372 A guardian is appointed when a parent is unwilling or unable to
provide adequate care for the child at the time of the petition, but the child’s
long-term need for a guardian may not be identified or even considered.
Guardianship laws’ silence on the status of parents during the period of
appointment, and the resulting ambiguity therefrom, sets the stage for
possible conflict on two crucial and related issues. One is the parent’s rights
369
See supra notes 40-52 and accompanying text. This view persists to this day in the UGCOPAA.
UNIF. GUARDIANSHIP, CONSERVATORSHIP, & OTHER PROT. ARRANGEMENTS ACT § 209(a) (“A guardian
for a minor is a fiduciary.”).
370
See Gleeson et al., supra note 6, at 307-08 (describing research findings that one pathway to
kinship care is a parent’s request that the relative assume care of the child).
371
Ann E. Ross, Stability in Child-Parent Relations: Modifying Guardianship Law, 33 STAN. L.
REV. 905, 909–10 (1981).
372
Julie M. Harcum, Terminating Guardianships and Returning Children to Parents: Pitfalls and
Possibilities, 95 ILL. B. J. 542, 543 (2007) (“It is apparent from the gaps in the statute that when legislators
passed it, they did not anticipate the high incidence of appointment of guardians for minors whose parents
are still alive.”).
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and responsibilities with respect to the child during that period; the other is
the termination of the guardianship when a parent seeks reunification.
Although a parent may still have some presence in a child’s life during
the period of a guardianship, most guardianship laws do not direct courts to
include in orders any findings or provisions addressing whether and the
extent to which a parent should have some retained rights such as for parentchild contact, authority to make decisions about a child’s medical treatment
and education, child support, and other components of parental rights and
responsibilities commonly found in family law or and child protection
orders. Rather, the default is appointment of a “full” guardianship:373 that is,
appointment as guardian provides a child’s non-parent relative with nearly
full control over the situation, not subject to the supervision of the state or a
court, or to the consent of the parent.374 The parent’s rights are thereby
implicitly superseded by the powers provided to the guardian, and a parent
may engage with their child only to the extent permitted by the guardian.
As noted in a prior section, courts have increasingly recognized and
protected parents’ fundamental rights to parent their children free from
interference from third parties.375 Such rights were rarely implicated in
traditional probate guardianships, as the parents were usually either dead or
adjudicated incompetent, presumably permanently. The increasing use of
guardianship for child protection, however, presents questions about the
extent to which a parent’s rights may be abridged in such appointments. As
they stand, the guardianship statutes say little about such rights.
This blind spot is reflected in provisions that limit the powers of a
guardian under a so-called “limited guardianship.” Since a guardian is
awarded the powers of a parent, to the extent any powers are limited, it
would seem that those not awarded to the guardian are retained by the person
who has such powers in the absence of the guardianship: the child’s parent.
However, many statutes are not framed this way. Rather, the standard
provisions about limited guardianships direct courts to fashion the order in
such a way as to help the minor develop “self-reliance,” suggesting that the
child, not the parent, would have the powers not awarded to the guardian.376
Such objective makes sense when placed in the adult guardianship
context,377 but it is out of place in a minor guardianship. Developing
373
Minor guardianship is described by the Maine Supreme Judicial Court as a “blunt instrument.”
In re Guardianship of Lantigua, 133 A.3d 252, 257 (Me. 2016).
374
Belcher, supra note 222, at 25.
375
See supra notes 175-181 and accompanying text.
376
UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 5-206(b). The UGCOPAA retains the “developing self-reliance of the
minor” objective but adds as a distinct interest to be considered by a court: “maintaining or encouraging
involvement by a minor’s parent in the minor’s life.” UNIF. GUARDIANSHIP, CONSERVATORSHIP, &
OTHER PROT. ARRANGEMENTS ACT § 206(c).
377
UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 5-311(b). The UGCOPAA does not use the term “self reliance” with
respect to adults subject to guardianship and instead reflects an overall goal of including in orders
appointing a guardian “provisions designed to ensure that the least restrictive means are used to protect
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children’s self-reliance is certainly a general societal and educational policy
goal, but most family law statutes are aimed at ensuring that there is a
suitable and responsible adult and, if necessary, the state to provide care,
education, and shelter and to serve a child’s “best interest.”378
Because a guardianship was assumed, under traditional applications of
the law, to be a permanent or at least indefinite arrangement, most statutes
lack provisions aimed at maintaining, improving, or fostering the
relationship between the child and their parents. In a guardianship
appointment, no one is responsible for supporting reunification between the
parent and child, and there is no equivalent to a family plan or other path to
reunification. As discussed above (see III.A.), reunification is a key policy
goal of federal child welfare laws and the structure and courts of dependency
proceedings are designed to facilitate reunification and determine whether it
is possible. Only after reunification efforts have failed may a state seek
termination of parental rights. Guardianship laws do not reflect this policy
goal and, because the state is not a party to the proceeding, a court has little
if any authority to order reunification or other services to be provided to the
family.379 The irony of this aspect of minor guardianship is that the family
situations that, by and large, lead to its use for child protection are less
serious than those resulting in formal state intervention. While family
reunification is a more realistic goal in guardianship cases, parents are not
provided the tools, support, or path to get there.380
The misfit between guardianship laws based on the orphan model and
their use in a private child protection context is perhaps most dramatic with
regard to a parent’s ability to terminate a guardianship and regain their
parental rights.381 For a child in a dependency case, federal law sets a
timeline for achieving “permanency”: for better or for worse, the end is
always in sight, even if the specific outcome is uncertain. There is also a
hierarchy of possible results in such a case, with reunification being the top
priority and the next being adoption. If the parent demonstrates their fitness
an individual alleged to need a guardianship or conservatorship.” UNIF. GUARDIANSHIP,
CONSERVATORSHIP, & OTHER PROT. ARRANGEMENTS ACT, prefatory note 2.
378
While some aspects of the law have evolved to give minors more authority over their lives, these
“rights” are not generally framed as having a basis in children’s liberty interests. Rather, most state laws
regarding children continue to be framed in terms of their “best interest,” including their safety, stability,
and the assurance of receiving adequate care, (much like so-called imbeciles and lunatics used to be) or
avoiding harm. See generally GUGGENHEIM, supra note 101, at 35-41. Not all states include broad policy
that grants rights to minor children to make decisions in their own lives; rather, such rights are limited to
specific circumstances such as certain health care and reproductive rights decisions. Id. at 216-22,
245-50. A child may not be emancipated absent a court order or specific circumstances. JACOBS, supra
note 54, at § 11:2 “Emancipation” (“Emancipation of a minor may be accomplished by judicial decree,
statute or by circumstance as established by common law.”).
379
Weisz & McCormick, supra note 18, at 209–10.
380
See Gleeson & Seryak, supra note 9, at 94–95 (concluding from research findings about parents
who use informal kinship care arrangements for their child that such parents care deeply for their children,
continue to provide some level of care, and should not be “written off”).
381
Id. at 214–15.
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within the timeline, the court must order that the child be returned to their
custody. This provision reflects the core recognition that, as long as it will
not result in harm, children should be with their parents. This priority in
dependency cases, is not the result of a straight “best interests” analysis.
There is no assessment here of whether the parent’s home is the best, among
a range of options, for the child; nor is there any consideration here of any
bond that the child may have formed with the foster family. Rather, the
parent-child relationship may be severed only if a parent has not and likely
cannot timely address the problems that led to the child’s removal.
In probate guardianships, by contrast, the appointment is usually
indefinite, and effectively permanent, for the minor’s entire childhood unless
and until a party brings a petition to terminate. The orientation here is the
opposite of that in a dependency case. In the orphan context, this approach
made sense; the court could assume that the appointment would continue
unless something happened to the child (adulthood, marriage, death) or to
the guardian (resignation or death).382
As used for private child protection, however, guardianship presents
courts with questions of how to assess a termination petition by a parent
based solely on a change to the parent’s situation, and specifically in terms
of their fitness and willingness to provide care for the child. Most
guardianship laws are silent on these scenarios. In the best instances, the
guardian and parent agree that the guardianship is no longer needed. While
they could file a joint petition to terminate the order, it is likely that most
families do not bother with this step. Instead, they may simply disregard the
guardianship order as the parent resumes custody and care without any role
for the court in the reunification. The guardian can stop using the
appointment order for school enrollment or other actions that require legal
authority. Alternatively, the guardian and parent may agree on some form of
informal co-parenting, again without court supervision.
If, however, the parent and guardian cannot agree whether the
appointment should terminate, the course of proceedings and outcome can
be exceptionally difficult for all involved. With no path to reunification and
little to no monitoring or supervision by the court after the appointment,383
neither the family nor the court is sufficiently equipped to assess a parent’s
demand for the return of their child.384
As discussed above, in dependency cases federal law mandates that
382
UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 5-210(a). The laws continue to permit termination of the guardian before
one of these events, such as if a person with “an interest in the welfare of the minor” can petition to
terminate the guardianship if they can prove that termination would be in the best interests of the child.
UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 5-210(b); UNIF. GUARDIANSHIP, CONSERVATORSHIP, & OTHER PROT.
ARRANGEMENTS ACT § 211(b).
383
Weisz & McCormick, supra note 18, at 214–15.
384
Harcum, supra note 372, at 543 (noting absence in Illinois guardianship law of any “statutory
standards . . . to allow for the termination of a guardianship when a parent becomes fit, willing, and able
to care for his or her child.”).
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parent-child reunification is a primary objective. States are required to
implement reunification plans; they may cease reunification efforts and
establish a permanency plan such as adoption or TPR only with a court’s
permission. In such cases, a parent’s efforts to follow their part of the plan
is often a central consideration in a court’s determination whether to
terminate parental rights. The absence of a similar approach in guardianship
cases creates considerable problems in the context of a parent’s petition for
termination of guardianship, where a court may be faced with, on the one
hand, a fit parent and, on the other, a child in safe, stable living environment
with a guardian. Without a family plan in place and no allocation of rights
and responsibilities, the court has limited evidence to consider.
In the context of guardianships for child protection, guardians who
oppose the termination of their appointments frequently base their
arguments on a “best interests” approach, emphasizing the safety and
stability they have provided to the child and the bond that has formed
through the caregiving and alleging that the child will be harmed if returned
to their parent’s care. 385 However, a parent’s contested petition to terminate
a guardianship implicates the constitutional principles outlined in the
Supreme Court’s opinion in Troxel v. Granville: a parent, unless found to be
unfit, is presumed to be making decisions in their child’s best interest.386
The story presented with a contested petition to terminate is often as
follows: (1) the parent at one time could not care for the child; (2) a guardian
was appointed—with or without the consent of the parent—and now the
child and guardian are doing well; (3) the parent claims to have addressed
the difficulty leading to the guardianship and now wishes to resume their
role as primary caregiver. If the parent petitions to terminate the
guardianship on the basis that they are fit, and the guardian disputes that
claim, the question is how, in light of the Troxel presumption, does the court
allocate the burdens?
The UPC is silent on the allocation of burdens, but some guardianship
statutes place the burden of proof that the guardianship is no longer needed
on a person petitioning to terminate a guardianship. 387 In some instances,
such allocation of burden makes sense. However, if the petitioning person is
the parent, the continuation of a guardianship over a fit parent’s objection
would be in direct contravention of the Troxel presumption. Moreover,
proving that termination of the guardianship is in the child’s “best interest”
is a difficult burden for most parents to meet, particularly where a
385
See, e.g., In re Guardianship of D.J., 682 N.W.2d 238, 245-48 (Neb. 2004); In re D.I.S., 249
P.3d 775,778–79 (Colo. 2011); In re Guardianship of Zacharia Stevens, 86 A.3d 1197, 1199–200 (Me.
2014).
386
Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000); see supra notes 175-181 and accompanying text.
387
See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 5-210 (1982); W. VA. CODE § 44–10–3(j) (2013); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 18-A, § 5-212(d) (2018) (to be replace by new law on 7/1/19; 18-C, § 5-210(6)); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 463:15 (2019).
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guardianship has been in place for a long time.388 Indeed, as noted earlier
(see Part II.C), one of the reasons a relative caregiver may seek guardianship
rather than continue with informal kinship care is to protect the arrangement
from the specter of the “returning parent.”389
Courts have not answered the burden-allocation question consistently.390
As others have examined the difficult issues that arise in these cases, I will
note the competing views here only briefly.391 Most courts decide whether
to apply the Troxel presumption on whether the guardian was appointed with
the consent of the parent or based on a prior court finding of unfitness. For
example, in In re Guardianship of Reena D., the New Hampshire Supreme
Court, following the majority line in such cases, held that, if the parent
consented to the initial appointment, they remain presumptively fit and
therefore, in seeking to resume custody, they are entitled to the Troxel
presumption that they are acting in their children’s best interests.392 The
court reasoned that the majority approach “not only satisfies constitutional
concerns, but serves important policy interests.”393 Regarding the applicable
burden of proof, it concluded: “The guardian bears the burden of proof in a
proceeding to terminate the guardianship because the fit parent’s decision to
terminate the guardianship must be accorded ‘special weight,’ and is
presumed to be in the child’s best interests.”394 In such an approach, a “best
388

Weisz & McCormick, supra note 18, at 214–15.
See supra notes 166-167 and accompanying text.
390
Compare Hartleib v. Simes, 776 N.W.2d 217, 224 (N.D. 2009) (holding that a non-parent
seeking to retain custody must demonstrate that “exceptional circumstances” exist to overcome rebuttable
presumption that custody should return to the parent and prove by a preponderance of the evidence that
it is in the child’s best interest for the guardianship to continue), with Tourison v. Pepper, 51 A.3d 470,
473-74 (Del. 2012); Boddie v. Daniels, 702 S.E.2d 172, 175 (Ga. 2010) (guardian must prove that child
will suffer physical or emotional harm if custody awarded to parent and that continuation of guardianship
will promote the child’s “welfare and happiness.”).
391
See Gupta-Kagan, Non-Exclusive Adoption, supra note 337, at 723; Leslie Barry, What
Happened to Kassandra H.: The Unsuspecting Impact on Parents, 2 WHITTIER J. CHILD & FAM. ADVOC.
19, 28–36 (2003); Harcum, supra note 372, at 555.
392
In re Guardianship of Reena D., 35 A.3d 509 (N.H. 2011). The court also noted that the majority
of courts to consider the question of whether parents who had consented to a guardianship were entitled
to the “Troxel presumption” that “fit parents act in the best interests of their children” concluded that
such presumption does apply. Id. at 512-13 (“These courts reason that a parent of a child in a
guardianship established by consent is presumptively fit and, thus, the parent’s decision to terminate the
guardianship is entitled to due regard.”) (citing cases).
393
The court quoted extensively from the analysis of one of that line of cases, the Colorado Supreme
Court’s opinion in In re D.I.S.:
An important characteristic of a guardianship by parental consent is that
parents have exercised their fundamental right to place their child in the custody
of another . . . [to] further [ ] the child's best interests. Failure to accord fit parents
a presumption in favor of their decision to terminate a guardianship established by
parental consent would penalize their initial decision to establish the guardianship
and deter parents from invoking the guardianship laws as a means to care for the
child while they address significant problems that could impair the parent-child
relationship or the child's development.
Reena D., 35 A.3d. at 513–14 (quoting In re D.I.S., 249 P.3d 775, 783 (Colo. 2011)).
394
Id. at 114 (quoting Troxel). Specifically, the guardian must demonstrate that “‘substitution or
supplementation of parental care and supervision’ is ‘necessary to provide for the essential physical and
389
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interests” determination is considered to be both separate from and
secondary to the question of parental fitness.395
As guardians are usually appointed with the consent of one or both
parents, most of the case law has developed in the context of such cases,
with the majority giving the Troxel presumption to the parents, as in Reena
D. Courts following a minority approach interpret Troxel narrowly to
conclude that a parent “who voluntarily relinquishes the care, custody and
control of his child by consenting to a guardianship also relinquishes his
entitlement to the Troxel presumption.”396 A few courts have considered the
implications of Troxel in termination petitions when the original
appointment was based on a finding of parental unfitness rather than
consent; and there is even less consensus in courts’ approaches in that
context.397
The unsettled law regarding burdens and standards for termination of
guardianship reflects a clash of models for what kind of judicial intervention
is appropriate to address a parent’s period of inability to parent. Courts are
seemingly faced with stark choices because the orphan model is reflected in
most guardianship laws.398 While the court-fashioned presumption-offitness approach is constitutionally sound, it does not sit well with many trial
judges faced with the prospect of removing a child from the custody of a
long-term caregiver.399 Given a range of situations, a court can try to fashion

safety needs of the minor’ and that terminating the guardianship will ‘adversely affect the minor’s
psychological well-being.’” Id. The court further concluded that Troxel requires courts to apply a clear
and convincing standard to such burden of proof. Id.
395
See, e.g., In re SRB-M, 201 P.3d 1115, 1120 (Wyo. 2009) (vacating order denying parent’s
petition to terminate based on best interest determination when there was no finding of unfitness); In re
D.I.S., 249 P.3d at 782–86.
396
Reena D., 35 A.3d. at 513 (citing In re Guardianship of L.V., 38 Cal. Rptr. 3d 894, 896, 902
(Cal. Ct. App. 2006); the other minority case cited in Reena was decided only a few months after Troxel
and makes no reference to the opinion). The court concluded that the majority approach “best comports
with Troxel and its New Hampshire progeny” that “parents who have not been adjudicated unfit in an
abuse/neglect or termination of parental rights proceeding are presumptively fit.” Id.; see also Matter of
Guardianship of W.L., 467 S.W.3d 129, 133 (Ark. 2015) (holding that a “guardianship is no longer
necessary once a fit parent revokes an earlier-given consent. . . . because a fit parent is presumed to be
acting in the child's best interest.”).
397
In re Guardianship of Raven G., 66 A.3d 1245, 1248–49 (N.H. 2013) (parent previously
adjudicated as unfit not entitled to Troxel presumption and must prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that the guardianship is no longer needed and that termination will not adversely affect child’s
psychological well-being); In re Guardianship of David C., 10 A.3d 684, 686 (Me. 2010) (indicating that
Troxel presumption may apply to all guardianship terminations but guardian may demonstrate unfitness
by preponderance standards). See also 14 VT. STAT. ANN. § 2632(b)(2), (c) (2014) (termination standards
based on whether guardianship appointment was consensual.).
398
Harcum, supra note 372, at 555 (“The apparent gaps in the guardianship statute [regarding
termination] create real difficulties for children who have guardians, as well as for guardians themselves,
and even for biological parents who wish to regain custody of their child.”).
399
Id. (noting that because “parents’ rights are superior” to a child’s best interests, a guardianship
termination petition brought by a fit parent could “could serve to threaten the permanency and continuity
for a child.”).
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an eleventh-hour “reunification” plan of sorts with hope that it will work,400
or it can maintain the custodial arrangement by granting the guardian status
as a parent, or it can grant the guardian some form of third-party contact
rights.401
It is far better for all concerned, but also far less common, for the court
and parties to a guardianship case to take a reunification-oriented approach
from the outset, as is done in dependency cases. Based on fact-finding in a
contested matter or inquiry of the parties to an agreement, the court could
identify the family’s specific problems and needs and create a series of
benchmarks with a timeline, if feasible. Such an orientation provides a
potential path to ending the case; and, if the parent veers off the reunification
path, then the court has more evidence and perhaps clearer options to work
with, rather than only presumptions and predictions. In other words, the key
to a sound approach to guardianship termination is a sound beginning at the
time of the appointment. Unfortunately, few guardianships laws direct courts
to follow this route. As a result, a parent who initially consented to
appointment of a guardian as a way to keep the matter within the family and
out of child welfare system may find that they cannot regain custody of their
child.402
c. Does Minor Guardianship Value the Role of Extended Family?
The very existence of minor guardianships—since its earliest origins—
reflects a recognition of the value of extended family to address a child’s
needs; and, in a contemporary guardianship proceeding, a child will likely
end up in the home of a close relative. Through nomination for a “stand-by”
guardianship or other form of consented-to guardianship, parents have an
opportunity to select a relative to care for their child, with no worry about
the relative’s ability to meet licensing standards or other requirements that
may be imposed by a public agency. The proceeding generally involves only
family members and is less complex, protracted, and formal than a
dependency case.
However, that caregiver may not be in the best position to meet a child’s
needs. As noted earlier, on the whole, kinship care providers are elderly,
poor, and generally unprepared for having a child unexpectedly put in their
care. 403 There are limited supports and financial assistance for relative
caregivers outside of the public child welfare system, which can place a
strain on the household. Minor guardianship laws can also undermine the
goal of protecting the role of extended family when the lack of guidance for
400
Harcum, supra note 372, at 555 (noting that while GALs can investigate and recommend a
specific transition services, there is “no mechanism or agency of the court set up to provide these services,
at least in the probate context”).
401
See, e.g. In re K.H., 773 S.E.2d 20, 31 (W. Va. 2015); Gupta-Kagan, supra note 166, at 75-81.
402
See Barry, supra note 391, at 40.
403
See supra notes 306Error! Bookmark not defined. and accompanying text.
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termination of the guardianship leads to intrafamilial conflict and
litigation.404
3. Using Probate Courts for Child Protection
The location of minor guardianship in probate codes has important
implications for which courts have jurisdiction over these cases. While some
states have established Unified Family Courts with comprehensive
jurisdiction and ancillary services for a range of family related matters,
including minor guardianship,405 in other states, minor guardianships are
handled primarily or exclusively in probate courts. Because the primary
focus of probate courts is estate and property matters—rather than family
and juvenile law—such courts have not generally been the sources of key
innovations and developments in disputes involving the care and custody of
children, including refining and implementing constitutional principles and
problem-solving approaches.
Most probate courts do not have child-focused caseloads, expertise in
the non-legal concerns associated with child protection, or the other features
found in most courts adjudicating dependency proceedings discussed earlier
(Part III.A.2).406 As a result, the court may be ill-equipped to meet a child’s
needs when their family is in crisis or conflict or recognize the central role
of preserving parent-child relationship and protecting parents’ liberty
interests, 407 and the handling of minor guardianship cases can fall short of
meeting the policy goals of child protection and preservation of family ties.
As a pair of commentators noted with respect to California probate and
dependency courts: “Despite adjudicating identical interests—the custodial
needs of abused, neglected and abandoned children—the two courts play by
vastly different rules.”408 Maintaining minor guardianship cases in probate
courts can also mean that there is fragmented jurisdiction over cases

404

See supra notes 381-402 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Md. R. 16-204; Barbara Babb, Maryland’s Family Divisions: Sensible Justice for
Families and Children, 72 MD. L. REV. 1124, 1127 (2013).
406
See supra notes 286-295 and accompanying text. Some state probate courts, however, have
undergone significant reform to reflect their new role in addressing the needs of children and families.
See Duques, supra note 6, at 94-95 (describing development of regional probate courts in Connecticut
devoted to hearing “children’s matters”).
407
CFS FINAL REPORT, supra note 196, at 2-3, 48-51. For example, important features to address
these cases, such as guardians ad litem, social services, court-appointed counsel, and other features that
are seen increasingly in family courts today are frequently lacking in probate courts. Smith, supra note
23, at 78-80, 86-90; Weisz & McCormick, supra note 18, at 204–205. Hardin observes that one of the
long-standing distinctions between probate and juvenile/family court guardianships is that “only the latter
involved ongoing cooperation between the court and social workers, probation officers, psychologists,
and other allied professionals.” Hardin, supra note 46, at 158. See also Hardin, supra note 46, at 164–
174 (arguing that judges overseeing child welfare cases must have a high degree of specialized expertise,
training, and knowledge of resources, and they must oversee the cases using a child-focused scheduling
system).
408
Weisz & McCormick, supra note 18, at 196.
405
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involving the care and custody of children.409 Such cases present an entirely
separate and additional set of problems when the child is the subject of
proceedings in multiple courts at once.410
While probate courts are often valued for being relatively informal,411
the process of seeking appointment as a guardian may still be daunting for a
relative caregiver, especially one who lacks the resources to retain counsel.
As I have learned from many probate judges and clerks and observed in
cases handled by our law school clinic, grandparents and other relative
caregivers often struggle with the paperwork and other filing requirements
to initial a guardianship proceeding.412 As the petitioner, the caregiver is
responsible for initiating and prosecuting the action. This can involve
complex paperwork and meeting other filing, service, notice, and
appointment requirements.413 Legal aid programs and so-called “kinship
navigators” may provide some level of assistance, but by and large, relative
caregivers must pursue this legal status on their own.414 It is likely that some
children end up in foster care only because the potential caregiver does not
have the resources to pursue guardianship.
Many of the limitations of using probate law and courts to address child
protection outlined above were raised more than 50 years ago when minor
guardianship was first explored as a tool for child welfare cases.415 While a
few states have followed some of these recommendations, in most others
this form of what is clearly “family law” remains wholly outside the
jurisdiction of the courts who oversee all other family law matters.416
409
As an example of both the fragmentation and the trade-off for families, Connecticut probate
courts judges transfer guardianship matters to juvenile courts, where they become dependency
proceedings, when there is a need for services for the family. CFS FINAL REPORT, supra note 196, at 17.
410
Ross, supra note 371, at 910 n.19 (In addition to the problems of conflicting standards,
guardianship statutes often create a conflict in jurisdiction over child custody matters). Most recently,
Vermont and Maine have taken steps to address the problem of split jurisdiction by enacting laws that
allow minor guardianship matters to proceed in courts other than probate courts. Me. P.L. 2016, ch. 460
(enacting ME. REV. STAT ANN. tit. 4, § 152(5-A) (2016)); Vt. 2013, Adj. Sess. No. 170 (enacting VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 2624 (2014)).
411
CFS FINAL REPORT, supra note 196, at 2; Duques, supra note 6, at 93–94.
412
There is a dearth of data on this evidently unmet need.
413
Some commentators have raised the question of whether relative caregivers “have, on average,
the legal, bureaucratic, and literacy skills to manage the application process.” Berrick & Hernandez,
supra note 7, at 31.
414
Berrick & Hernandez, supra note 7, at 26.
415
One of the first scholars to propose that states develop a regulated system of judicially-appointed
guardians for children in need of care by others was social work scholar Irving Weissman. Probate courts,
he found, lacked adequate administrative staff, “dignified” courtrooms, social services, and judges with
the appropriate backgrounds and knowledge to oversee child welfare cases. Guardianship proceedings,
he concluded, should not be in probate courts but in juvenile courts or other courts of general jurisdiction
regarding the welfare of children. WEISSMAN, supra note 197, at 168-79. See also Testa & Miller, supra
note 136, at 406–407; Hyatt, supra note 197, at 13-19.
416
See Hon. Robert M.A. Nadeau, Maine’s Probate Courts: The Other Family Law, 18 ME. B.J.
32, 34 (2003) (probate judge describing how “Maine’s probate courts have become family law courts.
Any Maine judge of probate today will tell you, if asked, that his or her time on the bench is primarily
consumed by custody and related family issues.”).
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IV. REFORMING MINOR GUARDIANSHIP TO BETTER SERVE CHILDREN AND
FAMILIES IN CRISIS
As we have seen, the present important role of minor guardianship in
addressing a family’s need for a legal custodian when neither parent is able
to serve as a child’s primary caregiver is the result of a complex set of
developments rather than intentional design. There are now two legal
routes—one public and one private—to secure authority for a non-parent to
care for a child in need of protection. The problems that lead families to take
either of these routes are the same: a parent’s poverty, substance use,
homelessness, incarceration, or an untreated or chronic illness. A
determining factor for whether the family ends up on the public or private
track appears to be if there is a relative—perhaps one identified by the parent
or a public agency—who has the knowledge, desire, resources, and ability
to seek the role of alternative custodian prior to any formal state
intervention.417 There are significant implications for the family if a relative
caregiver pursues appointment as a guardian: in remaining outside of the
public child welfare system, the family is subject to a statutory scheme that,
in most states, was not designed to operate in a child protection context.
The appointment of a guardian for a minor can forever transform a
family, including the adults’ ties with each other and their legal relationship
with the child. In many families, the guardian is not seeking to become the
permanent substitute parent for the child and may hope the parent will
resume their role, perhaps solely or in tandem with the guardian. In other
cases, the guardian may want to perpetuate the guardianship indefinitely and
assumes that the appointment will assign them long-term parental rights. In
either context, a guardianship appointment confers neither the expectation
nor the tools for facilitating reunification between the child and parent. And
this is the critical difference between public and private child protection.
To ensure that the core child protection policy goals developed by the
nation’s courts and legislatures are met in such cases, states must reform
their minor guardianship laws and procedures to reflect their contemporary
use.418 Accordingly, I outline in this Part some broad considerations for
417
CFS FINAL REPORT, supra note 196, at 20 (noting that “there is little difference between some
of the children in Probate Court and the children in Juvenile Court, just that Probate Court ones are lucky
to have family.”).
418
Children’s advocates have criticized the current dual track system as “depriv[ing] children of
equal justice under the law and contraven[ing] the central goal of protecting the ‘best interest of the
child.’” Weisz & McCormick, supra note 18, at 191. Some refer to private kinship care as “watered
down” foster care or a “separate, unequal, and unnecessary system for at risk families.” AECF, supra
note 158, at 13. A pair of scholars noted the “illogical and inconsistent” distinctions among the various
categories of relative caregiving for purposes of public support and services. Berrick & Hernandez, supra
note 7, at 30. They attribute these distinctions to varying “philosophies” and an “incremental approach”
to policymaking. Id. Child welfare scholars have advocated for the development of better “private law
alternatives” to the child welfare system. See Gupta-Kagan, supra note 166, at 62. One person
interviewed for the AECF study on kinship diversion observed: “Loss of control is a high price to pay”
for getting the supports and services the family needs. AECF, supra note 158, at 2. The implications for
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reform to minor guardianship laws and procedures. The reforms described
below are geared to the overarching policy goal of protecting children from
harm while valuing and preserving kinship ties to the greatest extent
possible. Minimizing the inequities for families on the private track requires
more than providing the additional supports and services that some
commentators have advocated: effective reform must address the entire
orientation of minor guardianship laws and procedures.
The foundation for such reform should be the recognition that minor
guardianship is a tool for child protection and a part of a broader child
welfare system. Two components are, therefore, crucial. First, minor
guardianship must be unanchored from its probate, orphan, and property
origins and de-linked from adult guardianship. Ideally, to ensure that the
laws and practices no longer reflect the orphan model, the laws should be
wholly removed from the probate context in terms of both codes and courts.
Specifically, to reflect their use addressing the needs of families in crisis, the
laws should be located in a state’s family law code, not the probate code;
and the cases should be heard not in courts that have primarily probate
jurisdiction but rather in specialized family courts, preferably unified family
courts.419
Second, policymakers should revise minor guardianship provisions to
address the policy goals of family law—and in particular child protection
law. Minor guardianship law must be re-oriented to protect not property but
kinship ties. It should do this by preserving the parent-child relationship
wherever possible and by putting a high priority on extended family
relationships. Applying these two components of reform means that changes
to guardianship statutes should be shaped by considerations of how the start,
the middle, and the end of the guardianship can each best serve the central
goal of preserving familial ties.
the extent of services and support for children in and out of the public child welfare system “remains an
area of controversy and complexity” because of the consequences for the families and system alike.
Goodman et al., supra note 7, at 290.
419
Other scholars have explored in detail the features and benefits of the Unified Family Court
model, which refers to a “specialized and separately administered court with jurisdiction over a wide
range of family related cases.” Mark Hardin, Child Protection Cases in a Unified Family Court, 32 FAM.
L.Q. 147, 148 (1998); see generally Barbara A. Babb, Family Courts are Here to Stay, So Let's Improve
Them, 52 FAM. CT. REV. 642 (2014); Catherine Ross, The Failure of Fragmentation: The Promise of a
System of Unified Family Courts, 32 FAM. L.Q. 3 (1998); Weisz & McCormick, supra note 18, at 217–
19. The complex nature of minor guardianships—with the difficulty, issues, emotions, and intrafamily
dynamics—make the case for UFCs well. In addition, if the family court also has jurisdiction over a wide
range of matters, the court is in a better position to consider whether a different kind of proceeding would
be more appropriate for the situation, such as whether a child protection matter could be addressed
through a parental rights or guardianship order or vice versa. Hardin, supra, at 182–83. See, e.g., In re
Custody of Lori, 827 N.E.2d 716 (Mass. 2005) (“If the court, in the course of a guardianship proceeding
determines either sua sponte or at the request of a party that the child should be placed in the custody of
the Department of Children and Families on an emergency basis, the parent, guardian, or custodian being
deprived of custody is entitled to the same evidentiary hearing, within seventy-two hours, as would be
available to a parent in a care and protection action in the Juvenile Court Department” under the
dependency law.”).

2019]

KEEPING IT IN THE FAMILY

345

Fortunately, there is already some progress being made in this area.
Some states have made revisions or major overhauls to their minor
guardianship laws to reflect these policy goals and unlink the laws from their
probate and property origins. For example, based on a task force report and
implementing a private child protection model, Vermont created ground-up
new minor guardianship statute in 2014.420
Minor guardianship laws can be effective reformed even if they remain
within a probate code. Maine, a UPC state, recently studied and made
substantial revisions to its minor guardianship law.421 In addition, in 2017
the Uniform Law Commission approved the UGCOPAA, reflecting the
ULC’s recognition, for the first time, of the predominant contemporary use
of minor guardianships for child protection. The UGCOPAA itself is an
important step toward a broad recognition of minor guardianship law as
properly part of the overall development of child protection and child
welfare laws, as well as a broader transformation of the role of courts in
adjudicating questions of children’s interests, including the question of who
is responsible for their care. If modest reforms such as these are to be
effective, policymakers must recognize minor guardianship as an essential
component of family and juvenile law and let go of the goal of maintaining
parallel provisions between the adult and minor forms of guardianship.
An appropriate model exists for all minor guardianship, namely the
subsidized kinship/permanency guardianships developed through public
child protection laws, particularly as originally envisioned by Bogart
Leashore and described earlier. 422 These appointments were developed
specifically to address a child’s needs in the child protection context, and
they provide many advantages over traditional probate-oriented
guardianships. Most notably, these appointments can provide safety and
stability for the child while preserving the parent-child relationship and the
child’s relationship with a relative caregiver.423 Specifically, such an
appointment provides the relative caregiver legal authority regarding the
child—shifting that authority from the state to the family through the
appointment—while enabling the child to maintain their identity and
relationship with one or both parents. Under this model, the guardianship
can be modified and even terminated if circumstances warrant it. It also
provides subsidies for the relative caregiver, which can be the support
needed to help the household remain stable and thrive.
As it stands, subsidized kinship/permanency guardianship remains an
420

Vt. 2013, Adj. Sess., No. 170 (enacting VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, §§ 2621–2634 (2018)).
The Maine Legislature used the 2010 UPC as the starting point. P.L. 2017, ch. 402 § A-2
(enacting ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-C, §§ 5-201–5-212 (2019)). Massachusetts is another state that
has made some reforms to its UPC based minor guardianship law. Sheriece M. Perry, Guardianship of
Minors Under the Mass Uniform Probate Code, GCP MA-CLE 8-1 (2015).
422
See supra notes 203-218 and accompanying text.
423
Gupta-Kagan, supra note 337, at 733–34.
421
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underused option. Most states reserve its use for older children and in other
contexts where adoption appears unlikely, in part out of concern that, as
compared with an adoption, it is not sufficiently “permanent.”424 However,
research has documented the significant benefits of this approach in meeting
family policy goals, including stability,425 and it should be employed far
more often in both the public and private child protection realms.426 Also, to
reduce inequities, policymakers should extend subsidies and services to
families that arrive at a guardianship arrangement without the initial
intervention of a public CPS.427
As part of a broader reform initiative, states should evaluate whether
there are revisions needed to other statutes to decrease a relative caregiver’s
need to seek appointment as guardian. As noted earlier, in many instances
relative caregivers seek such orders primarily to access health care, public
benefits, and school enrollment. In many of these situations, however, a less
extreme legal remedy could serve such needs and be a better option for the
family otherwise. For example, school residency and enrollment laws could
give authority to school districts to permit students to enroll when they are
temporarily in the home of a relative caregiver, particularly with the consent
of a parent.428 Similarly, health care access or caregiver consent laws could
authorize relative caregivers to serve as surrogate decisionmakers in some
contexts.429 Such laws have their own limitations430 but may be sufficient in
many contexts.431 A power of attorney or delegation of parental rights might
424

Testa & Miller, supra note 136, at 416–17.
Testa, supra note 237, at 521–34.
426
Clare Huntington has argued:
By providing financial support for permanent care by family members, the
state is less overtly involved in the lives of the family, increasing stability and
permanency in children’s lives, and leaves the door open to contact between
biological parents and children. This makes it more likely that a child can have
strong, stable, positive relationships with both parents and family guardians.
HUNTINGTON, supra note 15, at 129.
427
The Family First Prevention Services Act (P.L. 115-123), enacted by Congress on February 9,
2018, provides expanded opportunities for states to support kinship families. See The Family First
Prevention Act: Historic Reforms to the Child Welfare System Will Improve Outcomes for Vulnerable
Children, CHILDREN’S DEFENSE FUND (Feb. 2018), https://www.childrensdefense.org/wpcontent/uploads/2018/08/family-first-detailed-summary.pdf.
428
See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT., tit. 20-A, § 5205(2) (2017) (permitting schools to enroll a child
“residing with another person who is not the student’s parent” if it would be in the child’s best interest);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-1-102 (2019) (providing several bases on which a school may enroll a child who
is not living with a parent). Some children living with relatives may be classified as “homeless” and
eligible to enroll in the district where they live pursuant to the McKinney-Vento Homeless Assistance
Act of 1987 (Pub. L. 100-77, July 22, 1987, 101 Stat. 482, enacting 42 U.S.C. § 11301 et seq.).
429
See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT., tit. 22, §1503-A (2016).
430
John W. Ellis, Yours, Mine, Ours? Why the Texas Legislature Should Simplify Caretaker
Consent Capabilities for Minor Children and the Implications of the Addition of Chapter 34 to The Texas
Family Code, 42 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 987, 1000–19 (2010) (discussing various approaches to state
caregiver consent laws and the problems and implications of the same).
431
For example, not all education and health care providers will accept written consent as sufficient
authority to provide services. HARALAMBIE, supra note 11, at § 11:5; G ENERATIONS UNITED, State
Educations and Health Care Consent Laws, AM. BAR A SSOC. (Jan. 9, 2018),
425
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provide the necessary authority in some contexts and would ensure that a
parent’s decision-making rights and role are protected and preserved.432
Because guardianship can result in conflict between the most important
people in a child’s world, a guardianship appointment should be made only
if it is found to be truly necessary and when no less restrictive means can be
used to address the child’s needs.433
In addition to providing parents and caregivers with a range of options,
states should provide the resources to enable families to learn, assess, and
implement these options. Many families that could benefit from a
guardianship appointment or other strategies do not pursue them because
they lack the knowledge and tools to do so. Ideally, civil legal aid services
should be available to inform and advise parents and relative caregivers. In
addition, kinship navigators (who are not usually attorneys) should be
provided to inform relative caregivers about their options and how to access
services. These navigators are available in a handful of states now with the
support of federal funding.434 In some guardianship cases, a relative
caregiver and parent may not need to work with attorneys, especially if the
appointment is consensual and the court provides a mediator or other neutral
party to assist the family with developing the guardianship plan. But because
these matters can be or become more complicated, the parties should have
access to counsel, including free legal aid.
I now turn to the specific features that states’ minor guardianship laws
should include to reflect and to serve their contemporary use for child
protection. Present guardianship laws and procedure overlook the
importance of how the appointment is made, which can provide an
opportunity to set the entire proceeding on a track to stability and effective
reunification.
Guardianship laws should require courts to assess the suitability of the
petitioner before the appointment is made. In some states, a guardian must
already be a caregiver for the child or be a close relative or otherwise have
a close relationship with the child.435 Permanency guardianship laws include
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/child_law/resources/child_law_practiceonline/child_law_practice/
vol-33/june-2014/state-educational-and-health-care-consent-laws/; See e.g., W. VA. CODE § 49-11-1 to
49-11-10 (2010).
432
UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 5-105. The ULC made this an optional provision in the UGCOPAA,
because it was not a guardianship; UNIF. GUARDIANSHIP, CONSERVATORSHIP, AND OTHER PROT.
ARRANGEMENTS ACT § 128, note (“[T]he subject matter of this section is more appropriately included
in a state’s general family law statutes”).
433
In addition, as other commentators have urged, states should provide services and supports to
the family that may prevent the crisis from reaching the point where the child cannot live safely with a
parent. This means access to health care, including mental health and substance use treatment, as well as
basic economic and housing security. See supra note 276 and accompanying text.
434
Berrick & Hernandez, supra note 7, at 31 (advocating for expanded availability of kinship
navigators to improve families’ ability to pursue minor guardianship). For example, the Maine Kinship
Advisory Group released a January 2018 report to the Maine Legislature describing the needs of kinship
families in the “informal” kinship system for information and resources. (Report on file with author).
435
See supra note 73.
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similar requirements and can serve as models here.436 In addition to requiring
guardians to have a specific prior connection with the child, guardianship
laws should reflect the role that most guardians play today and include
language regarding assessment of their suitability for these duties.437
Where a parent is consenting to the guardianship, and thereby waiving
their constitutional rights, the court should ensure that such consent is fully
informed.438 Specifically, parents should understand the implications of the
guardianship for their parental rights, the process for terminating the
guardianship, including the fact that they cannot simply revoke their consent
and resume their role as parent.439 This understanding can be reflected in a
court form outlining information about the guardianship that is signed by the
consenting parent with the assistance of counsel.440 Guardians too must be
informed of their responsibilities, what the guardianship does and does not
mean, and how it may end.
Whether or not the appointment is made with the consent of the parent,
the statute should require the court to adopt a guardianship plan as a court
order. If possible, the plan should be devised with the engagement of the
guardian and parent, perhaps assisted by a guardian ad litem, child’s
attorney, or visitor. At a minimum, the court should make mediation
resources available to the family to work through the terms of a plan, which
can be presented to the court for review, modification, and approval. Court
forms can also be used to ensure that the guardianship plan addresses all
necessary components. While these tools—mediators, attorneys, guardians
ad litem, visitors etc.— involve cost, the expenditure serves as protection
against future costs. Participation in mediation and, as necessary, receiving
counseling can better enable the family members to identify solutions, as
436
Katz, supra note 202, at 1096-97. Katz notes that, because the Adoption and Safe Families Act
does not define “kinship,” states have developed their own definitions of “relative.” Some are quite broad,
including, “not only people related by blood, marriage, or adoption, but also people who have a
significant relationship with a child often referred to as ‘fictive kin,” while others are narrow. Id.
Compare, e.g., ALA. CODE § 38-12-2 (2017) (defining “relative” as is an individual who is legally related
to the child by blood, marriage, or adoption within the fourth degree of kinship”), with MD. CODE REGS.
§ 07.02.29.02 (2019) (defining “relative” to include any adult “related by blood, marriage, or adoption
within the fifth degree of consanguinity or affinity” or “who makes up the family support system,
including adults related beyond the fifth degree of consanguinity or affinity, godparents, friends of the
family, or other adults who have a strong familial bond with the child.”).
437
Maine recently added a definition to its minor guardianship law to require a court finding that
the petitioner would be “suitable” to serve as a guardian, which is defined as: “guardian can provide a
safe and appropriate residence for the minor, understands and is prepared to follow the terms of the
appointment and understands and can address the minor's needs and protect the minor from harm.” ME.
REV. STAT. tit. 18-C, § 5-102(31) (2019).
438
See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. tit. 18-C, § 5-205(6) (2019); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 2626(a) (2014).
439
This is a critical different between a guardianship and a delegation of parental rights, the latter
of which may be revoked at any time. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 190B, § 5-103(d) (2009) (“Any
delegation under this section may be revoked or amended by the appointing parent(s) or guardian(s) and
delivered to all interested persons.”).
440
In comparable situations where a person is waiving a fundamental right, they receive access to
a lawyer, court-appointed if necessary, such as when entering a guilty plea or consenting to state custody
of their child.
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they are in the best position to assess what might be helpful to address the
parenting gap. The more the parties enter into the arrangement with
knowledge, input, and buy-in, the less likely there will be conflict and
litigation—both of which are costly on several levels—down the road.
The scope of the appointment order and guardianship plan—whether
developed by agreement or after a hearing—should be limited and tailored
to the family’s specific needs, rather than being a “blunt instrument,” as one
state court describes the “full” guardianship order seen in most cases.441
Guardianship laws need to include specific provisions authorizing courts to
enter child-focused limited and tailored orders so that there is no question
about whether the court is acting within its jurisdiction.442 A conflict-free,
successful, and appropriate guardianship termination has its roots at the
beginning of the guardianship, through a reunification plan and perhaps a set
of benchmarks that reflect the specific situation and provide clear
expectations to all. As remarked by child protection scholar Martin
Guggenheim: “The key to a successful [parent-child] reunion is nurturing
the relationship between parent and child during the period they are
apart.”443
During the period of the guardianship, any level of continued
engagement with a child by a parent is a potential route to their reunification.
Parental engagement can also minimize the stigma of the guardianship for
all concerned. In certain cases, it may even make sense to appoint the parent
as a co-guardian, and the court should have the clear authority to do so.444
The prospect of a tailored order may also increase the likelihood that the
orders are entered by consent, which will minimize conflict and allow the
parties to devise a plan that best suits the situation rather than leaving it to a
court to do so based only on evidence received in an adversarial court
hearing.445 Perhaps more importantly, such measures can minimize the need
for such hearings.
To the extent that it is safe and practical, there should be clearly-defined
rights of contact between the parent and child, which can be as limited as
phone or video calls, supervised visits, or letters and small gifts. There can
be a plan for increased visitation rights once benchmarks are met. The
parties and court should also consider whether to provide other opportunities
for engagement by the parent, such as involvement in decision-making
regarding the child’s health care, education, religious upbringing, and other
441

In re Guardianship of Lantigua, 133 A.3d 252, 257 (Me. 2016).
Some probate courts that have attempted to fashion reunification plans and order services have
been found to overstep their jurisdiction. Weisz & McCormick, supra note 18, at 209 (citing In re Kaylee
J., 55 Cal. App. 4th 1425, 1433 (Ct. App. 1997)).
443
GUGGENHEIM, supra note 101, at 203.
444
See ME. REV. STAT., tit. 18-C, § 5-206(4) (2019) (“A parent may copetition and be appointed as
a coguardian of the parent's minor child if the court determines a joint appointment with a nonparent is
in the best interest of the minor and is made with the parent’s consent.”).
445
RELATIVES RAISING CHILDREN, supra note 151, at 78.
442
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key aspects of the child’s care. In some cases, it may be appropriate to allow
the parent to be consulted or at least informed as part of decision making.
Courts should also have clear authority to order the parties to engage in
services and supports, including those that can be accessed through the
public child welfare system.446
Michigan’s guardianship law provides for the entry of a limited guardian
placement plan. The law limits the contexts in which such plans can be used,
but it is a useful improvement over the typical broad letters of
guardianship.447 Maine and Vermont have enacted reforms that require
detailed orders of appointment.448 Stand-by guardianship provisions can also
serve as a useful model for how a parent can play a role in devising the
guardianship itself.449 Such appointments enable a parent to grant authority
to a non-parent for purposes of school enrollment, insurance, and health
access. The model has been criticized for being too limited in its availability
and based on an illness paradigm. A better model, critics note, would reflect
the fact that parents may have such needs even when not facing a terminal
illness.450
Guardianship laws should spell out a continued role for the court after
the initial appointment, as appropriate in each case. The court should have
the authority to monitor the guardianship plan, including the extent to which
the parent has engaged with the child and any difficulties that may have
come up between the parties in implementing the plan. The court should
ensure that the guardian is fulfilling their duties without interfering with the
parent’s ability to reunify with their child. Such monitoring can include
regular status conferences—the time frame for which can be adjusted for the
situation.451 In some cases it may be appropriate to require the guardian or a
guardian ad litem to provide written reports.452 The court can decide to revise
or suspend the reporting requirement, such as if the parent has knowingly
446
This authority would need to be coupled with the availability of a range of services that are not
tied to the child being in state custody. The Family First Prevention Services Act expands the categories
of children and families entitled to federally-supported “prevention services” so to include contexts when
the child is not in foster care. See CHILDREN’S DEFENSE FUND, supra note 427; Family First Prevention
Services Act, Pub. L. No. 115-123, § 50711. Congress described the purpose of the new act as: “The
purpose of this subtitle is to enable States to use Federal funds available under parts B and E of title IV
of the Social Security Act to provide enhanced support to children and families and prevent foster care
placements through the provision of mental health and substance abuse prevention and treatment
services, in-home parent skill-based programs, and kinship navigator services.” Id. § 50702.
447
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 700.5205 (2018).
448
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, §§ 2628-2631(2018); ME. REV. STAT., tit. 18-C, § 5-206(1) (2019).
449
McConnell, Standby Guardianships, supra note 18, at 274; supra notes 231-234 and
accompanying text.
450
Brandt, supra note 182, at 299; McConnell, Securing the Care, supra note 18, at 40-41;
McConnell, Standby Guardianships, supra note 18, at 268-73. See also Czapanskiy, supra note 172
(discussing extra-judicial consensual co-guardianships).
451
Federal law requires courts to hold judicial review hearings at least every 6 months if a child is
in state custody. 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(B) (2018).
452
See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 2629(b)(6) (2018); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 18-C, § 5-207(3)
(2019).
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and intentionally waived it or has apparently abandoned the child.
This monitoring should aid the court and the parties in assessing the
future course of the arrangement. If the parent is making progress addressing
the underlying problem—for example, substance use—then adjustments to
the order can be made, such as a progressive visitation schedule or some
other way to increase the parents’ engagement incrementally and safely. If
the parent has disappeared, the court may make modifications to the
visitation or reporting requirements as needed. In all cases, the court will
have a track record of the guardian’s and parent’s conduct and the child’s
progress and needs, all of which will aid its decision making.
Finally, a guardianship statute should facilitate the end of the
guardianship in a way that serves family law goals. The statute should have
a clear termination procedure and standard that reflects the rights and
relationships of the parties. If the parent desires to resume their role as
primary caregiver of the child, the parties should be encouraged or required
to participate in mediation to see if they can reach agreement about the future
of the guardianship appointment. They may agree to end it immediately, or
they may agree to modify the appointment to provide more of a role for the
parent, including appointing the parent as a co-guardian. They may also
decide to develop a transition plan to bring the guardianship to an end in the
near future. If the parties are unable to reach an agreement, then the court
will need to hold a hearing to evaluate the contested issues, such as the
parent’s current fitness and whether termination is in the best interest of the
child.
The questions presented by a termination petition are difficult; the court
should not see its role as limited to providing simple answers to them. Rather
than being faced with the options only of maintaining or terminating the
appointment, and regardless of whether the guardianship ends by agreement
or court findings, the court should have the authority to order a transition
plan by modifying the guardianship order for a period of time. Maine’s
guardianship statute and the UGCOPAA both include language authorizing
courts to order transitional arrangements for a child.453 Where such
arrangements are imposed over the objection of a parent who is fit to resume
custody, such orders may infringe on the parent’s rights. For that reason, they
should be defined and limited in terms of both scope and time to address
only what is essential to mitigate emotional or other potential harm to the
child in the transition.
Statutes can equip courts with a range of strategies to employ in
termination orders. Like the tailored provisions that may have been ordered
originally, such transitional arrangements can include professionally
supervised visits, individual and family counseling, or residence changes
453
UNIF. GUARDIANSHIP, CONSERVATORSHIP, & OTHER PROT. ARRANGEMENTS ACT § 211(f): ME.
REV. STAT. , tit. 18-C, § 5-211 (2017).
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that are tied to the school year, permitting the parent to have more
involvement in medical or educational decision-making, among other
measures.454 In this context as well, the court should have the authority to
enlist the assistance of a guardian ad litem to make recommendations and
facilitate the parties’ participation in the development of the plan.455
A separate but related question that can complicate a guardianship
termination disputes is whether the guardian can or should have a legallyprotected relationship to the child after the guardianship ends.456 It is a
separate question because the purpose of guardianship is to provide a nonparent the legal authority to care for a child when a parent is unable to do so;
the focus of both the appointment and termination determinations is on the
child’s need for care and the ability of a parent to provide such care. It is a
related question because a close relationship may exist prior to or develop
over the course of the guardianship, giving rise to concern for the child’s
interest in continuity of such relationship if the guardianship is terminated.
For this reason, courts struggle with termination determinations because
statutes fail to provide direction for courts about how to protect the interests
and rights of the parent, guardian, and child.
Guardianship is not designed to be a parentage determination or a route
to establishing permanent parental rights. Rather, it is a mechanism to
appoint someone as a substitute parent in order to protect a child when a
parent is unable to provide care. By contrast, states’ parentage and custody
laws address a wholly different need: preserving a relationship between a
child and adult that is in the child’s best interest. While it is preferable that
the guardian have some prior connection with the child, the approval of the
appointment is not based on the extent of any existing caregiving
relationship. Thus, a guardianship should not remain in place solely to
maintain a relationship created by the caregiving role. A guardianship statute
that enabled a court to grant parental status or long-term custody or visitation
rights to a guardian would be something other than a child protection
measure: it would be a law that focuses on a non-parent’s relationship with
a child. If a guardianship appointment provides an explicit path to parental
rights for the guardian, parents may be reluctant from the outset to allow a
relative caregiver to be appointed or they may seek termination of an
appointment simply to prevent such result. For these reasons, among others,
guardianship statutes should not authorize a court to grant parental or other
rights to guardians.
There is no simple solution to the complex question of the legal status
of guardians when a guardianship is no longer needed. I do see two
alternatives that may provide a more coherent approach when a fit parent
454

In re Guardianship of Stevens, 86 A.3d 1197, 1204 (Me. 2014) (citing 18–A M.R.S. § 5–213).
Id.
456
See, e.g., In re K.H., 773 S.E.2d 20, 32 (W. Va. 2015) (guardian as psychological parent);
Hartleib v. Simes, 776 N.W.2d at 229 (N.D. 2009) (awarding grandparent visitation rights).
455
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seeks to resume care and the child and guardian have a close relationship.
First, as noted above, courts can use transitional arrangements specifically
to address the potential impact on children of returning to their parent’s
care. 457 These can include engagement of the child’s counselor as well as a
graduated schedule of contact. This can provide a child-focused approach to
the transition that is based on the child’s actual situation rather than on
abstract speculation about the potential harm that could result from a change
in custody after a long period of time.
The other way to address the question is for states to enact clear laws
regarding non-parent custody, visitation rights, or non-exclusive adoption458
that are expressly based on the relationship between children and nonparents.459 As extensively discussed and persuasively advocated by many
scholars, state laws can recognize and protect the relationship between
children and adult caregivers.460 Such laws, however, cannot and should not
replace minor guardianship, which has a specific and unique role in family
law. Comprehensive and clear custody laws can eliminate a caregiver’s
attempted use of guardianships solely to create a permanent legal
relationship with a child. Ideally, guardianship and custody laws are part of
a state’s comprehensive family law statutory scheme, with one court having
457
See, e.g., In re SRB-M, 201 P.3d 1115, 1121 (Wyo. 2009) (“[T]he district court retains the
discretion to enter a reasonable order to assist the child in the transition from DM’s home to Mother's
home.”); Gupta-Kagan, supra note 166, at 100 (noting that where the returning parent is no longer unfit
a court can order contact with the former caregiver to minimize harm to the child from the transition).
458
This would grant the caregiver a role as parent, thereby recognizing their role, while also
preserving the parent’s rights rather than terminating them as in most adoptions. It would provide stability
to the arrangement while allowing the adults to share in the care of the child, even if the original parent’s
role remains very modest. See generally Gupta-Kagan, supra note 337, at 735–63; see also Coupet, supra
note 129, at 651-56; Gupta-Kagan, supra note 166, at 51-57.
459
Some scholars—addressing third-party custody laws generally—have advocated for use of a
“harm” standard to preserve a child’s relationship with a non-parent even in the absence of parental
unfitness, but it requirements something more than a showing of best interests. Gupta-Kagan, supra note
166, at 94–100. And even if the parent resumes custody of the child in such a case, a recognition of the
relationship may permit the former caregiver to have some visitation rights. Id.
460
Sacha Coupet has advocated for the development of “Kinship Adoption,” which is very similar
to permanency guardianship but outside of the child protection context and with no requirement of a prior
adjudication of unfitness. Coupet, supra note 129, at 651–53. It is an adoption that does not require
termination of parental rights, and the parents would have residual rights while caregiver would have
formal legal authority of a parent as well, so it resembles de facto parent as well. Elizabeth Barker Brandt
has advocated for the adoption of “de facto custodian” statutes, which would provide a route to legal
authority for relative caregivers without requiring a finding of unfitness but based on the existing
relationship between the caregiver and the child. Brandt, supra note 182, at 312–13. All of these models
would have high threshold standing requirements—including proof by clear and convincing evidence—
in recognition that litigation in itself can represent a significant intrusion into the parent’s constitutional
rights. Id. at 312; Gupta-Kagan, supra note 166, at 108-09. This can be structured in a way that moves
beyond the conjugal-dyad model to recognize and preserve relationships based on the actual history
rather than the status of the individuals involved with respect to each other and the child at the center.
See Coupet, supra note 129, at 645–55 (advocating for expanded definition of “parent” to include
caregivers outside of the conjugal-dyad context); Gupta-Kagan, supra note 166, at 86–113 (advocating
for relationship-based third-party custody statutes); HUNTINGTON, supra note 15, at 87 (noting how
family law’s “rule of two” limits recognition of other caregivers’ relationships with a child); Murray,
supra note 35, at 442-54.
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jurisdiction over all such matters.
As a final note, the focus of this article is minor guardianship as child
protection, but, to serve those policy goals, extensive reforms are needed to
the public child welfare system as well. I have addressed here only the most
crucial problems in minor guardianship and suggested only the most
essential revisions. Courts, advocates, and policymakers should use the
lessons of the minor guardianship as child protection to consider a broader
set of problems and undertake a broader set of reforms as well. As Clare
Huntington has observed: “[W]hat the state calls ‘preventive services’—
counseling, substance abuse treatment, and so on—are offered only after the
family has come to the attention of the authorities and it is deemed to be at
risk of abuse and neglect. Often, this is too little, too late.”461 States need to
provide families at risk with ongoing prevention services that actually do in
fact preserve families, reducing the need for any child protection measures.
When a child cannot remain in their parent’s care, state CPS agencies
should look to relatives as a potential resource. But to avoid the inequities
resulting from most “kinship diversion” practices, public CPS agencies need
to reframe kinship care not as diversion (away) but as part of a holistic
strategy, and minor guardianship can play an appropriate role in that, if the
above reforms are made. 462 Child welfare agencies should also make more
use of and reduce the barriers to kinship placement, guardianship, and
nonexclusive adoption for those instances when they do take a child into
custody. Most importantly, as many other scholars have urged, policymakers
should examine and address the underlying causes of family crises—
particularly economic, racial, and gender inequality—so that there is less of
a need for invasive child protection measures, whether public or private.463
V. CONCLUSION
Guardianship as a form of child protection is, in important respects,
invisible; there is limited data about its prevalence and the families
involved.464 Because both federal and state laws have extensive data
collection requirements for public agencies, we have much more
information about permanency guardianship, kinship placement, and, to a
461
HUNTINGTON, supra note 15, at 94. As she points out, this lack of adequate services earlier leads
to more drastic intervention later “because the family has fallen apart to such a great degree.” Id. at 94.
462
For example, the Annie E. Casey Foundation’s 2013 Report on Kinship Diversion urged public
child welfare agencies to develop models for “supported diversion,” which would include risk
assessment, services, permanency planning. AECF, supra note 158, at 12–14. One other feature the report
encourages to help the child and relative caregiver move out of “legal limbo” by obtaining guardianship
or an equivalent form of custody, to ensure that the caregiver can enroll the child in school, obtain
healthcare, and make day to day decisions on behalf of the child. Id. at 12.
463
See supra note 276 and accompanying text.
464
Maine’s probate courts are not centralized and therefore a study of the use of minor
guardianships required a county by county examination of filings to identify the numbers. Smith, supra
note 23, at 79.
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limited extent, kinship diversion. While we do have some information about
the history and use of minor guardianship from a range of sources, none of
it is grounded in empirical research.
As noted at the start of this article, minor guardianship is itself a bit of
an orphan in terms of scholarly research. Scholars, advocates, and service
providers have described their observations and experiences with minor
guardianship,465 and practices—or, more specifically, controversies—
relating to its use are reflected in reported court opinions. Media reports
about relative caregivers frequently mention it in passing.
But, contrasted with the families involved with public child welfare
system, we know little about families’ attempts to use guardianship to
manage a situation without public intervention. Because minor guardianship
is private, we don’t know the extent of this phenomenon—its patterns,
trends, and demographics—how it reflects the needs of children and families
today. We do not know how many families pursue minor guardianship, or
the reasons they choose do so, or the consequences of their choice. We also
need to understand why some relative caregivers never seek legal authority
regarding the child in their care. For example, is it because they are sharing
some degree of co-parenting with a parent, who can ensure that the child is
enrolled and has access to medical and other services, because the parent
will not consent, or because the caregivers lack access to information and
assistance needed to pursue guardianship?
The implications of this invisibility are significant. The reforms outlined
in Part IV will be most effective if they reflect the reality on the ground. One
of the aims of this Article is to demonstrate that minor guardianship is an
increasingly important social and legal trend, but it is also a story that needs
closer examination. Far more research is needed to uncover the prevalence,
causes, and outcomes for the guardianship choices families make today. In
particular, without closer understanding of the short and long-term outcomes
for families, we have no way of knowing how many parents and children
have been unable to reunite, to any degree, because the guardianship process
has failed to provide a path to such result. Data reflects the thousands of
children in kinship care; we do not know how many of those could be with
their parents but for the fact that their family pursued a route that did not
facilitate a return to their parent’s care. 466 Without question, there are
465
For example, both Maine and Vermont have received conducted reviews of the use of minor
guardianship in the respective states but the reports were not based on a data compilation and analysis.
ACT 56 MINOR GUARDIANSHIP COMM., supra note 190; ME. FAMILY LAW ADVISORY COMM’N, REPORT
ON MAINE PROBATE CODE PARENTAL RIGHTS PROVISIONS TO THE MAINE LEGISLATURE JOINT
STANDING COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY PURSUANT TO RESOLVE 2016, C. 73, SECTION 3 (2017) (report on
file with author). I was involved with the Maine Family Law Advisory Commission’s review of minor
guardianship. The findings in that report were based primarily on case law and interviews with dozens
of stakeholders, including state and probate judges, attorneys, guardians ad litem, and relative caregivers.
466
See, e.g., Deanna Hackey, This Photo of a Mom Overdosing As Her Baby’s in the Back Seat
Saved Her Life, CNN (Oct. 31, 2017), https://www.cnn.com/2017/10/30/health/indiana-mom-overdose-
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significant practical barriers to collecting the data needed to fill these gaps
in our knowledge. I hope that empirical researchers will find a way to
undertake the research needed to enable us to better understand this trend, to
identify the lessons it has to offer, and to better meet the needs of the children
and families involved.
As described in this Article, families’ use of minor guardianship to
address a child’s need for care and safety reflects the stressors on and
inadequacies of the public child welfare system. Since the initial
development of that system, it has faced and been shaped by broader societal
problems that can lead to instability in large numbers of families. These
problems included war, migration, poverty, mass incarceration, and
widespread illnesses such as AIDS, which can overwhelm caseloads and
bring the inherent tensions in child welfare policy into sharp focus. The
opioid crisis has the potential to dwarf these earlier challenges by
comparison, and it shows few signs of abating. It has never been more
important for policymakers, service providers, scholars, and attorneys to
ensure that families and the institutions that serve them are equipped to
provide children the care they need and to provide parents the support, tools,
and compassion they need to remain in their children’s lives.

photo-trnd/index.html (describing a young mother who went from a high-profile overdose in her car to
sobriety and employment, and noting “[s]he also cares for her son, but her mom has guardianship”).

